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The study of history is not easy. it requires time, elTort, dedication and endless
patience but it is ultimately a most rewarding and fascinating activity. The
reasons are many with the more important ones relating to the search for
identity (personal. local, national and international) and the search for truth.
Cicero mote two thousand years ago, 'not to know what took place before you
were born is to remain forever a child', thus, it is only in the study of our past
that we situate ourselves in the present both as individuals and as part of local
and wider communities. Not only do we claim our identity in the past but we
look to the past to understand the present and we seek the truth in the past.
The past is uncovered through the studying, researching and miting of
history. In order to retrieve 'history' and indeed 'herstory', we rely on the
work of historians. This collection of essays results from the enthusiasm.
interest and commitment of historians.
In 1999, History Studies, challenged readers with the variety and quality
of the essays. This current volume fulfils the same task. 11 includes
contributions from historians based in educational institutions located
throughout Ireland. The scholarship of undergraduate and postgraduate
students, university faculty and post~primary teachers is represented herein.
Essays are included on a range of periods from the medieval, early modern 10
modern. on a range of themes such as incarceration, urbanisation, ideology,
religion. education, diplomacy and conflict and finally, the essays are situated
within an Irish, British, European, American and Asian contexts.
Each of these essays offers new insights and interpretations and makes a
valuable contribution to the cannon of history. I commend the collection and
congratulate the University of Limerick History Society and the journal editors
for maintaining such high production and scholarship values.
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Editorial
Building on the success of History Swdies. volume one, we are happy to
introduce this second volume of history containing the work of students from
around Ireland. The collection presents the work of both undergraduate and
postrgraduatc students on a range of topics and themes. The collection is
enriched by the inclusion ora paper read to the 'Vikings' Symposium hosted
by University of Limerick History Society in April 2000.
While the essays vary in both style and content, all portray the author's
perspective on a particular historical theme. This may sometimes lead the
reader to question the arguments and reasoning of the author. This is to be
encouraged. Indeed. in selecting these essays, we hope that readers will ~
infused with a sense of critical analysis which may prompt some to wrIte
papers for subsequent volumes, in response 10 the views stated herein. The
long-term success of History Studies rests less with the editors than with those
who dare 10 submit their views of history 10 the scrutiny of publication.
Wc wish to acknowlege the valuable support and advice given to us by
members of the history faculty at the University of Limerick and our generous
ben factors. Finally, we thank the authors. We hope that the reader will enjoy
this collection and that pleasure and knowledge can be gleaned from it.
David A. Fleming
Edward Horgan
3 I October 2000
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In hope and fear
The Victorian prison in perspective
Sean-Pol Mac Carthaigh
The sophistication or otherwise with which a society formulates a critique of
deviancy and the manner in which it proceeds to combat the challenges that
criminality pose, provides the onlooker wilh a telling insight into its calibre.
This paper charts the assumptions. prejudices and perceptions that impacted
on the area of criminal activity and the role of the prison system in Victorian
Ireland and Britain. h challenges the assumption that the Victorian prison and
the wider intellectual matrix from which it sprung was both irrational.
inhumane and essentially worthless. It hopes to illustrate the extent to which
popular and sincerely held notions about the nature and extent of criminal
behaviour made certain aspects of the penal system not only rational but
imperalive in the prevailing context. Taking as a starting point the principle
thal "the historian cannot look down, but only look around,' a central refrain
of the paper is the notion Ihat the Victorian prison was based on the belief that
punishment be accompanied by the hope of reformation. I Several works on
Ihis system have concentrated upon the punitive side of the equation. This
paper will consider the other side, emphasising Ihe notions of hope and
humanity that underpinned the work of many men within this structure. It
seeks to stress the manner in which the prison system was predicated upon the
profoundly ideological and optimistic determination that man was essentially a
perfectible creature with the active assistance of a benevolent state.2 Its true
significance will be highlighted with reference to eighteenth century penal
administration. By scrutinising the situation in Irish prisons, particularly from
1850 to 1880, and by setting the prison syslem within the wider Victorian
mentality, it is hoped that the reader will come to a just verdict on a bold
instrument of social engineering.
The development of a prison system during the nineteenth century, based
upon a religious mission, a rigorous labour regime, an educational programme
embracing industrial training and basic literacy skills, each subsumed within a
.. --:'"
I U. Lee as quoted in foreword to Nicholas Manscrgh. NationDlism and independence:
selected Irish papers (Cork, 1997) p. xvii.
2 Paul O'Mahony, 'Punishing poverty and personal adversity' pp. 49-52 in Ivana 13acik
and Micheal O'Connell (OOs.). Crime and poverty in Ireland (Dublin. 1998),
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grand grade system, designed to reward those who showed signs of
improvement and encourage certain character traits. marked a seismic shift in
notions of criminal justice and the role of the state in combating social
delinquency.J Eighteenth century prison life for the most part was marked by
arbitrary cruelty, massive administrative inertia and a general air of
dilapidation. In this era of exemplary justice, prisons had no role other than as
holding centres for. or as places to house the insane. The comprehensive
review of the British criminal justice system undertaken by the Bow Street
Magistrate, Henry Fielding, in the middle of the 1750s indicates as much in a
clear manner. If Georgian society believed that prison life had anything other
than hard fare 10 offer a convict then it was decidedly unimpressive in showing
it Ihrough its prison service. For the Victorians. however, much of the changes
that swirled about their heads might have frightened and disorientated them;
there would be no return 10 exclusively repressive approaches to the crime
question. Prisons were regulated in an increasingly thorough and impressive
manner. a regime was established based around a religious ethic and the
concept of the 'perfectibility of man,' and complaints that there was not any
provision for work became a thing of the past.4 It seems clear that by the last
quarter of the nineteenth century the Victorian prison system had learned how
to avoid some of the more notorious administrative difficulties that had
characterised the earlier system. Utilitarian Victorians saw merit in
imprisoning people for years rather than executing. branding or transporting
them. Fielding posed several questions in disgust:
What good conscience then can arise from sending idle and disorderly
persons to a place wherc thcy arc neither to be corrected or employed and
where with thc conversation of many as bad. and sometimes worse than
themselvcs. they arc sure to be improved in the knowledge and confinned
in the practice ofiniquily? ~
To these. Victorians could respond with a confident rendition of the
improvements put in place in the interim. Through a strict system of
) Phi lip Pr;cstley. ''ictorian prison fives (London. '999). Sce also Clive Emsley. Crime
and sociel.v in England 1750-1900 lLondon. 1987): Scan Mc Conville. 'The Victorian
prison in Eng.land. 1865·1965' in The Oxford history ofthe prison: the practice of
punishmenJ in western society (New York.I995). p. 135: Charles Lysaght. .The history
of('rime and treatment ofoffenders sim:e {he Famine· (Thomas Da\'b Lecture. R.T.E.
Radio One. 9 February 1999).
• Andrcw Barrelt and Christopher !-Iarrison leds.). Crime and punishment in England:
a source book (London. 1999). p. 175.
s Ihid.. p. 175.
2
c!assification and separation, the adoption of prison education facilities a~Imple yet statutorily established system of prison labour, the inertia ~nd
Incoherence that marked Ihe inherited system disappeared. Such scenes as
wen: record~ at Newgate prison in the 1830s. where 'ribaldries were
lubricated With q~antities of beer:6 were rarely repeated during the next few
decades. Uncoordmated 'parnassian islands,7 of liquor and lust would not be
an ~ccurate description of the Crofton intermediate prisons which would
dommate the remaining decades of the nineteenth century.8
Central. to Victorian notions of the virtuous citizen and worthy existence
was a pasSIOnate regard for work. The glorification of industry as a virtue
resulted ~om bot~ practical and idealistic calculations. Laziness or idleness of
any sort In a .s?Clety -:vher.e the market was expanding at a bewildering pace
a~su.med ~sltlvely vlce-I~ke proportions. The middle classes accepted the
blbh.cal nOllOn ~f. every smgle task of the individual being dedicated to the
s~rvlce of. the dlvme creator. Popular sermons of the time went further than
either ~~tIOIl of in~~stry or work and insisted on classing the daily grind of
every CItizen as a dlvmely rendered mission.9
. A .cr~cial aspect of the Victorian approach to crime was the manner in
whl.ch It Invested industry with the power of redemption. The penitentiary was
des,gn~ to. be a secure place where the prisoner could reflect and seek a
c~ange t~ lifestyle. This was based on the powerful notion that idleness and
d.lsorderlme.ss ~ere. akin to ungodliness. By keeping idle hands occupied the
t1~~ ~nd mclmatlon to ~mm.it offe.nces was said to be significantly
dtmlnlshed. Solemn declaratlO~s tn relalton to the necessity of honest industry
~er~ not res:erved for the parliamentary division or the public pulpit. If the
diaries ~nd !tfe-styles of some of the most impressive Victorians are examined
then thiS same regard for work and contempt for fecklessness or casualness
emerges with an impressive regularity. The remarkable diaries of Wil1iam
Ewart Gladstone. the symbol and the outstanding example of the era that he
~t~ode, .are no exception in this regard. Possibly because of his Quaker
Oflgl~S, hiS exhortation~ to industry and an all consuming belief in the power
of faith to redeem the sinner were practised in private just as sincerely as they
~ Prie~t1cy. '';ctarian prison Iive:t, p. 34.
I Ralttek Kava~agh. 'C~al Ban~alk' in Colfectedpoems (London. 1964). p. 150.
For an WlalYSIs of the clghteenth century inheritance sec ibid p 34· G M Y clWD I . . . . . , .. oungan
.. -{an~ (cds.), English hlstorl~a/ documenl$, xii (I) 1833-74 (London, 1956).
pp..506-12, See also Joseph Starr 'Pnson reform in Ireland in the age of
;nl1ghtenment' in /listory Ireland. 2 (1995).
W.E. Houghton. The l'ictorianframe ofmind (London, 1957), pp. 242-7.
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were preached in public. 10 However. there were practical consi.derations as
well as philosophical ones. Refonn of the penal code became vnal after the
Australian colonists' refusal to accept convicts after 1840.
Bef~e examining the internal regimes of mid-nineteenth century prisons,
we must endea..'our to understand how contemporaries perceived crime and
criminals. The t.....o most crucial observations in this regard were the firm
beliefs that crime was essentially a class issue and that criminal motivations
were unrelated to economic considerations. Crime was the result of idleness.
dullness, a degenerate character and a taste for luxury.11 Darwinian idea.s of
criminal man, located largely out of the sight of his more refined super1~rs.
assumed positively monstrous proportions, the malcontent schemmg
continuously in an attempt to turn the tables upon the middle class. In an
attempt to reassert control over the lower orders. those horrific, yet fascinating
'prognathous brutes with huge jaws and tiny brains: 12 ""ere to. be allow~ no
lenience. Crime jarred uncomfortably with such profound notions as middle
class status and everlasting privilege. The overwhelmingly hostile depiction of
criminal man in the press as being almost as subhuman in form as he was in
deed, speaks eloquently for a ruling class almost at its wit's end. ll If the stakes
were as high as Lord Salisbury assumed. and if life amounted to a ·struggle
between those who have. to keep what they have. and those who have not to
get it'. then the hostility of the middle classes to the threatening and roving
crim inal is understandable. 14
For most Victorian commentators the relationship between crime and
poverty simply did not exist. Interested parties su~h ~s W.D.. Morrison, the
loquacious chaplain at Wandesworth tackled thiS Issue WIth a pungent
declaration to the effect that, 'it is not really destitution but intemperance that
10 M.R.D. F~ and Ite.G. Matthew. The Gladstone diaries. i. iv (Oxford. 1978).
11 Emslev. Crime and socieIy. pp. 56-85. Sec: also John Paul McCanhy. Cork city gaol:
"iclOri~ criminology and the Cork experience (unpublished paper. Cork. 1998). pp.
3-5. For muses of female de... iance in particular see Lucia Zedncr. Women crime and
cuslodv in I ";clarion England (Oxford 1993). pp. 11-90.
I~ L.P. Curtis. Apes and angel.f_ the Irishman in '"ielorian caricaJure (London. 1997).
p.102.
Il Barren and Ilarrison. Crime OfUJ punishment. p. 197·208.
14 Quoted in P~ter CI:U"kc. 'In a class of his own' in The Sunday Times, 12 S~ptcmber
1999; John Grigg 'More po\\cr than principle' in The Smlday Telegraph. 12 September
1999.
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leads to crime.'15 Crime ""as viewed overwhelmingly in terms of individual
failing. The principle of ultimate personal responsibility, occupied a crucial
place in the well-thumbed Victorian criminological lexicon. (fcrime was.seen
as being the result of innate and sometimes inherited character defects., then
for the prison system in its attempt at refonnation to concentrate
overnhelmingly upon the individual was neither as irrational or surprising, as
some would have maintained. If 'character consists in little acts, well and
honourably formed; daily life being the quarry from \l.hich we build it up, and
rough hew the habits which form it: 16 we can understand how emphasis upon
reforming the moral character of the individual while in prison was born out
of long standing perceptions as to the causes of deviancy, rather than an
arbitrary sense ofcruelty.
If the many and diffuse commentators on criminal activity in the
nineteenth century shared anything, it was their common belief that the scale
of both social delinquency and consequent moral degeneration in their society
was rising exponentially. In many of the more popular journals. lamentations
at the e...er·growing number of recorded violent crimes were frequent and
anxious. The criminal. it was assumed. was plotting a turning of the social and
economic tables. And ""hat was most disconcerting was the belief that he just
might succeed. Thus even a cursory glance at the depiction ofcriminal man in
many drawings as well as in a sizeable portion of the main stream literature
indicates that the convicted criminal arrived in prison on the back of a strong
current of popular hostility. Punishment and repression were the mainstream
press priorities. 17 Education and retraining were distrusted as potentially
disastrous courses of action. I' Having been told in no uncertain terms the type
of regime that the media found most congenial, where harshness was assumed
to be the most important ingredient. it is worth examining how those charged
with the daily administration of the prisons responded.
In a society where religion assumed such importance, the role of the
chaplain within the penal project was crucial. What is most significant about
these men is the extent to which in many cases, oomplex and often abstract
emphasis upon the elucidation of theological doctrine was superseded by a
IS W.D. MOl'Tisson 'Crime and ;Is.,causes' as qUOled in part in Crime andpunishmenJ.
p. 197-208. - •
16 Samuel Smiles. ·Self.help· (1859) as quoted in Ilarbara Dennis and David Skilton
(eds.). Reform and ;nle/lectU(11 debate in Vietorian BriUlitl (London. 1987). p. 52.
17 (Jarrett and Ilarrison. Crime and punishmenl. pp. 199-201.
11 II.C.G. Motthcw. Gladstone pp. 116-9. Sce also Ray Jenkins. Gladstone (London.
1995) and The chancellors (London. 1998). pp. I -Ill.
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more interventionist and personalised mission. Whereas one Catholic chaplain
concerned himsclfmainly with the 'divine mysteries', others 'took advantage
of. private intercourse with the prisoners to suggest and enforce many
practical lessons, especially in reference to their future' .19 Except when
complaining as to the, 'lamentably ignorant,20 among the flock., their language
and level of commitment is impressive in its devotion and sympathy. Evidence
is also available that these men took seriously the regulatory role that statute
conterred upon them?l There can be no doubting that many were utterly
convinced that they were the instruments ofcharity and compassion.
With all the optimism that the advancements of their age brought with
them. prison authorities placed a significant emphasis upon the role of
education in the quest for refonnation. The commitment of individuals in this
regard was decidedly impressive. George Farrelly appeared to have been a
particularly outstanding example of zealousness and humanity. Offering his
pupils at Philipstown an impressively varied curriculum and displaying a
highly developed sensitivity to the needs of the individual, his promotion of
reformation appears to have been tircless.22 The following declaration provides
an admirable insight into his pedagogic philosophy:
I take them lconvicts] individually and not in the hearing ofother prisoners
and enter fully with them into their history of their past lives and future
prospectS. I am thus better enabled to individualise them. and to shape
them tor a further course of action such as will be calculated to restore
them to the social status which they had forfeited by the violation of the
laws of God and their oountry.Z3
When Waiter Crofton declared that the greatest task confronting his
reformatory project was, 'the depressing opinion that prisoners in general hold
of their own qualifications, believing it to be impossible that they are
susceptible ofimprovement:24 it appears that he intended his schoolmasters to
take up the challenge. One teacher said that 'no prisoner capable of learning
or willing to learn should leave the prison unable to read and write at least'.25
So it appears that many of these men were not in the business of shirking the
I~ Sixth annual report ofthe director ofIrish convict prisons. /859. p. 20. (henceforth
D./.CP.).
:!O Ibid.
~I D.I.CP.. /86-1. p. 19.
~ Ibid. p. 61.
~ Ibid. p. 62.
:'.4 D./.C.P.. 1855. p. 3.
15 D.I.CP.• /86-1. p. 22.
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grand plan as laid down by the directors of the prison system. If a depressed
sense of self worth was the chief impediment to re-integration then the same
teacher who 'had several prisoners able 10 write letters to their friends outside
after receiving only six months schooling,'26 could confidently be included
amon~ the chosen few who had answered Crofton's clarion call with alacrity.
Tune ~~uld not lessen the .z~a~2~f Ihe staff of Mountjoy prison. Elderly
pflsoners, w~th b~oken down Splflts were not dismissed as being lost causes
or hardened Il1 Cflme. Due to the ministering of the head schoolmaster, their
progress under the school system, 'was a pleasing fact - only a few have left
un~?le to fI..>ad ~nd write'. Possessed of an all-consuming confidence in the
abIlity of ~ucallon to transfonn and encourage the individual, many of these
men contflbul~ in a not insignificant manner at convict self-rejuvenation.
Secular educatIOn was a suspicious concept for many. Social commentators
who put their faith in more 'traditional' remedies for criminal recalcitrance
felt sure that secular education 'so far from preventing crime is accessory to
it,.28 When Farrelly and others found a marked improvement in both the
behaviour and skills of their charges,29 one must consider such enthusiastic
co~ments as an eloqu~nl refusal to follow the path constructed by their more
excl~able contemporafles lo a system based exclusively upon repression and
pUlllshment. There emerges in these reports a willingness at all times to
a~ntuate the positive, to promote the success story, be it in the new
wlllmgness of old female prisoners to respond to the schoolmaster's
encouragement or the newly taught literacy skills of men popularly written-off
as degenerate.
However content certain commentators may have been to watch prisoners
trundle away haplessly upon the treadmill, the combined efforts of some of the
best ~en within this system, particularly teachers and chaplains, amounted to
nothlllg less. than a moral crusade, one that refused to simply consign
thousands of ll1mates to the scrap-heap of history. It seems certain that the role
that these men had cast themselves in was certainly not that of Dracobellowin~ f~r retribution and punishment as the final solution to the probre~
of the cflmlllaL They envisaged themselves rather as the moral guardians of
the men and women under their care, charged with the difficult task of
rekindling the flame of th~ir,self-confidence and dignity. One particularly
".,
26 Ibid.
17 D.l.CP.. /876. p. 16.
2lI Emsk-y. Crfme and society. p. 57.
29 D.I.C.P.. /859. p.62.
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enlightening report deals with the case of juvenile offenders at Mo~ntjoy.
Arguing for longer sentences so that his project may have enough time to
produce results. Edward McGauhran complained that;
1 have always regarded it as cruelty to cast a >'oung,person at th~ tender
agc or fillecn ... out on this world to do for himself lor g~ or eVIl. upon
his own slt:nder responsibility and without that great malnprop to a youth
"... parental control. .However one may wish to class his sentiments. they exude a baSIC concern that
cannot be denied. nor often found within the columns of many popular
newspapers. . . .
Waiter Crofton and his staff insisted in 1859 that the maJonty of convicts
within the prison system were 'members of the crimi~al class - b~lrglars.
felons and pick pockets,' those in society that pursued cnme as a vocatIOn and
after a conscious decision?1 However. despite his pessimistic view that a
significant proportion of Irish convicts emanate from the very worst sections of
the criminal world. he was determined that his system would endeavour to
improve their lives and affect a reformation. A. key test f~r pe~ologis~s at this
time was recidivism. The re-offender undermmed the Vlctonan rationale of
self-reformation. Crofton opined that:
The utmost that a good system of convict treatment can accomplish i~ ~y
good training and by other appliances. to promote the impro\'ement of. It IS
10 be hoped. the large majorilY; and by arrangement.and syste~n 10. as far
as pos~ib1c. ensure Ihe reconviction and the incarceratIon of the
remainder.H
This indicates a capacity for optimism not readily available in .the li~e~a~~re
upon these subjects available to his conH;mporaries. J?espite the m.coITIglblhty
of many if not the majority of the ConVIctS under hIS control, thiS ~tatement
indicates a determination to press ahead with at least a sustamed and
systematic effort at improvement. Commentator~ consistentl~ criticis~ .the
government for their failure to adequat~ly d~al w~th the q~estlon of cnml~al
dementia and the often-shocking conditIOns m which lunatICs were ~eld ~hl!e
in prison.33 Their repeated insistence upon th~ im.po~ance ofed~catlon wlthm
the prison and their complaints about defiCienCies tn the partlcul.ar ~~Id of
female instruction belie a passionate belief in not only the deslrablllty of
.lO DJCP.. 1859. p. 29.
31 lbid.. p. 12.
J2 Ibid.. p.13. I
3l Ibid.. pp. 57-60. Sce also Forty-third report ofthe inspeclOrs-general Oil the genera
state ofthe prisons of Ire/and. pp. xxv-xxviii.
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reformation but in the possibility of achieving such results within a strictly
controlled environment. 34 Their praise for the progress of many of the inmates
under their supervision was a profoundly ideological position. As previously
noted, the belief in the feasibility of affecting reform was by no means an issue
of consensus within the confines of the Victorian intellectual world and the
results of their work may be viewed as robust. if oblique repudiations of more
pessimistic lines of thought.
Many commentators have seen fit to class this particular system, and more
particularly the internal regimes within these prisons, as being rigid and
mechanical in its ruthlessness.33 Yet to dismiss this system as incapable of
flexibility, humanity or capacity to take a total view of any given situation
seems inadequately absolutist.J6 Perhaps one of the most striking examples of
the Victorian prison system's capacity to respond to particular problems and to
incorporate new structures into old ones is the evolution of charitable
institutions.37 First mooted by its directors in Ireland as a cheap and efficient
manner of promoting the reformation of female offenders, the discourse
surrounding this particular venture contains evidence of the extent to which
Victorian penal theorists had the capacity to place their own situation within a
comparative context. It was based on a seemingly successful continental model
of a secure environment outside of the immediate jurisdiction of penal
administrators. Recognising the powerful social stigma attached to all inmates
of convict prisons, female offenders were particularly vulnerable upon release,
being 'totally deprived of any honest means of obtaining a livelihood' .38 The
importance of the refuge sprung out of the recognition that 'great difficulties
present themselves in the final disposal offemale eonvicts,.J9
Promoting re-integration appears to have been the decisive priority in the
Victorian mentality. In seeking to strike a delicate balance between the various
groups clamouring for attention within the criminological sphere, the impulse
at least ofthe Croftonites seems clear. The refuge was envisaged as a place:
J4 DJC.P.. /856. p. 22. See also 7hirty-eight report ofinspectors-general on the
general state ofthe prisons in Ire/and. 1860. pp. 219-48.
JS Freida Kelly. A history of KilltlfJitlham gaol: the dismal house ofnI/le ease (Dublin.
1988). p. 12. .....,.
J6 Elizabeth Cunnlngham. The statu; ofcriminality in County Cork during the Famine
years. 18-15-51. (M.A.thesis. N.U.L Cork. 1997).
37 V.I.C.P., 1855. p. 9.
38 lbid.. p. 7.
39 Ibid.
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so managed as 10 produce relOrmation of the inmates and al the same lime
at1o..d to socicty such assurances of that reformation as \~ill be receivcd
\~ilh confidence hy those \~ho arc likel) to gi\'e them the means of earning
Iheir hread ") honcst industl) .~O
The refuges amount to an imaginative attempt by the authorities to co-opt the
middle classes into the rehabilitative schema by devising structures that might
gain their confidence in the groups that would emerge from the prison. The
key notions of industry, regular labour and the individualisation of the
offender, found pride of place within the refuge experiment. Armed with a
clean moral slate, the female offender was to emerge from these private
charitable institutions content in the knowledge that she was now possessed of
recommendations which would then be considered satisfactory to obtain her
employment. In spitc of the inadequacies of these institutions and their almost
monastic atmosphere, they amounted to a considerable attempt by the
Victorian reformers to counter the social exclusion ofex·prisoners.
The hard labour that took place in many prisons in both Ireland and
England was itself part of the grade system that lay at the heart of this
structure. Generally unproductive and wearing work, such as working the
crank. tread-wheel or picking oakum in the solitary cell, werc reserved for the
opening portion of the sentence, designed to be the most penal.~l Through
adequate displays of industry, docility and a willingness to submit to the rules
of the prison, the convict found that opportunities for better and more
satisfying work were opened up. Only through adopting the mantle of model
citizens. by becoming 'stcady, sober and industrious members of society, a
credit to themselves and a pattern to others.,.~~ could making boots be replaced
by more attractive trades. such as weaving, mat-making, tailoring or
carpentry.~} At Mountjoy under Crofton, prisoners felt the full rigour of his
system. Silence, solitude and sewing became the orders of the day. Nine
months later. acceptable behaviour assumed. more ambitious trades were
taught at one of the intermediate prisons where morality classes wcnt hand-in-
hand with mortar work. By placing the enervating next to the rewarding,
Wandcsworth Scrubs' df..-puty governor found that this, 'supplies that spur or
010 Ibid.. p. 8.~I Evidence 10 supporllhis point can he loond in the various reports of Mountjoy's
sUiXCssive governors in the Reports ofIhe IJ IC/'. for 1855. 1859. 1864. 1877.
42 D.l.C.I'.. 1876. p. 17.
U For a sample of the lmdcs taught at Cork city prison see Annual reporl oflhe
illSpeClor.v.gcneral into the slale ofthe prisons ofIreland. 1864. p. 299. See also
111irly-eight anmwf reporl ofthe inspectors-general. 1879. p.82.
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stimulus to continuous effort of the highest kind; where the majority of his
convicts, 'are satisfied to wait patiently on, until by uniform submission and
the steady performance of the heavier toil, they gain their reward and are put
to more agreeable ifnot really easier work'.« He quotes with satisfaction the
graduation of many convicts from the lowest form of work to the skilled labour
division, where industry and selfreliancc supposedly mingled gleefully with a
new found obedience and sense of pride. The basic equation model that this
paper has insisted upon is handsomely in evidence at this particular point,
where the principle of fear lies in the ever present emphasis upon discipline
and the danger ofdemotion to the 'clay', with the element of hope residing in
the ability of the industrious prisoner through self-discipline to raise his
standard of living by graduating to 'carrying the hod'.o This project may be
interpreted, at least in this example, not as an attempt to 'grind rogues honest'
through a punishing labour schedule but, as an attempt to equip the many with
the skills so vital in an industrial age.
More humane considerations did intrude upon the calculations of penal
theorists at this time. Many of the most impressive institutions and
administrators shared a variety of virtues. An ability to take a total view ofany
given situation, devising structures capable of harnessing the energy of the
philanthropic and idealistic and a capacity to place any situation in a
comparative perspective have all been isolated by some commentators. The
Victorian prison system, as described, may be said to fulfil all three conditions.
The legislative regulations that endeavoured 10 ensure a basic level of decency
amongst its staff along with the important regulatory roles given to the
chaplains and medical officers were decisive, if unSpeclacular, improvements
upon eighteenth century practice.% An examinatioo of the practice in prisons
at this time reveals that the Victorians displayed a passionate insistence upon
moving away from the inheritance of their precursors.
The penitentiary experiment was just that, an experiment. The grade
system that so personified the Victorian belief in the ability of man to reform
himself with the active assistance of the state was very compatible with the
beliefs of a society soaked in the rhetoric of self-help. While some may
consider the idea or forcing the 'deviants' of society through the hoops of
discjplinarians to be a restr~d view of humanity, the reports examined by
;
.;4 DJ.CP.. 1876. p. 600.
4S Ibid.. P 600.
016 An ActIo consolidate and amend the laws relating 10 priSOfLv. 1865 (28 and 29
Victoria).
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this author displayed a passion for effecting reformation in the subject. by
using the grade system as a stimulus to all the traits that the society felt were
so vital. This was by no means a uniquely Victorian practice.
47
'Grinding
rogues honest'. did indeed appeal to a certain class of administrator. But the
Wormwood Scrubs Report indicated others were convinced that they were
actively helping in the creation of model Victorians and took pride in the
newly taught skills of their charges. These officers mayor may not have been
committed Aristotelians. But the sentiments expressed in many of the reports
considered here are eminently in tune with the great philosopher's belief that
.those who are capable of recovery are entitled to our help'. While structures
may do little to subvert thoroughly injurious intentions, they can, as this
system showed, galvanise the genuine compassion of the few while
simultaneously limiting the input of the lllore pessimistic.
The achievement of the Victorian prison system in providing for the basic
education and training of prisoners appears all the more impressive when il is
set within the context of popular impulses. After all, prison officials were
public officials and amenable to political pressure. Powerful sections of the
press articulating middle class angst and harassment looked to the prison to
punish. Through the provision of the grade system. retraining opportunities
and projects such as the refuge, prison officials refused to bow to such
pressure. The most significant aspect of the Victorian achievement was its
ability to consistently cater for different priorities. be they hostile or more
generous, by trying to become all things to all men. The basic equation after
all contains two sides. hope and fear. But the fact that they even provided in a
substantial manner for the hope dynamic, was itself of huge significance given
the level of popular hostility surrounding them. As this paper has
demonstrated there was a significant proportion of people within this system
that were possessed of these attributes and who were not slow in using them to
help their fellows regain a sense of dignity as they walked the risky road of
reformation. That they did so in the circumstances detailed above should only
add to our admiration at the magnificence of their achievement. 4S
47 For an analysis of the slate of European criminological pral".1icc and penal
administration at Ihis time Sl".'C Michd Foucault. Discipline and punishment: Ihe birlh
of/he prison tNew York. 1979). pp. 231-57. Cli've Emsley. 'The origins of the modem
policc' in {-/islory Today. (49) 4 (1999) pp. 8-14.
4ll Diarmuid 0 Giollain..All bcaloideas agus an st[lit' in Bea/oideos t 19&9). pp. 151-
63. For an analysis ora particular prison and the wider Victorian context see an
interview the author gave to Radio na Gadtachta -Priosun Chathair Choreal' on 0
Ihigh go ligh. first broadcast 1 July 1999.
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Kingdom, emporium and town
The impact ofViking Dublin
Howard B. Clarke
In recent years the precise location and nature of Viking Dublin have been
much debated. [t is no~ generally accepted that there was a longphort phase
fr?m 841 to 902: a penod of enforced exile from 902 to 917, and thereafter a
dun phase. Havmg become the focus of a Scandinavian kingdom in 853
Dublin began to los: its poli!ical independence c. 980 and was reduced to th~
status of an under-kmgdom m 1052. By the mid eleventh century Dublin was
und.oubtedly an urban place, an international trading centre with some of the
attnb.utes of an. unchartered town. So much is reasonably certain. What
rema~ns uncertam. apart from matters of topography, is the stages by which
~ubhn became 3.n u~ban .place and the chronology of that process. Any
Judge.~ent of thiS kmd. IS inescapably related to notions about, if not
defitllt~~ns o.f, what constItuted a town in an early medieval European context
In addition, m so far as the origins of most towns were evolutionary by nature'
we have t? make allowance for and to develop a vocabulary for th;
transformation of non-urban. or protcrurban sites into urban ones. These
~atte.rs are too complex to diSCUSS here in detail, but a forewarning of this
kmd IS not out of place.
Anyone w.ho is familiar with the documentary sources will be aware that
~ords .alone. Will not suffice. In the early Middle Ages scribes, whether writing
m La~m or III vernacular languages, were notoriously inconsistent in their use
of epithets to describe towns and other types of human settlement. For this
reason, as well as the general lack ofevidence about most places in this period
(~D 400~ I000), a q~ite different approach has been tried. This is to draw up a
h~t o.f urban attnbutes that can be identified archaeologically and/or
h.lst~ncally. Such a. 'bundle o.f criteria" might include a permanent and
slgmficant non-agrarian populatIon, regular craftworking and trading activity
one o~ more market spaces, a dense ne~work of streets and laneways, ~
defenSible enclosure, and so on. Some time ago, a list of this kind was
produc~ ~y J. Bradley and_ t~is remains broadly applicable to town sites in
Irctand. SlIlce then a much n,rrower view has been adopted by one writer
. .
\~ohn .Bradley. 'Planned An.glo-~onnan towns in Ireland' in l-tB. C1arke and Anngret
Slmms (ccL). The cumparallve hlS/ory o/urban origins in non-Roman Europe: Ireland.
Wales. Denmark Germany. Poland and Russiafrom /he ninth fO the thineenth century
(2 paris. Oxtord. 1985). ii. p. 420.
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elevating the single criterion of the house plot or yard to a position of being
"central to the idea of urbanisation' 2 Apart trom the difficulty that house plots
or yards were a standard feature of rural settlements in many parts of medieval
Europe, it seems undesirable to predicate the concept of urbanisation on the
primacy of only one attribute of what everybody agrees is a complex organism.
In particular it is unhelpful to select a criterion that is scarcely documented at
all in northern Europe prior to the twelfth century.
We ought also to consider brieny the terms 'Viking' and 'Viking Age'.
'Viking' can be as misleading as it has become universal. Old Norse vikingr
appears to have signified originally someone from V(ken in southern Norway.
In a land of innumerable inlets from the open sea. this was the inlet in the
sense of the big one whose Iow-lying shores constituted the natural
geographical focal point of that exceedingly mountainous country. Derivatives
from vikingr may have been used by Frisians and by Anglo-Saxons to refer to
traders from this district. But during the Viking period, when Scandinavian
piracy became more extensive than before, the word acquired a more
generalised meaning of ·sea-raider'.] The era of these sea-raiders (Vikings)
has been variously dcfined by Scandinavian and by non-Scandinavian
scholars, representing in particular the academic disciplines of archaeology,
history and the history of art. It is important to remember that, as a cultural
label, "Viking Age' and its analogues would have mcant nothing to people
living at that time. Like the term 'Middle Ages' itself: it ;s an
historiographical constrllct.
A commonly expn...-ssed opinion is that the Viking Age extended from c.
790 to c. 1100 AD, although there are numerous variations. A recently
published chronological list of impeccable vintage starts with the foundation of
Ribe in western Jutland c. 705 and ends with the elevation of Lund (then also
in Denmark) trom bishopric to archbishopric in 1104.4 The first clearly
documented raid in western Europe took place in 793 011 the island monastery
of Lindisfarne. situated directly across the North Sea from southern Norway as
~ P.I'. WaHaL"C. "Garrda and airheada: Ih..: plOllhickcns in Viking Dublin' in A.P.
Smyth (ed.). Seam:has: s/Udies in early alld medieva/lrish archaeolO?J'. history and
literature in honour of Frallds 1. Hyrne (Dublin. 20(0). p. 263.
1 Finn Ilodncho.. Who were the lirst Vikings?' in J.E. Knirk (cd.). Proceedings ofthe
lenth I"ikingcOIl1{ress. Larkollen. NorwaI'. 1985 (Oslo. 1987) pp. 43-54.
, I'etcr Sawyer (cd.). The Oxford illustrated history ofthe l"ikings (Oxford. 1997). pp.
273-81.
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~cJl as from Jutland. 5 Some archaeologists, howevcr, are now emphasising
o~~-tenn cultural developments and are projecting the true beginning of the
Vlkmg A~e much further back in the eighth century.6 At the other end ofthc
chronologlca~s~rum, histori~ns.do not normally regard the twelfth century
as part of thIS penod, but again m archaeological circles and especial! 'nIrelan~ and more loosely in Scotland, the Viking Ag~ is envisagJ ~s
extendmg from the attack on Rathlin Island in 795 down to the Anglo-Fre ch
capture of Waterford and Dublin in 1170 n
To label suc~ a long stretch of tim~ (nearly foor centuries) as 'Viking'
beg~ a lot ofquesttons and causes a lot ofdifficulties. From an historian's point
O~Vlew, the last arguably Viking event in Ireland was the second expedition of
Kmg Magnus B~rele~ of.No~ay to northern Ireland in 1102-3.7 Part of the
pr~lem of definmg thiS hlstoncal period lies in the fact that, whereas the first
raIds on north-western Europe in the 790s appear to mark the beginning of a
ne~ age, no comparable :oncentration of events can be found to mark the end.
It I~ an age that, p~overbl3l1y speaking, starts with a bang and finishes with a
wh~mper. One obvl.ous explanation for this phenomenon is widespread cultural
fuSIOn between natives and foreigners.
Accordingly we .need an ~~reed ~riodisation that is meaningful to all
~ of sch.ol.ar, w~l~e recogfllsmg regional variations. In Ireland the main
pertod of Viking raldmg, from outsidc and from inside the country extends
from ~95 to the mid tenth century. The last great expedition oot of Du'blin took
place m 951, to the Ke~ls district of present-day County Meath.' To be sure
there were som~ later ra.lds, but broadly speaking thc third quarter of the tenth
century loo~ like a ~rtod of transition from Viking to Hiberno-Norse. From
c'. 980 Dublin came mcreasin~ly u~der the control of the Irish provincial
kl~gs, many of.th~m s()-~lled hlgh-kmgs, beginning with Mael Sechnaill 11 of
Mlde and contmumg With Brian B6ruma of Munster and a whole successi
of other rulers from various parts of Ireland. In what follows, therefore, t~~
~ Th~.Ang/o-Saxon chronicle. cd. and trans. Dorothy While10ck with D.e. Douglas and
S.I. lucker (London. 1961: reprinted Westport Cr. 1986) (henceforth ASC) 36 b
sce also p. 35 sub anno 789 and nn 4. 5. p. . ut
6 For example. ~!om Myhre. 'The archaeology ofthe early Viking Age in Norwa . inI~.R. C:lark.e. !"1alre Ni Mhaonaidi,.and Raghnall 6 Floinn (cd.). Ire/alld and y
!jeandmaVla m the early l'iking Agt (Dublin. 1998). pp. 3-36.
Tm: a.nna/s ofUlsu:r (to A.D. IIJ)). part 1. texl and Irans/ation, ed. and trans. Scan
Mac Alrt m:'d Gcar6ld Mac Niocaill (Dublin. 1983) (henceforth AUj. pp. 538-9. 542-3
For the basl~ chronology ofevents this study depends on the annals of Ulster' other .
annals are CIted only for additional details '
sAU. pp. 396-7. .
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term "Viking' is used down to the third quarter of the tenth century and
'Hiberno-Norse' thereafter. The time of change coincides with the important
and lengthy reign of Amlaib Cuarim. king of Dublin from 945 to 980.
Two recent authors have attempted to delineate the Scandinavian
kingdom of Dublin on a map. with similar results. 9 This is the case despite the
fact that A.P. Smyth's key indicates Hiberno-Norse overlordship of the
territory. whereas J. Bradley's map is more concerned to emphasise actual
settlement. Drawing lines on maps is a dangerous occupation. as many a
military man has discovered to his cost. and historical reconstruction maps of
this kind can create a fdlse sense of exactitude and permanency. The medieval
boundaries of territories the size of kingdoms were often not precisely
demarcated. except where rivers were employed. Thus the medieval province
ofLeinster came. by a long process of evolution. to be defined with the help of
the Liffey and its tributary the Rye Water to the north and the lower Barrow to
the south. In between lay a more indeterminate tract of bogland. woodland and
the high ground of SIievc Bloom and Slieve Margy.IO The incident that took
place at the Liffey crossing in 770 sounds like a classic border clash and pre-
Viking Dublin was probably a border post of some kind.1\
Dublin's destiny. therefore. lay very much with Leinster belore and during
the Viking Age. and indeed far into the Hiberno-Norse period. For all of that
time. the chief native power centres of the province lay to the south-west of
Dublin. at Castlelyons (Liamain). Naas and Mullaghmast. These were the
royal residences of Ui Dunchada. Ui Faebiin and Ui Muiredaig respectively.
The provincial kingship circulated among these Ui Dunlainge septs until the
first halfofthe eleventh century. that is to say. throughout the Viking Age as
here defined and well beyond it. I! Thus the last Ui Dunchada provincial king
was deposed in 1003. the last Ui Faelain in 1018 and the last Vi Muiredaig
was killed in 1042. Despite the presence of the Scandinavian kingdom of
Dublin (except in the years ofexile 902-17). all of these sub-dynasties survived
the classic Viking Age to supply provincial rulers. As tribute-takers from the
whole province. they were probably able to limit permanent territorial
9 A. I'. Srnyth. re/lie l.einsler: lowards an hislOrical geography ofeur(v Irish
civilisalion AD 500-/6()O (Dublin. 1982). p. 149. plate ix: John Bradle)'. ·Th..:
interpretation ofScandinavian s..:ttlcmcnt in Ireland' in John Brad\cy (cd.). Selllemenl
and society in mediel'a/lreland: studies presented 10 F.X. Alarlin. o.S.A. (Kilkenny.
1988). p. 63. fig. 3:2.
\0 Srnyth. re/lic /.eimler. pp. 8-12. 141-4. plates i-iv.
II AV. pp. 224-5.
I! T.W. Moody. F.X. Martin and F.J. Uyrne (cd.). A IK'll' hisloryoflreland. \"01. 9.
(Oxford. 1984). p. 134.tablc R.
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exp~?sion by the Norsem~n, though not of course to prevent periodic raiding.
Pollttcal fortunes were mIxed: some of these provincial kings were defeated
taken hos~ge ~ kill~. by Vikings; others succeeded in defeating Vikings; stili
ot~ers .allled With Vlkmgs. But where it mattered, in the plain of Life, the UI
Dunlamge dynasty lasted as a relatively effective force down to the 10305despi~e ~i~s of weakn~s.11 It was defeated in a long-term sense not by th~
Dubl~n .Vlkmgs, but by Its southern rivals, Ui Chennselaig, who took over
Dublin Itself in 1052.14
. Whereas political relations between the Dublin Norsemen and the
Lemster dynasts were varied, those with Brega to the north and Mide to the
north-west were usually hostile. Hardly any alliances with southern Ui Neill
ru!e~ are on recor~ and for much of the tenth century there was a good deal of
raldm~ and fightmg. 's For a brief period in the 970s, Amlaib Cuanm's
authOrity may have extended north-westwards beyond a small enclave in
so~thern Brega, but his crushing defeat at Tara in 980 and subsequent
retlr~ment .to Iona would have put paid to these ambitions. 16 This situation
contmued mto the eleventh century, as when in 1005 Dublin was despoiled by
an ~rmy from southern Brega. 17 In 1013 the king of that district died after a
ses.SIO~3 of heavy drinking in Mael Sechnaill's house, suggesting that they were
allies. That same year Mael Sechnaill's raiding party was caught and
defeated
l9
by Kin~ Sitr~uc and his Leinster ally, Mael M6rda, at Orinan near
Swords. By .thls ~rlod the territory of the Dublin Norsemen had probably
expanded a httle III a northerly direction, to the Tolka and some distance
beyond towa.rds the Broad Meadow Water. In 1023 they plundered southern
~rega. and kIlled the king of Saithne, whereas six years later a member of an
mtruSlve dynasty, Mathgamain Ua Riaciin, captured and ransomed the son of
I) ~dc1 Bhreatna~h. 'Kings, th~ kingship of Leinster and the regnal poems of
Imdshenchas LQ/Ken: a reflection ofdynastic politics in Leinster. 650-1150' in Srnyth
(ed.). Seanchas. pp. 305-7. 310.
HAV. pp. 488-9.
IS I\.B. Clarke. "The bloodied eagle; the Vikings and the development of Dublin 841-
1014' in The Irish Sword. 18 (1990-2) p. 103. fig. 2. .
16 Ed.el Uhreatnach. "Authority~d supremacy in Tara and its hinterland c. 950-1200'
~~I ~Isco~ery programme reporls.·~ (Dublin. 1999). p. 8.
Chramcum Scotorum: a chronicle of Irish qffairs. from the ear/iesllimes 10 AD
1135: wilh a supplemem. containing Ihe evems from 1141 10 1150. cd. and trans.
W.M. llenncssy (London. 1866) (henceforth Chron. ScOI.). pp. 242-3.
IS AV. pp. 444-5.
19 Ibid.
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the absent Sitriuc.20 The confllsed history of southern Brega down to the
twelfth century by no means suggests firm and continuous Hiberno-Norse
control of the region.
During the Viking period as here defined, the most likely direction of
expansion for permanent settlement was towards the south-east, in the
territory of Ui Briuin Chualann. Native kings of this district are recorded in
the annals occasionally down to the early twelfth century, but they may have
tound it harder to resist pressure from Dublin, being situated in a confined
space between the mountains and the sea, to echo the title of a recent
publication.21 This may have been the original Fine Gall, the territory of the
foreigners, llrst recorded in a context north of the Liffey in 1013.
n
In support
of this argument the process of definitive conversion to Christianity offers two
kinds of evidence. One of these takes the form of the Rathdown grave-slabs,
which are now thought to represent an expression of Hiberno-Norse
ChristianityY The existence of these distinctive grave-covers ought to reflect
church building and usage, and the distribution of the survivors is an entirely
north Leinster one.24 Some of them were located in or near the main settlement
at Dublin. Another expression of this process may have been the round tower
attached to the church ofSt Michaelle Pole, as it was known in later times.z~
The other source of evidence is the early endowment of Christ Church
Cathedral, founded around the year 1030. A very corrupt record of the
acquisition of lands by the senior church. in roughly chronological order. takes
the form of an early thirteenth-century confirmation by King John.!tJ The
initial grant by King Sitriuc comprised the site of the cathedral and
Grangegorman . Next came Lambay Island and Portrane. granted by Murchad.
the Ui Chennselaig under-king lTom c.I052 to 1070. Then came Clonkeen c.
20 .IFM. ii. 804-5: AV. pp. 466-7: Bhrcmnach. 'Authority and supremacy'. pp. 11-2. 13.
:1 Peter pcarson. Hel\l'een the mounwins and Ihe sea: Dun Laoghaire-Ralhdown
('oullty (Dublin. 1998).
n The Annals of IlIisfaf/en (MS Rawlillson H5{}3). cd. and trans. Scan Mac Airt
(Dublin. 1951). pp. 182-3.
z"jI.B. Clarkc. ·Conversion. church and cathedral: thc diocese of Dublin 10 1152' in
James Kdly and Daire Kt..·ogh (cd.). History ofIhe calholic diocese of Dublin (Dublin.
2(00). pp. 36-7.
:4 lbid.. fig. 3.
15 Ihid.. figs. 4. 5.
11> Calendar ofArchbishop Aler!'s Regisrer c. 1172- /53./. cd. Charles MeNeill (Dublin.
1950). p. 28. dated 6 March 1202: Jocclyn Otway-Ruthven. 'The mediaeval church
lands of County Dublin' in lA. Watt. J.B. Morrall and F.X. Martin. O.SA (cd.).
Medieval swdies presenled to Aubr0' Gwynn.•')'.1. (Dublin. 1961) p. 60 and n. 46.
datcd c. 1203-9.
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1075 and a whole series of . I
Tully, parts ofCabinteely a~a;il~~;~r~~~onali~ns:~the twelfth century:
part of Kilgobbin Glasnevin part of Sh er pa 0 lonkeen, Ballyogan,
along with a few ~thers that c'annot be ide~~~=gh't~nd finally Drumcon.dra,
Thus most of the earl cndowm W1 any degree of certatnty.
south of the Liffey or~IY a sho~~?ftanthe cathedral chur~h of Dublin lay either
I h' . IS ce north of the river 27
n I e lIght of thts evidence the or" I .kingdom of Dublin lay in Lein~t Thlgl~a dheartland of the Scandinavian
Dunlainge sept were robabl ta er. e an s of VI Fergusa, a minor Ui
after which a c~ain :mount ~ft~tove';;lomp.letely and immediately in 841,
absorbed. Traces of a possible . t~ory ongmg to UI Briuin Chualann was
Cherrywood n-' L I' mn ·century Norse farm have been found at
, ........ ough tnstown 21 Le' r fl: .
settlement towards the west, may ha' beelX lp, 0 en Cited as evidence of
itself-where salmon negotiated thve n ~o ,:"or~ than a feature of the river
attempt by Dublin V'k' ~ natura rise m the river-bed. An early
:~i\~~:~~:~n'::a~;:E~~;~a~~,~:::::;~(\:~;:a;:)th;.,~~;,~;::;
that the Dublin Nor . e. pace-name htstorlan Llam Price suggested
In that year the VI ~:;~~~: ~~~ ~:t~~;/t~~nghold ~t ~lg~y by 1021.30
and, according to the Annals ofth F gM' fuated Sttr.IUC SII~beard there
Chualann territory were slaughter~ 'lO~ a:,ters, the foreIgners tn VI Briuin
Hiberno-Norsemen had . us, y the early eleventh century the
heartland which ~robab~absorbed the traditional Vf Briuin Chuaiann
district. The only m~~rsea:~rect n focu~ hon the .Rathmiehael and Tully
W
. name tn t e Dublm area . I
mdgale, heading south towards Wi kl 32 IS a rura one,
I h
cow.
n t e year after the batt! f Cl fpolitical manoeuvring that ledeu~ t ~nttar ,.the real victor in the military and
came to Dublin and burnt it to the°gro:n~I.C COlndt~t, M
I
act Sechnaill of Mide,
, mc u IIlg a I of the houses outside
"- Clarke. ·Conversion. church and cathed ,. I' 3
"Jh6N' ra.lg..o n cll1.·A Norse settlement in I C .•.13. no. 4 (1999). pp. 8-10. rura ounty Dubllll m Archaeology IrelaruJ,
29 AV. pp. 322-3.
;~Ii.am Price. The place-names ?!.:.County Wicklow (7 vols.. Dublin. 1945-67). v. p.
,IAV 4567"" •. pp. - ....nnala RlOghachfa tireann- an I if he K'F~ur Masters. from the earliest period to the~ar76~: ~ anmgdom oflre/aruJ by the~ Donovan: (7 ~'Ols .. DUbli~. 1851) (henceforth AFM). ii. p~. 7~8t~ns. John
Colman Ltchmgham. 'EvldenceofScandinavian I . .
I-Iannigan and William Nolan (-d) Wi" h' sett ement. In Wicklow' in Ken
.... .. IC ow IstOry and SOClel .' d"
essays on the history ofan Irish county ID br I y. IlIter Isclplillaryu m. 994). p. 131 and fig. 3.2.
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the main settlement.33 His death in 1022 created a political vacuum that would
have made northward territorial expansion possible for the Hiberno-Norsemen
of Dublin. This process may be related to the stark instance o~ d~truction in
1031 when King Sitriuc burnt a crowd of two hundred people mSlde the stone
chur~h at Ardbraccan and took into captivity a further two hundred.}! Even so.
permanent expansion seems to have been limited for a. long time to the Broad
Meadow Water. for the northern limits of the dIocese of Glendaloug~
(including that of Dublin) in 11I1 are recorded as Gr~~ge and L.ambay.J·
The Vi Chennselaig and Vi Briain over-kings of Dublm In the penoo from
1052 to 1114 (Le. down to the illness and political enfeeblement ~f
Muirchertach Va Briain) may well have been supportive ofefforts to expand In
that direction, as is suggested by Murchad's grant of ~mbay Island and
Portrane.3tJ But. to all appearances, Fine Gall north of the Llffey was long and
hard in the making. l7 .
Even if we avoid labelling vast tracts of historical time as 'Vikmg'
without qualification, we still need to remain aware of the nuances of
historical development, as far as the evidence allows. We need al~ to be
careful with other labels.. a case in point being 'urban' along With the
corresponding noun 'town'. The cultural conditioning o.f mooern ~holars
varies, of course, from one country to another, the question here bemg the
concept of town. Archaeologists in Ireland, as in Norway and sw~en, te~d
almost as an automatic reflex to associate a small number of houses sItuated m
close proximity with the phenomenon of town. A rece~t example is to be found
in the foreword to an interim report on the excavatIons at Exchange Street.
Dublin: 'The ninth century and its /ongphort era must be regarded as urban'.JB
The evidence for this belief comprises a few houses ~nd some pr?perty
divisions dated by radiocarbon 14 to the mid to late nmth century. fhese
JJ Chron. $col.. pp. 254-5 (dcfe<.1ive): AFM. 11, pp. 782-3.
.l4 AV. pp, 468-9. . ~
JS The hislOrl' of/reland by Geoffrey Keoting, 0.0.. (cd,), Davld Corn)" an~ I ..S,
Dinneen 4 v~ls .. (london, 1902-14), Hi. 306-7; John Mac Erlean, :~)l1od 01. ~{uth
I3reasail: boundaries of the dioceses of Ireland (AD 1110 or 1118) In ArchlVlUm
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houses were associated in some cases with small·scale activity involving
scattered hearths, leather-working, textiles and amber.J9
In much of Europe the basic hierarchy of settlement types extends from
single farmstead, to farm cluster (hamlet), to village (small and large), to town
(small and large), to city. The discovery of houses in clusters, or side by side
with fences or other types of boundary marker in between, should not be
assumed automatically to be evidence of a town. In medieval Europe, there
were tens of thousands of villages, containing houses in clusters or standing
side by side, separated by property divisions (fences, hedges, banks, baulks and
so on). Villages were often home to craft-workers of different kinds:
blacksmiths, carpenters, brewers, millers, spinsters, weavers and potters to cite
some obvious examples. Later on in the Middle Ages, villages might have a
weekly market and even an annual fair, yet they remained essentially villages
with a predominantly agrarian economy, They were not towns, though they
may have had some features in common with towns.
In an early medieval context there is an alternative term. borrowed from
Latin---emporium-signifYing a major trading settlement. Trading places
could take a very simple form, such as a beach market. a number of which
have been identified around the Irish Sea, as at Dalkey Island, Meols in
England and Whithom in Scotland.<IO Such market places became common in
Iceland when the Scandinavians settled there and had no urban infrastructure
of any kind. Another early type of trading place would have been located at
major river crossings, especially on political boundaries such as those
represen~ed by the lower Liffey and the lower Barrow and Suir rivers. Pre-
Viking Ath Clialh may well have been such a place, commanding as it appears
to have done several long-distance routeways across Ireland.~1 A more
developed type of trading settlement may be called an emporium or port of
trade, characterised by permanent habitation, craftworking and regular trading
activity. Such places may have had numerous houses, streets and lanes,
cemeteries, and jetties, but whether they should be regarded as towns without
qualification is a moot point. Many of them lacked the attributes of a fully
developed medieval town, such as defences and gates, clearly defined market
spaces, town law, record·keeping facilities, lax and toll collecting
J9lbid.. pp. 17-26. .....,
<10 David Griffiths. 'The coastal trading ports ofthe Irish Sea' in James Graham·
Campbcll (cd.). Viking treasurefram the North West: fhe Cuerda/e hoard in its contexf
(LiverpooL 1992). p. 64. fig. 6.1.
~l H.B. Clarkc, . Pr<Jto-lowns and towns in Ireland and Brilain in the ninth and tenth
centurics' in Clarke. Ni Mhaonaigh and 6 Floinn (cd.). Ire/and and &andinavio. pp.
346. 350 and figs. 13,1. 13.2.
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mechanisms. public buildings. a managed water supply system. recognised
places of religious worship and schools. Many of these genuinely urban
attributes are not identifiable archaeologically, while early medieval
documentary evidence is usually lacking as well.
A well-known continental model envisages a core, such as a royal palace.
a cathedral complex, an important monastery or a military garrison, with a
dependent suburbium, or more than one of these. For the longphort phase of
Dublin's history. this seems to be the best way to think about this question, as
it is also for the contemporary question of so-called 'monastic towns'. The
ship harbour or naval encampment was the core, ships being vital for re8:ular
trading and for escaping in an emergency. whilst along the banks of the LLffey
there was probably a good deal of infonnally arranged habitation of the kind
discovered at Exchange Street. Dominance by a military elite, rather than by
merchants in the later sense, is symbolised by continued reliance on raiding
monasteries from time to time down to the middle of the tenth century. On the
occasion of the 951 raid on Kells, the loot consisted of cattle. horses. gold.
silver and human captives, that is to say, traditional Viking values were alive
and well.4' Townspeople as such do not nonnally mount horses and go off 10
plunder a monastery. Down to the mid tcnth century at least, slave trading was
probably a mainstay, if not the mainstay, of Dublin's trading economy. The
greatest recorded influx of captives came in 871, when an eslim~ted two
hundred ship-loads were brought over from Scolland.4l The systematIc nature
of this trade is hinted at in 929, when a raid on Kildare was timed for St
Brigid's Day."'" The question of where captives were held prior to ransoming
or sale is pinpointed ten years later when an abbot was drowned when
swimming from Dalkey Island to the mainland 'while fleeing from the
foreigners'.4l Early medieval emporia and towns had trading activity in
common, but they were not the same kind ofscttlement.
Not long after the death of that unfortunate abbot, a new epithet is applied
by the annalists to Dublin-dun, which remained in use right down to the
third quarter of the twelfth ccntury.'i6 Bank two at wood Quay, the first
archaeologica~ly identified defensive feature there, has been dated to c. 950.47
The ~nstructlonofpennanent earth and timber defences marked an important
stage I~ town deve~opment. At Dublin, this came after a politically unstable
generatIOn under kmgs descended from the ninth-century fmar. Thus Sitriuc
Caech ha.d a~~mdoned Dublin for York in 920, as did his successor Gothfrith
te~.poraflly m 927,. while his successor Amlafb, son of Gothfrith, pursued
mlhtary adventures 10 England in 937 and again in 939." The latter's cousin
Amlalb Cuaran, made two attempts on the kingship of York before departin~
for Dublin in 952.019
lmpor:ant evidence for the chronology of true urbanisation has come from
an analYSI.s of plot eleven at Fishamble Street by an environmental
archaeologist. Here th~first house was built at level six. in the third quarter of
t~e tenth century, while property boundaries were first established at level
eight. towards the end of that century. Before the first house was constructedth~ plot was apparently used for pits, the retting of flax, the slaughtering of
~Imals, !he drying and storing of grain, and for human burials.~ None of this
highly m.lscellan~us group of activities strikes one as specifically urban. The
most .actlve. locat~on for real urbanisation was probably the waterfront along
the Llffey, IOcludmg the present~day Exchange Street area. In the early tenth
centur:r the east end became an open-plan industrial site and so remained until
~he.~ld twelfth century.5.1 Meanwhile, at the west (Fishamble Street) end. six
mdlvldu~l plots were laId out, each with a house and related buildings. A
substantial wattle path or road, dating from the middle of the tenth century~an parallel to th~ ~iffey. A single coin of King Edmund (939-46) was found
m t~e ~n~ b~lldmg level, representing slow and hesitant monetisation of
tradmg actIVIty III and around Dublin.52 The big hoards of English coins found
at Castle Street ~nd ~erburgh Street have been dated collectively to between
c. 991 and 997. J~st pnor to the launch ofthe Hiberno-Norse currency itself.D
I~ 944 Dubhn suffered one of its periodic devastations by the Irish. led by
the klOg of North Brega. According to the Annals of the Four Masters its
houses. fences, ships and all other structures were burnt and many of'the
41p.F. ~al1ace. 'Archaeology and the emergence: of Dublin as the principallown of
~eland In Bradley (cd.), Self/ement and society. pp. 130-1 and fig. 6.4.
49 AV, pp. 370-1: 37~-9, 384-7;"A.EjW. ii. 638-9 (for the events of939).
~S'."yth, ScandmaVla~. ~ork and ~blin. ii. 107-12. 156-61. 171-2.
SU)~hAn Geraghty. "'king Dublm: botanical evidencefrom Fishamb/e Street
W~bhn. 1996) pp. 3. 18-19.29-30 and figs. 2. 4. 6. 7.
, SlInpson. Direclor'sjindings. pp. 1. 30. 33.
2 Ibid.. pp. I. 30-1.
~3Michael Kenny. lecture given on 20 April 1996.
41 AV. pp. 396-7.
43 Ibid.. pp. 326-7.
44 AFM. ii. pp. 622-3.~sChrorl. Scot.. pp. 202-3; AFM. 11. 638-9: A.P. Srnyth. Scandinavian York and
Dublin: the history and archaeology of two related !'iking kingdoms (2 vols.. Dublin
and New Jersey. 1975-9: reprinted as 2 vols. in I. Dublin. 1987). ii. pp. 132-3.240-2.
'i6 ChrOtl. ScOl.• p. 206.
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inhabitants were taken away.~ In the year following thi~isaster ~ n;o~w:ir~~
was set u in Dublin. Amlaib Cuadn, who repr~ent a no~e, .
looking d~ve'opment in that he had already been king of York In 941·3 ~hl~
first attem I),SS Whilst in England he had under~onc. at least nomma
conversion ~o Christianity, a point t~a.t reele~v~fia mel1t~n~~etht~a~~i~il:S~oO~
Chronicle because of its local POhtlC3 sIg"' ~cance... . S7
emporium to town almost certainly dates ITom hiS long reIgn In OU.bh\ f
To conclude very briefly, there appear to have been two mal." p ases 0
ft 841 Onc was Viking and was charactensed by andevelopment a er . . h H"be no-
emporium specialising in the slave trade in partIcular. The ot er ~s 1 t~ cl
Norse and was characterised by urban development and a part y mone 1~
d' The Viking kingdom was territorially small, correspondmg:~a li~l~ :~~:7~~n the ancestral land of Ui Fergusa and adjacent parts of the
kingdom ofUi Briuin Chualann. Unlike in Scotland. ~here are no -d~/r•.-se~
and similar place-name el.eme~ts representing l~xte~l~e r~iaIDc:~~~i:~lO;~d
partly because the Scandmavlans were not a ow Y f h
1 U' N"'II dynasts to occupy land on this scale. The occupants 0 t esoutlern 1 cl . ' " . . th y h,d
. were probably not particularly mtcrested m larmlll~. e
emporIUm effective means of getting rich. The Hlberno-Norse~~~~~~m.an~ve~~~~IY domhinated
h
by becPOnwe~r:d I~~h in~~~~:~r~~e ~:~e~~o~~
. e Place-names t at ave ., IdeXP~~~~:~ian settlement are mostly Irish in type.S\> So~e colonl~atlOn ~u~:e been entirely peaceful. through l?n.d purch~se.a~dk.lIlt~=r~;g~~~~i~ ~~
least arguable. therefore. that the Vlklllg tcrntona. mg
almost as much ofa myth as the Viking town ofDubllll.
54 AFM. ii. pp. 652-3.
<5 Smyth. Scandinavian York and Dublin. 11. pp. 107·12.
~ ASC. p. 71. 61 363
s7Clarke. 'Proto-towns and towns'. pp. 334. ~58.. . ctJ Atl ofSeol/ish
5ll Conveniently summariscd in P.G.Il. MeNclIl and H.L. Ma ucen. as
history to 1707(Edinbur~.I?%).pp.64-70 .. lid" BoAlmqvistandDavid
59 M Oftedal "Scandmavlan place-names m rc an m
agne '. ofthe seventh I'ikillgcongress. Dublin 15-21 ~ugust.'97JGrccb"l~ (Cld,')7"6Pjroceeld2'"S'3\' Etchin"ham 'Scandinavian settlement in WIcklow. pp.(Du Ill. . pp. -, &".
127.131-2.
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Physical force or parliamentarianism?
Arthur Griffith and the rise of Sinn Fein
1905-17
lason Begley
In 1905 at the Rotunda in Dublin a new nationalist movement came into
being, known as Sinn Fein. or 'ourselves alone'. From fairly inauspicious
beginnings, this movement would go on to play a major part in the foonation
of the new Irish state. The driving force behind this new organisation was
Arthur Griffith, editor of the nationalist paper, the United Irishman. Griffith
derived his inspiration, from Hungarian nationalists like Franz Deak, who had
boycotted the Austrian parliament until self-government had been conceded to
Hungary. l Thus, the original beliefs of Sinn Fein were passive resistance,
abstention trom Westminster and a self-sufficient independent Ireland. Ideas
of separatism were only to become policy at a later date, as concepts such as
dual monarchy became increasingly unacceptable to nationalist Ireland?
However. it must be noted that Sinn Fein was more than just a 'Green
Hungarian Band', as its critics dubbed it. Griffith originally saw Sinn Fein's
role as that of a forum for nationalist debate, and the dissemination of
propaganda.' There were other early influences on the movement, and it is
necessary to examine such groups, to fully understand the importance that
Sinn Fein's foonation had.
Modem Irish nationalism derives trom two schools of eighteenth century
thought, that ofphysic:.:al force republicanism and parliamentarianism. Physical
force republicanism can be traced to the United Irishmen, led by the Protestant
Theobold Wolfe Tone and the 1798 rebellion. Later examples of proponents of
physical force included Robert Emmet in 1803, the Young Irelanders in 1848
and the Fenians in 1867. The 1916 rising was the culmination ofsuch physical
force republicanism. being the ultimate demonstration of the common
characteristic these movements shared. that is, the idea of using force of aons
to overthrow British imperial rule.4 Though only 1798 and 1916 caused the
British government concern, ~ny writings and speeches kept such insurgency
"
I F.S.L. Lyons. Ireland since the/amine (London. 1973). p. 251.
2 R.M. Ilenry. The evolution o/Sinn Fein (Dublin. 1920). p. 51.
J Lyons. Ireland since the/amine. p. 249.
• E.R. Norman. A history o/modern Ireland. (London. 1971. p. 117-8.
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to the forerront of the public mind. The Young Irelanders in particular,
produced some outstanding nationalist writers. Thomas Davis in the Nation
newspaper, The Jail Journal of John Mitchel and articles by James Fintan
Lalor in 111e Felon, gave the credo of physical violence a romantic. patriotic
appearance. ~
These physical force advocates were offset by the constitutional tradition
of Irishmen, who hoped to obtain a repeal of the Act of Union. or to a lesser
degree, Home Rule, by forming an Irish Parliamentary Party of one hundred
and three Irish MPs. to bargain with the existing parties at Westminster.
Under the leadership of Charles Stewart Parnell the party became a
disciplined. organised unit. which would later make Sinn Fein's withdrawal
policy feasible. This withdrawal was pos."ible because Pamell provided a
bridge between orthodox constitutionalism and the ultra-constitutionalism of
Sinn Fein, who insisted on the continued validity of the old Irish parliament.
6
The use of physical force and constitutionalism usually followed each other in
cycles of failure and disillusionment. Lines of demarcation were rrequently
fluid. as exampled by the Young lrelanders who were themselves an offshoot
of Daniel O'Connell's constitutional repeal movement.
7
With the death of Parnell the party split into pro- and anti-parnellitcs.
This divide, in conjunction with the House of Lords' rejection of Gladstone's
second Home Rule Bill in 1893, made parliamentary success even more
unlikcly. Physical force advocates became increasingly disillusioned and
lethargic during this period. Force had been tried and proved unavailing. The
experiences of 1848 and 1867 had left little doubt that the attempt to regain
Irish independence by force of arms was foolish and impossible. Irish
nationalism now sought a new avenue for expression. Younger men began to
congregate in literary societies to study the Irish language and work out new
schemes for the betterment of society. Such societies drew their inspiration
from the Young Ireland movements of the I840s.8 The publication of journals
of literary and political con lent signalled the beginning of a new cultural form
of nationalism, with papers like the Shan Van Vochl, becoming semi-official
exponents of the new Irish-Ireland movement. The foundation of the Gaelic
League in 1893 represented a turning point in the cultural re-awakening then
'Henry. Theevolulion ofSinn rein. p. 102.
b Norman. A history of modern Ireland.
7 R. Davis. The Young Irelam movement (Dublin. 1987). p. 13.
8 D.G. Boyce. Nineteenth century Ireland: fhe search/or stability (Dublin. 1990). p.
217-9.
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occurring. Led by Douglas Hyde, the league was non-sectarian and non·
political in outlook, working for the restoration, preservation, and ditfusioo of
the.l.rish language. It attempted to remain rigidly and sternly aloof from all
political parties. but according to Padraig Pearse. one of the leaders of the
Easter Rising, 'the revolution which it wrought was moral, intellectual
spiritual and its influence in strengthening and developing the national
character cannot be over-estimated,.9 The vigorous national sense it fostered
began to lead to further expression and political action.
The centenary of the 1798 rebellion led to a quickening of interest in the
~istory of Irish ~paratist I~ovements, and an endeavour was made to keep the
mterest from dymg out with the establishment of '98 clubs. After 1900 both
the '98 clubs and the Gaelic league became the focus of republican and
adva.nced nationalist elements such as the Fenians, who increasingly
dommated the councils of such groups. Fenianism after 1867 had declined to
all ou~rd ap~arances. It had suffered rrom the fact that it had put
reV~IUtlOl1ary action first and preaching republicanism second. 10 Subsequently,
FeOlans had attempted to make the dissemination of republican ideals an
essenti.al part of their propaganda. Yet Fenianism was not the only centre of
republican thought. In 1896, James Connolly founded the Irish Socialist
Republican Party in Dublin. Under his editorship, the Workers Republic
became an organ of socialism and republicanism. In spite of the criticism
levell~ at it, that a labour movement should occupy itself solely with
questions of labour, the movement took its place in Irish political activities,
involving itself in the organisatioo of 1798 commemorations. It remained
sympathetic to the national movement and was ready to lend aid ifneeded. 11
The year 1898 also saw the first publication of the United Irishman with
Arthur Griffith as editor. Taking its name rrom the paper published by John
Mitchel in 1848, the periodical was published on a weekly basis and had as its
aim the creation of a forum in which all real nationalists might have their say.
The United Irishman ran a diverse set ofarticles championing the cause of the
Gaelic League, of native industries, of native music and games. It was after
one such article in 1900 that delegates from various literary and political
societies met and a new organisation, Cumann na nGaedheal was instigated.
Differing little rrom the Gaelic League, it acted as a front for the activities of
the Irish Republican BrothetJt~ (lRB). It was while editor of the United
9 Henry, The evolution 0/Sinn Fein. p. 47.
10 Ibid.. p. 89.
I\U. Lee. The modernisation ofIrish society (Dublin. 1973). p. 149.
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Irishman that Griffith first "Tote about ideas of abstentionism and dual-
monarchy, noting that recourse to force should only happen when
circumstances were suitable for such an action. for example in the event of a
European war. Griffith himself was no stranger to the physical force
nationalism. having been born into a Catholic working class background. with
roots in the IRB movement. However. Griffith was no advocate of violence as
a means to independence. 'Concentrated nationalism. nol parliamentarianism
or force of anns. was Griffith's recipe for national independence."2 After
interest was displayed in his Hungarian articles. Griffith clarified his position.
by drawing parallels between the abstentionist policies of the nationalist Franz
Deak and the weak efforts of the Irish Party to bring about Home Rule.
However. Hungary's significantly more powerful position vis-a-vis the
Austrian parliament in comparison to Ireland sccms to have been lost on
Griffith. His original intention to persuade Irish MPs on the benefits of passive
resistance. and the withdrawal en-bloc from Westminster to form an Irish
parliament in Dublin became the kernel for the setting up of a new movement
to force such an occurrence. II
Griffith originally wanted the movement to act in a purely propagandist
role. to educate rather than contest. It was his hope to give Irish nationalism a
coherent and rational philosophy, to mould the Irish character into habitual
acceptance of the solid material values of self-help, thrift, civic discipline and
the full cultivation of Ireland's natural resources. 14 However, having outlined
these ideas to a meeting in the Rotunda, Dublin. in November 1905, Griffith
was voted down and a new nationalist party was instigated. As the most
experienced man in the organisation, responsibility gravitated to Griffith. until
he became an essential component in the party. Consequently, in the words of
historian R. Davis. 'Griffith had leadership thrust upon him'."
Membership of the new party, Sinn Fein, overlapped with that of Cum ann
na nGaedheal, a technically more militant grouping. To further confuse
mallers, the Dungannon Clubs, started in Belfast by Bulmer Hobson, began to
sprcad across the country, whose aims were similar to those ofGriffith, as they
too called for the restoration of the 1782 constitution, and the independence of
Ireland. With no central organisation. other than the recognition of Belfast as
their place of origin. the Dungannon Clubs competed with Sinn Fein for
12 R. Davis. Arthur Griffith and non-violent Sinn Fein (Dublin. 1974). p. xvi.
1) Lyons. Ireland since thefamine, p.250.
14 Ilenry. The evolUlion ofSinn Fein, p. 50.
IS Davis. Arlhur Griffilh ond non-violent Sinn Fein. p. xiv.
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members. However. Sinn Fein differed from other national movements.
principally in the policy that it outlined for the attainment of its ultimate end.
the independence of Ireland. It proposed the breaking of dependence on
Britain that resulted from the Act of Union and the de·anglicisation of Ireland,
by recovering for the Irish people the management of the departments of
public administration in which the anglicising process was working most
markedly, and which could be reformed without breaking existing law. The
policy further stated that the party sought the stimulation and fostering of
native industry and manufacture. which was ofextreme importance to Griffith.
believing as he did in the need for both agricultural and industrial
development in Ireland, to help the country become a secure economy. 16
Central to these ideas was the belief that Ireland's problems stemmed not
from any intrinsic weakness, but instead from mismanagement through
foreign rule. As a result, Griffith developed an economic policy on the basis of
the most optimistic appraisal of Ireland's industrial potential. Drawing on the
ideas ofGennan economist Friedrich List, specifically those of utilising duties
to protect industry. Griffith superimposed them on the ideas of John Mitchel
and Thomas Davis. 11 Mitchel had opposed British free trade. believing it to be
the root cause of Irish industrial underdevelopment. Meanwhile, navis had
concluded that Ireland had a bountiful supply of resources, and, therefore,
promoted the ideas of using tariffs to encourage indigenous industry, as had
occurred in Gennany.
The superabundance of Ireland's resources was an accepted fact and part
of the advanced nationalist credo. despite the shortcomings of her geographic
position and lack of necessary raw materials such as coal and steel. Thus it
was with confidence in these principles of plenty. that Griffith outlined his
economic policy. which advocated import substitution by tariff protection and
an extended canal system which would allow for the transport of mineral
resources such as coal. stone, salt, gypsum, marble and slate. Griffith also
included refonn of the banking system and stock exchange to facilitate
industrial development and the formation ofa mercantile marine to help ship
Irish goods, as well as the establishment of Irish consuls in European capitals
to popularise Irish goods and to help exports of Irish products. ' •
This policy was not with9lU its contemporary critics. Michael Davitt wrote
in February 1906: -,
16 Nonnan. A history ofmodern Ireland, p. 2434.
11 llenry. The evo/Uliofl afSinn Fiin. p. 49.
I' Lyons. Ireland since thefamine. p. 253.
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H1C corollary of an Irish Ireland. in your sense. is an English England.
Frcneh France [lnd American America: all economically secluded from
each other's markets and living an existence of racial and commercial
isolation. The parallel to this condition would be that of a familv in
Dublin. resolving 10 be. say. a 'Murphyish Murphy" and detcnninin-g to
grow their own tea. sow and reap Iheir o\\n grain. tan their own leather
and cultivate the timber v.hich would supply them with their own
turniture. 19
However. despite such reservations, the Sinn Fein movement began to garner
support, mostly due to the forcefulness ofGriffith's diatribe.
It is doubtful that Sinn Fein could have remained propagandist. as
envisioned by Griffith. The very nature of its doctrine meant a political
movement was inevitable. Over time. the Dublin bias of the movement was
gradually eroded, making the organisation more national in outlook. The
alliance of left and right wing sympathisers, forced Griffith to accept the
necessity of branches in the country, gradually allowing Sinn Fein to develop
along party lines.lo This pressure from the left and right wing elements of the
movement stemmed from the belief that the organisation needed to meet the
parliamentary party step by step, to advance as they retreated. The view that
the Irish Party was a separate front, fighting for national Ireland, no longer
prevailed; instead the party was seen as an obstacle to independent Ireland.ll
The 1905 Sinn Fein conference sanctioned the establishment of branches
in every electoral district, as well as creating an executive branch of twenty-
live members. Eight articles were drawn up outlining rules of membership and
acceptance of council decisions. However. despite the move towards
decentralisation. the movement still remained Dublin orientated. This
centralisation of party rule was demonstrated after 1910, when the number of
branches in the country dropped from one-hundred and thirty-five in the same
year. to six in 1911 and finally, as the movement became increasingly
moribund after 1912. dropping to just one branch outside of Dublin and
remaining so until reorganisation occurred in 1917.22
One of the major obstacles to the growth of Sinn Fein was the internal
dispute emanating from the growing republican element. Griffith had
anempted to appeal to more moderate nationalists, by calling for the return of
the 1782 constitution or dual monarchy. The movements stance on physical
19 J. O·Connor. The history ofIreland. /798- 1914. ii (London. 1971). p. 245.
20 Davis. Arthur Gri/fith and non-violent Sinn Fein. p. 75.
cl Lyons. Ireland since the famine. p. 247.
n lY.wis. Arthllr Gri/fith and non-violent Sinn Fein. p. 96.
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force. which ~as to.neither promote it nor condemn it, left the way open for a
more pragmatic pollcy to be pursued, while not creating tensions between itself
and the existing nationalist traditions. However, the growth of the Dungannon
clubs had cau~ an obvious threat to Sinn Fcin's position. The two groups
had been movmg closer together. but could not agree on certain issues.23
. Bulmer Hobson ..the driving force behind these clubs. failed to agree with
Gnffith on the key Issues of the 1782 constitution and the use of force to
achieve nationalist goals. Born into a Quaker business background, Hobson
had been exposed to the writings of Alice Milligan in the journal Shan Van
Vocht at an early age and had left school in 1899, a devotee of the ideals of
Tone. Having joined Cumann na nGaedheal in 1901 he had become
disillusioned by its lack of activity and set up the first Dungannon club in
Bel!3st in 1905, with the aim of restoring the 1782 constitution and creating
an mdependent Ireland. Yet, it became increasingly difficult for Hobson to
advance the cause of dual monarchy in Ulster, due 10 Protestant fears of a
Catholic separatist state being set Up.l4
Hobson became more susceptible to republican ideals of the lRB and the
'98 club, not least because of their acceptability to many Ulster Protestants.
Hobson ~as also more d:finite on the use of force, believing that action should
be taken If the OpportUllIty arose to do so, for example in the eventuality of a
European war, which was becoming ever imminent. Griffith was unable to
reconcile himself with Hobson over these points, and both men remained at
loggerheads over these issues. Griffith's position was not helped by the release
of The Republic by Hobson in Belfast in 1906, a paper with a definite
republi~n doctrine. This strained relations between the two, as Griffith did
~ot beheve that. the bulk of nationalists would wanl a separatist policy, stating,
I am ~ separatist. [However] The bulk of Irish people are not separatists. I do
nOI thmk they can be united behind a separatist policy,.15
The formation of the Sinn Fein League, a more republican movement than
Sinn Fein containing elements from Cumann na nGaedhael, in 1907, as well
as the amalgamation of the individual Dungannon clubs into a more
disciplined organisation in the same year, put Griffith in an untenable
position. It seemed to suggest an obvious threat to his authority on two fronts.
However. this threat never m_at~rialised, as Griffith's policy of dual monarchy
'\
~M.E: Coil ins. History in the makj~g: Ireland. 1868-/966 (Dublin. (993). p. 188.
P. Gibbon. Tire origins ofUlster Unionism: lhe formalion ofpopular Protestant
~olilics and ideology in nineteenth century Ireland (Manchester. 1975). p. 126.
Lyons. Ireland since the famine. p. 256.
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suddenly bore fruit. with the resignation of John O·Meara. MP for Soulh
Kilkenny. as well as C.J. Dolan who agreed 10 lea...e the Irish Party and contest
a North Leitrim by-election under the Sinn Fein banner. Both Sinn Fein and
the Sinn Fcin League agreed to shelve their differences and join forces in
pursuit of a common goal. Griftith now took charge of the movement.
becoming the chicforganiser for the coming election,
Although Dolan failed to win the seat. his polling of over one-thousand.
one-hundred votes. in an area previously considered a safe seat by the Irish
Party. was heralded as a triumph by Sinn Fein and Griffith's position now
seemed unassailable. Some authors would question the success of the
campaign: Lee in particular notes that many of the votes were for Dolan as an
individual. rather than the Sinn Fein movemenl. 26 Yet. it is interesting to
observe that even the unionist paper, The Irish Time:.', was impressed by the
achievements of the movement. noting that D1:>lan had done well, despite the
resources mobilised against him by the Irish Party. 11 went even further by
stating that Sinn Fein's policy of self·reliance was somewhat akin to the
principles ofconstructive unionism.27
However. the storm clouds were gathering on the horizon for the Sinn
Fein party. In 1909 the House of Lords rejected the Liberal Party's budget. The
then Prime Minister Lord Asquith. took up the challenge, by calling a general
ek'Ction. The rC$ult was to leave both the conservatives and the liberals with
almost equal numbers and the Irish Party with the balance of power. The
Liberal party. which previously had a sufficient majority to safely ignore the
Irish MPs., were now forced 10 parley. causing Irish public opinion to focus on
John Redmond and the Irish Party. Sinn Fein now became sidelined as the
country drifted away from the principles of independence and moved towards
Home Rule.
With the collapse of the Sirm Fein paper in 1910, which had replaced the
United Irishman in 1909. the movement was at its lowest ebb, It now took on
an observer role. retaining the right to examine. criticise and warn, remaining
'wholly free from any moral responsibility'll for legislation offered by liberals
to the Irish Party. This was not purely an act of self-sacrifice. During this
period from 1910-6, Sinn Fein appeared so inactive and static. that its
subsequent re-organisation on a national basis was partly due to the fact Ihat
:!(i Lee. The modernisation ofIrish society, p. 156.
27 Davis. Arthllr Griffith and non-violent Sinn Fbn. p.49.
11 lien!)'. The evolution ofSinn Fein. p. 81.
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after the rising of 1916, unionist papers wrongly used Sinn Fein's name as a
contemptuous epithet for the failed rebellion.19
However. the movement was no( a complete failure prior to 1916. It never
compromised its ideals on independence. allowing a basis for success of
National Sinn Fein in the reorganisation of 1917. More importantly. the
movement acted as a forum for national debate. providing a breeding ground
for a diversity of ideas thal ",ere drawn on after 1916. Added to this was the
fervour and virulence with which Sinn Fein succeeded in spreading republican
ideas to a significant number of young Irishmen. Many inferiority complex's
fostered by long years of dependency and frustration were burnt away by
Griffith's flame of invective..lO Therefore. the foundations were laid in these
years for the increased militancy of Irish nationals that would culminate in the
1916 rising. catapulting the Sinn Fein organisation to the forefront of the
national agenda.
With the success of the Irish Party in 1910. and the passing of the Home
Rule bill. the beginnings ofa devolved Irish government now seemed assured.
However, with the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, plans for
Home Rule were shelved until hostilities were concluded, However support for
Home Rule was not total throughout the island. In the north of the country
certain Protestant or unionist elements were opposed to Dublin rule fearful of
the consequences of a devolved government dominated by Catholics.J ! The
unionists' fears were partly to do with religion, but also the possibility of heavy
taxation on prosperous northern industry,n Sinn Fein attempted to allay
unionist fears.. by pointing to the non-sectarian nature of their organisation.
However. what the nationalists failed to grasp was that unionists feared less
the threat to their religion. than the threat to their political ascendancy.H
Gibbon sees the rise of Ulster unionism as much a political and social struggle
as a religious one:
Ulster Unionism arose ... from a process ... whereby Iklfast conscrvathes
were able to establish authority over both the urban working class and
rural tenant fanners.}ol
Ulster clubs began to organise throughout the province. and began talking in
terms of opposing Home Rule. Meanwhile Conservative Party members at
~ Bo)'Ce. SineteenJh cenJury Jr~' The Marchfor slObility. p. 254.
)Il Da...is. Arthur Grjffi/h and non-vJolenJ Sinn Fein. p. 153.
JI Gibbon. The origins ofUlster Unionism. p. 126.
)2 Boyce. Nine/eenth cenfllry Ireland. p. 223.
JJ Ibid. p.211.
}ol Gibbon. The origins ofVIs/er Unionism. p. 143.
·33
Westminster, in an irresponsible act. moved olllside constitutional rules and
began to encourage a small but compact group of unionists, led by Edward
Carson. 10 sign a covenant in opposition 10 Home Rule. A theory of loyalty was
developed. which was compatible with loyalty to the union, while at the same
time defying the authority of the king and parliament. in the affairs of
government.35 As the Ulster clubs grew in power and strength. the possibility
of opposition by force of arms became increasingly real. The movement was
organised into a single entity, known as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and
gave credil 10 their name by anning themselves accordingly. The landing of
rifles at Lame. County Antrim. put guns into the hands of the UVF. with linle
opposition trom the British government, who now backed down and talked of
partitioning the country.
The anning of the Ulstermen and the seeming inability of the government
to stop them. now encouraged Irish nationalists to. organise themselves into a
volunteer force oftheir own. whose aim was 'to secure and maintain the rights
and liberties common to all people of Ireland,.}6 Led by Eoin MacNeill, the
movement was ready to defend Home Rule and like their Ulsler counterparts,
were willing to do so by force if necessary. The existence of two militant
groups in the country, willing to use force to further their political aims,
benefited the republicans, as for the first time since the Fenians, a section of
Irishmen had moved to arm themselves against the British. However. while
individual Sinn Fcin members were prominent in the movement, Sinn Fein as
an organisation, remained distinct, preferring instead to remain aloof and to
act as a supportive on-looker.37
Whether or not a conflict between the two armed camps would ever have
broken out. is a moot point, as the outbreak of war in 1914 transfonned the
situation once again. The UVF promised their loyalty to the crown in time of
war. and fonned an Ulster regiment to march off to war. Meanwhile the
councils of the Irish Volunteers had come under the control of the
parliamentary party and after Redmond impulsively offered their services 10
the British army, all but five percent of the Volunteers joined. Those who
remained were led by the IRB, who continued to drill and train. AI first these
Sinn Fcin Volunteers. as they were incorrectly called, were held in contempt.
J~ Boyce. Nineteenth century Ire/and. p. 20 I.
)6 Davis. Arlhur Grij/ilh and non-vio/enl Sinn Fein. p. 1]6.
J1 Ibid.. p. 1]6.
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hO""e...er the bias shown against Redmond's Volunteers by the British
government, saw the beginnings ofa change in opinion.JI
By early 1916. the IRB's supreme council had made definite plans for an
early insurrection. Griffith al first tried to prevent the rising. which had little
chance of success, but Padraig Pearse, one ofthe main conspirators, was more
interested in redemptive sacrifice. When it became clear that the rising was
going ahead. Griffith offered his services. but was rebuffed, on the grounds
that he was too useful as a civil leader to risk death. The eventual rising took
place on Easter Monday. 1916. and saw approximatcly one-thousand, three
hundred men and women holding Dublin for fivc days. However, the
insurrection was comfortably repressed by British forces, and thirteen of its
leaders were put 'to death. Several hundred were imprisoned. Griffilh included.
The rising had not been the work of Sinn Fein. but the general public.
some tram mere instinct. others from a desire to discredit a movement ",hich
they disliked and feared, persisted in calling the insurrection the Sinn Fein
rebellion and its participants the Sinn Fein volunteers.)9 It would have been
impossible for Sinn Fein, even if it wished to do so. to repUdiate all
responsibility for the rising. Initial reactions were ones of condemnalion by
nationalist and unionist alike and Sinn Fein were reviled for the stimulus it
provided. However, the subsequent reaction of the government, with
internment and execution without trial. turned public opinion.
In fact nationalist support for Redmond and Home Rule had already been
waning. British indifference, not directly attributable to the war. had left the
bulk of nationalists feeling uneasy, while at home many were unhappy at
Redmond's lack of opportunism in the face of British difficulties. The
insurrection offered republican ideals and the promise of Irish independence in
keeping with the best traditions of Irish nationalistism. Consequently. despite
the failure of the rising, what it had stood for now became the policy of
national Ireland. Sinn Fein by association profited, but was forced to drop its
ideas of dual monarchy and 10 become a republican party instead..ao In October
1917, Sinn Fein was reconstituted and Griffith ceded his presidency to Eamon
de Valera, a younger man, but Ihe senior surviving commandant trom the
rising.
The new Sinn Fein party !,low dropped all pretence of passive resistance;
insttad it concentrated its effi5n.~ on gaining an independent nation. by means
J' Lee. The modernisation ofIrish society. p. 156.
J9 Soycc. Nineteenth century Ire/ond. p. 254.
411 Da... is. Arlhur Grij/ilh and non-violefll Sinn fein. p. 219.
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of force if necessary. It also looked to external factors, such as seeking
recognition of Ireland's independent status fi'om the international Paris peace
conference in 1919. Thus Griffith's original ideals of non-violence and
peaceful co-existence were sidelincd, as was Griffith himself, with Sinn Fein
now falling into the hands of the more extreme nationalist elements.41 The
evolution of Sinn Fein fi'om a propagandist movement, to a fully-fledged
constitutional party, was not an unprecedented occurrence. Many Irish parties
have started from far less auspicious circumstances. However, the far-reaching
effects of the Sinn FCin movement cannot be understated. In its attempts 10
plough a path between two mutually exclusive traditions, that of physical force
and parliamentarianism, what it did was to create a bridge between extreme
nationali!t1s and constitutionalists. Consequently, it should not come as a
surprise that Griffith's plans for dual monarchy and passive resistance should
eventually grow into a party with a strong history of both republican and
violent activity. Sinn Fein by its very nature could not remain indifferent and
impassive, as Griffith would have wished it. Its very name 'ourselves alone'
rang out like a challenge to tepid, entrenched nationalists, stimulating thought
and encouraging physical action.
41 Ibid.. p. 220.
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Unveiling the cloisters
Augustinian nunneries in twelfth century Ireland
Lauryl B. Green I
This paper will analyse the importance of the Augustinian nunneries in twelfth
century ireland. Until the 19705, monastic archaeology focused almost
exclusively upon the development of male orders. Churches and cloisters were
described by a series of plan types, analysing the archaeology and architecture
of male monasteries, be they Augustinian. Dominican or Cistercian. Such
research strategies for monastic archaeology prioritised the social. structural
and economic developments of monasteries. For example, Moorehouse
concentrated almost totally on the economic role of male orders and the
methods used by these men to achieve a state of sclf-sufficiency.2 Coppack
described the development of monastic archaeology as having, ;a growing
emphasis on the economic aspect of religious life,.3 Such research neglected to
consider the social and religious roles of the monastery. In addition, it
overlooked the lives of religious men and women such as nuns and anchorites
who were not associated with traditional orders.4 Gilchrist has referred to these
'fi'inge' medieval religious as 'the other monasticism'.~ The word other refers
to those religious vocations that remain on the margins of modern historical
and archaeological scholarship. Though neglected in traditional study, this
'other' vocation played a central role in medieval society and is worth further
analysis. What is presented here is a brief sketch ofone particular female order
of the Augustinians.
Previous historical and archaeological scholarship doubted the importance
of women religious in the medieval world, describing nunneries as
1 The author would like to acknowledge the help of Or. Elizabeth FitzPatriek and Or.
K.A. LoPrcte, N.U.L Galway. and Dr. Terry Darry. University of Dublin. Trinity
Col.lege. "..,
2 Robert Gilchrist. Contemplation knd action: the other mOfUlSticism (London, 1995).
r· •.
Ibid.
4 Ibid.. p. 5.
~ Ibid.. p. 1.
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undisciplined and impoverished instilutions6 and examples of poor or failed
monasteries.7 Butler stated:
Prioresses lacked preslige ... A Mother Superior was a contradiction in
terms ... It .....as considered that the prayers of women had far less 'alue
.... hen offered in intcroc:ssion 10 the saint.'
This negative image of religious women that developed in monastic
archaeology is partly explained by the claim, held by histocians such as Butler.
that there was inadequate documentation and material from the nunneries to
conduct a proper investigation. They ignored the fact that previous antiquaries
did extensive studies on various nunneries such as Gocing in Oxfordshire by
Stone in 1893 and the Augustinian nunneries of Lacock in Wiltshire by
Breakspear in 1900.9
With the development of gender archaeology, archaeological and
historical scholarship has gained an increased interest in the lives of women
religious in medieval society and in their unique monastic identity and
spirituality.lo A number of nunneries have recently been excavated in England
including Elstow in Bedfordshire, which has revealed textual and material
remains which suggest that women in medieval England were held in high
regard. For example, Power noted that in a list of inmates at Elstow, some
nun's names were accompanied by the title of'chaplain,' suggesting that these
women fulfilled a liturgical role in their community.ll Such respect is not
unique to the women of Elstow. H..ildegard of Bingen (1098-1179), who
established Ihe convent of Rupertsburg, was recognised for her piety and
knowledge. Popes and emperors accepted her scientific treatises and in 1146
Pope Eugenius heard of her revelations and two years later declared that she
" For example. see Powers (1922). Though. it is now recognised that Po.....ers was
working .... ith biased material. using only published and late documenls from a small
number ofhouses and that she accepted the possible m.3.le-bias that aooompanied these
writings. As cited in R. Gilchrist. Gender and material culture: the Archaeology of
religious ....omen (London. 1994). p. 24.
7 Gilchrist. Gender and material culture. p. 24; Gilchrist. COIIJemplatiun and action. p.
5.
• Cited in Gilchrist. Gender and material ClIlture. p. 24.
9 Ibid.. p. 23.
III Sce R. Gilchrist and 11. Mytum. Advances in monastic archaeology (Oxford. 1994);
S. Thompson. Women religious: the founding of English nunneries after the Norman
conquest (Oxford. 1991).
11 Cited in Gilchrist. Gender and material cllllure. p. 20.
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had the gift of prophecy. The learned read her works such as Scillias: know
the ways ofthe Lord. 12
Unlike England, Ireland has yet to proceed with sufficient levels of
archaeological inquiry regarding the architectural, historical or soci~
economic functions of nunneries. The historical and architectural study of
religious foundations in Ireland only developed in the nineteenth century. By
this time, most of the medieval nunneries were in ruins or destroyed. What is
left to be described by the archaeologist are architectural remains to
reconstruct a ground plan of the destroyed sites. Stalley estimated that in
Ireland, thirty large Augustinian houses remain today from an estimated one
hundred and twenty-one present in the twelfth century.1J Of those thirty. only
eight of the foundations had any substantial remains. Therefore, analysis and
explanation of medieval nunneries in Ireland lack sufficient evidence at
present upon which to build a better understanding. 14 Yet, in light of the
progress made in gender archaeology and the widening interest in studies of
the medieval nunnery, this paper will explore the importance of Augustinian
nuns in Ireland and their role in twelfth century Church reform, both through
archaeological and historical knowledge.
The religious undertone of twelfth century Europe was one of reform.
Corruption amongst the ecclesiastical orders, such as the practice of married
priests, was common during the middle of the eleventh century. The popes,
most notably Gregory VII (1073-85), set out to purifY the Church with
ecclesiastical reform, creating a wave of religious enthusiasm throughout
Europe. which carried through to the twelfth century. In monasticism. new
orders, such as the Augustinians, were established as monks and nuns sought a
more pure and uncorrupted religious life. The Augustinians did not offer a
precise set of detailed regulations, but general principles for communal life,
based around concepts of poverty and chastity, which were suitably flexible for
adaptation by unique traditions of various communities. Ij
Like other European countries, Ireland was woven into the fabric of
ecclesiastic reform. Irish monasteries had become corrupt wilh many often
becoming heavily involved in political affairs and acquiring great wealth. In
12 B: S. Andersoll and Judith P.· iipsser. A hjslOry oflheir own: women in prehistory
from prehislOry to the presenl (Nc~ York. 1988). p. 188-9.
Il R. Stallcy, Archi/t'Clllre and sculpture in Ire/al/d, 1150-1350 (Dublin. 1971) p. 125.
14 Mcany, rhe Augustinian houses ofCounty Clare. (MA thesis. NUl. Galway, 1995)
p.82.
IS J. Watt. The Church in medieval Ireland (Dublin. 1998). p. 45.
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Ireland, this political interest is not too surprising as many coarbs were
laymen. In 1172, Pope Alexander III listed the abuses in Ireland as reported 10
him:
that men marry their step mothers and are not a~hamed to have children by
them ... that one man will live in concubinage with his two sisters; and
that many of them. putting away the mother. will marry the daughters. 11>
The approach to refonn in Ireland, however, was quite different from
what was found on the continent. Since the introduction of Christianity in
Ireland there was no organised ecclesiastic hierarchy that could enforce these
reforms. This monastic structure of Early Christian Ireland is described in
Cogitosus's Vitae o/St. Brigit:
She fBrigitl built her monastery on the plains of Mag Litfe on (he finn
loundation of faith. It is the head of almost all the Irish churches with
supremaC)' over all the monasteries of the Irish and its paruehia extends
over the whole land of Ireland. reaching from sea to sea. 17
The claim to be the head of all Irish Churches was also held by other
monasteries, such as Armagh, emphasising the lack of a hierarchical structure.
Consequently, before Church reform could be contemplated in twelfth century
Ireland, a secure hierarchical and diocesan framework had to be formulated.
This arrangement was implemented at the Synod of Raithbreasil in 11II and
the Synod of Kel1s in 1152. 18
Watt has referred to the Augustinian movement as, 'ultimately the most
fundamental change in medieval Irish monasticism'. 19 Indeed, St. Malachy,
who died in 1148, was responsible for introducing the Augustinian movement
into Ireland and was recorded as being, 'the man who restored monasticism
and canons regular' to the country.2° He is praised in his Vitae, written by SI.
Bernard of Clairveaux as, '[instituting] anew the most wholesome usage of
confession, the sacrament of confirmation and the marriage contract, all of
which were either unknown or neglected'.21 Some authorities argue that
Augustinian canons were introduced into Ireland well before St. Malachy.
Henry suggests the Imar O'Hagen of Armagh introduced the Augustinian
16 G""')'Tln, The Irish church. p. 168.
17 S. Connolly and J.M. Picard. 'The Life ol'St. Bridgel' in Journal ofthe Royal
Society ofAntiquaries. 117 (1987). p. 11.
I~ Meany. The Augustinian houses ofCounty Clare. p. 18.
19 lbid.. p. 19.
20 P. J. Dunning. 'The Arroasian order in medievallrcland' in /rish Historical Studies.
4 (1945). p. 3M.
21 A. G""')l1n, The /rish church. p. 178.
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order at the Priory of SS Peter and Paul in 1126.22 Yet, Meany points out that
such evidence of Augustinian establishments before Malachy musl be
disregarded due to lack ofsubstantial proof. While it is quite probable that the
widespread popularity of canons regular germinated from numerous sources.
Malachy alone is fully credit with their introduction.l3
However, it remains unknown how Malachy first eame into contact with
the Arroasian order. It is recorded by the abbot of Arras, France, that Malachy
visited this Arroasian community on his way to Rome between 1139-40 and
noted their practices so that he could implement them in Ireland. The lack of
reference in the Annals to Malachy suggests that he faced few problems to the
introduction of reform models and canons. In all probability the Annals would
have recorded significant upheaval in the religious community.l4 Though the
exact date of the first Augustinian foundation remains uncertain, it is arguable
that the first wave of Augustinians came to Ireland in c.1140. One-hundred
and twenty-one male houses alone were established, sixty-two between 1140-
69 and forty founded between the years 1140_8.25 During this later period,
Malachy himself oversaw the adoption of forty Arroasian communities in the
north of Ireland, including Bangor and Down.l6
In the twelfth century. Augustinian canons were linked under a rule or
centralised authority. The two most popular were the Premonstratensian and
the Arroasian. with the latter being the most preferred in Ireland.27
Contemporary records for female Augustinian houses in Ireland are
meagre in comparison to those of their male counterparts. Many early Irish
nunneries died out long before the Synod of Raithbreasil. This decline was
most often the result of a stipulation in Brehon law that land owned by a
woman automatically reverted to their families upon her death.28 As a result
only a few nunneries remained by the twelfth century. Those which did persist
adopted the Arroasian rule in c.1144.29 The female orders were directed by
:!2 F. Henry. Irish art in the Romanesque period. 102(}..1 170 AD (London. (970), pp.
11-2. IS.
rI Mcany. The AUKUStinian houses ofCounty Clare. p. 23.
2~ Ibid., p. 19.
2S A. Gwynn and R.N. Hadcock. !I;fedieval religious houses: Ireland(Dublin. 1970). p.
153-6. "'-'0
l6 Stalley. Architeclure and sculpflJe in Ireland. p. 2.
Z7 S. Thompson. Women religious: lhe foundation ofEnglish nunneries after the
Normanconquesl. (Oxford. 19(1) p. 133.
21 Meany. The Augustinian houses ofCounlY Clare. p. 89.
]9 O""')'Tlll and Iladcock. Medieval religious houses. p. 307.
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"omen. either an abbess or prioress. A priest, however, was still needed to
perform the mass and other ecclesiastical services.
Female Augustinian houses in Ireland began later than male
congregations. commencing in 1144 with the foundation of Clonard. County
Meath. Clonard was the head house of the Arroasian order until 1223.30 By
c.1180 there were fifty houses ofAugustinian canonesses in Ireland. Six of the
houses were located in County Meath, probably due to the location ofClonard.
Eight houses were founded in the immediate post Anglo-Norman ~riod with
two being of Anglo-Norman patronage in Timolin, County KIldare and
Killcigh, County Offaly. .. .
In traditional Arroasian orders, nuns followed a pattcrn of rchglous Itfe
centred upon the Christian tradition of isolating women. Ireland was uniquc in
that most Arroasian congregations were established for ixllh men and women.
Most of the Arroasian canonesses would have d~icated their house to SI.
Mary while their male counterparts would retain the original name. An
example of this can be seen at the double house - a community of male and
female religious - at Annaghdown, County Galway where St. Mary,
Annaghdown was established for the women religious.J ! Thompson specula~es
that the developmeru of double houses in Ireland stemmed from natIve
traditions. For example, at S1. Bridget's. Kildare, the abbess was head of both
the male and female orders. Gerald of Wales spoke of the scandal of this Irish
practice as permitting men and women to live in 'dangerously close
proximity,.n .
The imporlance of these houses in the religious development of Ireland IS
perhaps best reflected in the distribution and spatial analysi~ of m~le. and
female Augustinian communities in Ireland, in other words, theIr prOXImIty to
population centres and topographical locations. Meany observes that such
distribution helps the archaeologist and historian to understand bot.h ~he
human and physical factors which would be considered when establishing
these monasteries and nunneries. For example, the wishes of the patron and
vocatiooal stipulations of the individual order had to be taken in~o
consideration. This would help to explain why some houses seem to be In
conflict with established geographical factors, and locate in areas with no
obvious advantages.
)(I MC3ny. The August/lfian houses o/Coumy Clare. p. 29.
)\ Ibid.. pp. 2]-4; Gwynn and J-1adcock. Medieval religious hOlLfes, p.308.
)1Thompson. Women religious. p. 149.
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Both male canons and female canonesses often established their order
upon native sites. usually at pre-existing early historic monasteries. Eight
known nunneries founded in twelfth century had previous native coonectioos
including Killeigh and Nun's Church, Clonmacnoise, County Offaly. It is
unknown iflhis conscious decisioo to establish Arroasian canonesses 00 native
sites was because of geographical considerations or a desire to provide
continuity with the past.3l A native site that was easily accessible and situated
on fertile land would be a tempting location for the canonesses. Indeed, most
ofthcse early sites were located in eastern and central Ireland where land was
productive. The poorer land in the west as well as bog sites seem to havc been
avoided both by the Arroasians and their earlier sisters. These native sites were
often situated on a well-known road ways such as the Slighe Mor, thc Slighe
Dala and the Shannon River. The Nun's Church, Clonmacnoise. for example
could easily be reached by both the Shannon River and the Slighe MOr.
Though possessing economic and geographic advantages, the established
atmosphere of holiness at these native sites~ also a fuctor. ..
The Arroasian movement made a conSCIOUS effort to locate In Isolated
areas in order to pursue contemplative work. Nevertheless, some sites do
reveal a location near urban centres to pursue morc pastoral work. In these
sites the nuns Ih·ed in proximity to native ring-forts, native monastic
settlements. or Viking or Anglo-Norman towns. The ring-forts were most
often located on low·lying ground that was often sought after by the Arroasian
orders. Seventeen Augustinian houses were situatcd on or near crannogs - lake
h "l"h .dwcllings - four alone were found at Loug Ree. ere were some native
monasteries. such as Clonmacnoise which boasted urban status by the twelfth
century. The decision for the Augustinians to locate at these urban-religious
sites was based on piety rather than the large populations of these centres.
Nevenheless by choosing such a site, the order could be assured of
maintenance' by the existing population.H The Viking towns of Limerick.
Waterford. Dublin. Wexford and Cork had become Christianised by the
eleventh century and were welcoming of monastic orders to promote religious
reform. Three Augustini3[l houses alone were situated in Viking Dublin. such
as All Saints Arroasian Priory, established by Lawrence O'Toole in 1162.
The Anglo-Normans oftql-established a monastic house in order 10 gain a
political hold over a particular~rea. Before the Anglo-Norman settlement of
llMeany. The Augustinian houses o/County Clare, p. 93.
.I<l Ibid.. p. 97.
J' Ibid.. p. 98.
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the late twelfth century, twenty-four Augustinian canonesses houses were in
existence in Ireland. After 1171, a further fifteen houses were established.
probably due to Anglo-Norman lay politics and thc quest for authoritative
controL}6 LoPrete suggests that the Anglo-Norman desire to establish
Augustinian houses in Ireland may have resulted from their experience of
reform in their ancestral lands in Normandy, where Augustinian communities
were in existence well before Malachy's arrival in France in 1139.n
Anglo-Norman settlement concentrated in Counties looth. Kildare.
Dublin, Kilkenny, Meath, Wexford. Tipperary, Cork. Carlow. Limerick.
Westmeath, Wicklow and Waterford. Nine canoness foundations were found
in counties looth. Kildare and Dublin. which boasted the largest population
density. Counties Kilkenny, Meath, Wexford. Tipperary, Cork. Carlow and
Limerick. which had an intermediate population density. had seventeen female
houses in total. County Meath alone boasted eight nunneries, perhaps due to
its close proximity to Clonard. Meany suggests that there is a direct correlation
between the distribution of Augustinian houses and Anglo-Norman areas.
showing that these women tavoured a sizeable population as well as good farm
land. Their choices might also reflect the desires of their lay patrons.}'
The availability of water for domestic purposes was of huge impor1ance
when Augustinians were choosing settlement locations. The cloistntl plan
reflects the importance of water. In this design, the water supply would pass
from the refectory, then the kitchen before reaching the latrine of the
dormitory. The water source was engineered by building drains and conduits,
often lead pipes, to create an artificial source from thc river. If a river was not
in proximity to the monastery the water supply could be obtained from a well
or fTom roof water. In addition. water was fed into an artificially constructed
fish-pond for dietary purposes. Indeed, one hundred and seventy-five days each
year were designated fish days on the medieval calendar.}'! Meany asserts that
future analysis of the water supply and drainage system at Augustinian sites
will help to provide information on medicval engineering and diet. thus
providing a broader picturc of the medieval world.
In addition to layout, one must also reflect upon the architecture of the
building in which these canonesses spent their lives. Ifere. the archaeologist
begins to reconstruct daily practices both within the order as well as their
.16 G\\ ynn and Iladcock. Medieval religious houses. p. S.
J7 In discussion with Dr. K.A. LoPretc. N.V.!.. Galway.
JI Meun~. Augustinian houses o/County Clare. p. 100.
'" Grcene (1992) ciled in Mean}. The Augwtinian houses ofCounly Clare. p. 108.
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importance to the secular community that lay beyond their walls. The initial
plans of most nunneries reflect simplicity. Many cloisters were formed simply
with the creation of lean-to roofs against the main ranges. The cloister and its
ranges might be buill of stone, rubble. cob or timber. with Ihe exception of the
church which was always constructed of stone. unneries that were
particularly poor. or those in regioos of little stone. were more likely to have
been built ofcob or eanh ..w
Like male monasteries, the nunneries. in general, followed a standard
monastic layout, a central complex of buildings grouped around a cloister.
Variations appear Inler in the thirteenth and fourteenth ccnturies where variety
of monastic plans were considered acceptable for later-founded female
houses.'u The church formed the northern range. The cloister was formed with
three ranges of buildings that formed a 'U' shape. attached to the church at its
south. At nunneries established at existing parish churches, the cloister
sometimes stretched to the south of the nun's choir. Rarely did this
arrangement of buildings depart from this standard pattern but there were
exceptions as clearly can be seen al the Nun's Church. Clonmacnoise.
The arrangemenl of the church required special attenlion so as to
maintain the segregation of the nuns from the laity. Mosl of these churches.
therefore. were un-aisled rectangles or parallelograms with the nun's choir
placed in the eastern end and separated by the pulpilum screen. A second
screen then was placed at the west to divide the nun's church from the parish
church. The eastern range contained the sacristy, chapter-house, warming-
room and a dormitory for Ihc nuns. The dormitories were originally
communal, but like their male counterparts, they became divided into
individual cells. The range opposite the church was the nun's refectory,
usually an upper storey above a cellerage. The western range would
accommodate the guest-house, private lodgings for the prioress, storage and
sometimes offices. One end would serve as a buttery that opened up into the
kitchen in the west end. This west range was usually arranged like a secular
manor house with ground floor hall. private parlour and buttery. An inncr
court was located behind the nun's cloister that acted as a service court. and
sometimes provided accommodation for lay visitors or servants. The priest or
chaplain of the nunnery alsoJived here.
Gilchrist speculates that the simple iconography present on many of the
buildings portray the founders of nunneries or even female saints as virtuous
Cl M.-:any. The Augustinian houses o/County Clare, p. 114.
•• Gilchrist. Contemplmion and QClion, pp. 155-8.
45
and holy women:1l Other carved images reflect devotion to Christ and the
Virgin Mary. the primary focus of worship in the nunnery. The dedication of
nunneries IQ the Virgin Mary is also overwhelmingly popular throughout
Europe as well as dedications to Mary Magdelane. St. Margaret. $t. Helen. 5t.
Catherine and the Holy Trinity. Though the iconography of female saints can
be found in male monasteries. their presence at nunneries is of particular
importance. usually being the only embellishment upon the church and cloister
structure. One example. at Killone. County Clare. shows a corbel on the
external SOUlh-east angle of a female head. hair loose held baek with a head
band. The woman's hands are raised in a gesture to support the roof of the
building. possibly representing a woman who had given notable financial or
spirilUal support to the women at Killone.
To a certain extCTlt. these nunneries imitated monastic manorial estates as
many were surrounded by moats. ordered in discontinuous ranges around
courtyards and constructed in the local material. such as stone or cob:u To the
lay world. this settlement pattern must have made these nunneries appear as
worldly places. Yet, the evidence found in the architecture and the landscape
of the nunnery shows that most female religious houses in medieval Europe.
including Ireland. maimained a frugal and modest existence. This frugality
might not be due solely to patrons thinking less of female religious. but also to
the spiritual aspirations held by them.
One example of an Arroasian nunnery which most likely followed this
traditional set up can be found on the shores of Lough Corrib, County Galway.
The ruins remain ofa double monastery established by St. Brendan in c. 578.
The nunnery was established at the same time by his sister Briga.~~ Arroasian
canonesses settled at Annaghdown - Enachdtin - in 1144 soon after Clonard
....'as established that same year. and became one of the dependent Arroasian
canoncss congregations of Clonard in 1195. remaining so until 1223 when
Kilcreevanty became the head house for Connacht. The nunnery's dedication
to St. Mary suggests that Annaghdown was indeed a double monastery or
attached 10 an almonry.~5 There are numerous factors behind the adoption of
Annaghdown by the Arroasian nuns. Turoulough OTonnor. king ofConnacht
was the strongest supporter of Augustinian canons. It was also located near a
ready water supply. Lough COlTib. and upon fertile land which could provide a
~! Ihid.. p. 142.
4.1Ihid.. p. 151.
.... Duignan and Killanin. The Shell ~uide 10 Ireland (London. 1969). p. 56-7.
~< Gw)nn and IlooClXk. I/ediem/ reli,'{iollS houses. p. J 12.
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source of wealth for the canonesses# and was built upon an earlier Irish
monastic site. providing continuity with the past.~7
Unlike Tllany other nunnerit.'S, such as Nun's Church, Clonmacnoise.
f\nnaghdown today possess almost no architectural attractions.~· What
ornamentation is left is dilapidated, making it difficult, though not impossible,
to make comparisons with known twelfth century motifs to secure an exact
date of construction of the nunnery.49 What remains at Annaghdown today are
the upstanding remains of the late medieval priory. the fifteenth century
cathedral. Romanesque architectural features of the twelfth century, the
nunnery and a holy well. The nunnery's south-west rectangular structures with
Inundations still survive at approximately full height. The nunnery itself. now
a national Tllonument. lies north west of the cathedral.50
rhe decoration at the abbey is found upon a doorway or arch, and a
.... indow no longer in its original context. The decoration is in Romanesque
fashion which flowered in Ireland in the twelfth century. The Romanesque
churches of Ireland were smaller than their continental or English
counterparts. yct did not lack in excellence of ornamental design and
craftsmanship.51
Another example of Romanesque artwork at Ihe nunnery can be seen in
what must ha\oe been the east window of the nunnery church. now located in
the east gable of the cathedral. The window is constructed of blue-grey
limestone. This round-headed window which splays inward is wider than most
Irish windows. On its jambs and the arch of the window is a carved chevron
design, which is in effcct an elongated animal. Its legs are at the base of the
right hand side and its head is devouring a group of serpents on the left side.
The pilasters were decorated with flat foliage caps of palmettes and flowers in
an abundant variety. This section of moulding is significant for dating
purposes. The sharp, square arris roll is typical of the stages between the
.06 Ibid.. p. 312.
H Ilarbison has argued that the cross slab found at Annaghdo"n. "hich suggest the
site ora sixth centul) nunl'lCf). 1lI!l) be misleading as it could ha\C been placed tht.TC at
some latcr date. ",
.. Fancy. 'Galway Excavations' p. 319.
-¥I 11.0. l.cask. Irish churches {lnd nl(JIIllslic build/,,}!,~·. 1 (Dundalk. 1977). pp. 92-3.
100.
<,(I Duignan and Killanin. The Shell guide ta Ireland. p. 57.
<I Ibid.. p. 100.
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Romanesque and Gothic styl~. Because of this motiF. Leas/.. gives it a date no
earl ier than c. 1180.j !
This Romanesque architecture has another significance. The detection of
Romanesque in Ireland is often but not exclusively synonymous with the
reform communities. such as that of the Augustinians. Most of the
Augustinian abbeys which employed the Romanesque style were those
established at existing native sites. such as seen here at Annaghdown. While
the amount ofinfonnation at Annaghdown, is scant. there is much that can be
inferred regarding the lifestyle of the nuns. especially ",hen compared to
contemporary nunneries. The foundations suggest a building construction.
similar to elsewhere in Europe and Ireland. lis ctose proximity to the male
order is typical of Irish Arroasian double houses. There is no record of the
drainage system, which could tell archaeologists more about diet and lifestyle.
The pipes. usually made of lead in the twelfth century, were valuable itcms
and were most likely stolen after the sitc "'as abandoned. Perhaps even equally
importanl would be an investigation of the Irish Annals to reveal the
involvement of the women of St. Mary, Annaghdown with the outlying
community. With both archaeological information and evidence from the
Annals being negligible, it is hard to determinc the contribution of these
women in medieval society. Yet, if we can compare them to their compatriots
elsewhere. it would be highly probable that these women were crucial to the
religious life in the parish of Annaghdown.
Archaeological studies of nunneries have certainly expanded the
knowledgeofmonasticism in medieval Ireland. Material remains have helped
to paint a picture of the daily lives of these women, who opted for a life of
celibacy and devOlion rather than the traditional occupation of wife and
mOlher. They played an important role in thcir communities as religious
leaders. nurses, teachers and intercessors. Yet, research in this area of
monastic archaeology is only beginning. There are many questions still left:
unanswered. feX example, how different were the lives of these women to
contemporary lay women in Ireland, how did the reputation of twelfth century
religious women compare with the prior role of women in Ireland, and was the
experience of nuns in Ireland similar to elsewhere in Europe?
At present, the answers to these questions cannot be found in
archaeological remains, thus begging for further research and excavation of
female monasteries. Though answl,.'fS to the above questioos are lacking in the
archaeological record. they can sometimes be detected in historical text. For
<1 Ibid.. p. 157.
48
example, women in hagiographies. such as St. Brigit in the Vitae o/SI. Brigit
0/ Kildare. composed in the seventh century, and in epic tales such as Queen
Medbh in the Tain, illustrate that women did indeed play a crucial role in Irish
society. commanding respect and reverence from their community. In ancient
Ireland, women were employed in important social occupations such as
priestess. physician or poeless. Law tracts also show that lay women were
often seen as equals with men, though men still held superiority in marriage
unions, as male mooks did over most double monasteries. For example, the
law tract. Crilh Gahlach. states: 'To his wife belongs the right to be consulted
00 e..ery subject.' With such an established respect for women. it is no surprise
that women were allowed a crucial part in the religious devotioo of the Irish
people.
Answers to questions such as why Irish women chose a religious life can
be implied by written documents left by their colleagues abroad. For example,
at Ihe beginning of the ,"elfth cenlury, a young Englishwoman, Christina of
Markyate. took the veil to defy her parents who wished her to marry, and
escaped secretly dressed in men's clothing to her spiritual mentor. Queen
Eleanor of Aquitiane al the end of the twelfth century used the monastery at
Fontcvrault as her place ofrctircment. Heloise (1101-63). the woman fumed in
Abelard's The story ofmy calamities. became a nun to restore her dignity and
honour after her affair with Abelard in twelfth century Paris.53
Irish religious women. for various reasons and in various locations, joined
monastic establishments in twelfth century Ireland, thus becoming an
influential force in twelfth century monastic reform. Their lifestyle, as depicted
in archaeological remains. reflect, in general. a life of simplicity and a move
away from the wealth and ostentation corrupting the Irish Church at the time.
Though their voices might be lost to history, their material remains tell of the
religious devotion of these women and their efforts to improve Christian life in




'1 Andcrson and Zinsser. A history of'heir Q111J, pp. 194. 198.
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Celtic and Christian cures
Healing wells in the County Limerick I
Micheal 6 hAodha
Written and oral sources confirm that Irish people have been VISll1t1g holy
wells and other places associated with saints for many hundreds aryears. They
go there to pray and 10 ask for favours. Many wells are famous fo~ the cur~s
associated with them and in past centuries people travelled long dIstances III
the hope of a cure. The connection between watery places, religion and healing
is a very old phenomenon and is found throughout the world. Archaeological
finds al Gaulish sacred wells such as Chamalieres and Fonles Sequanae
indicate that healing waters played a very important role in Celtic religion. 11
is said that the legendary druid and doctor Dian Cecht prepared a holy well to
heal the men injured at the Battle of Moytura and the custom of visiting holy
wells is mentioned in our oldest literature. Christianised versions of these well
stories can be found in the Lives afthe Irish saints written before the twelfth
century. In later centuries these wells became the scene for patterns and
faction fights with thousands of people attending on certain occasions.
This paper will examine some accounts of pilgrimages to holy wells. with
specific reference to wells in County Limerick. As with any rural gathering the
pilgrimage to a healing well was a great social occasion. Occasionally
travellers to Ireland wrote down their impressions of what they saw. One
Englishman described a scene he observed at a holy well near Cork city in
1778:
We went this morning to that I\\clll ofSt Bartholomcw which being that
saint's dav was surrounded hv vast crowds of Roman Catholics some upon
their kne~s. at their devotion' and others walking with their beads in their
hands. This ceremony is here called a ·Patron·. The well is enclosed with
trees close to the side ofthc road and even the sight of it looks rcfreshing.
When thcir devotions were o\'er thc)' rctircd to sC\'eral sUllers' tents
en..oc{cd for that purpose. some to cat and drink. others to wrestling. and
yclling. dancing. noise and mcrriment which brought on sc\'cral boxing
1 This paper is almost entirely based on oral history material oollech.-d in County
Limerick during thc I940s by An Cartlann Choimisiun Bcaloidcasa na h-Eireann. This
collel,,'1ion is held in University Collegc Dublin.
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bouts while \\e stood there. [n short it is cxactly what wc call a 'wakc' in
England. setting aside Ihe dcvotion.2
At some wells diseases were cured but in other cases lhe well or the saint
seems 10 have specialised in performing specific cures. Such names as Tabar
na Slit-the Eye Well - or Tabar na P1aighe - the Well oftlte Plague suggests
this. Tabar Brfde in the parish of Darragh, County Limerick, was particularly
associated with cures for whooping cough in Children, the patient being
brought there to drink the water on I February, the feast of SI. Brigid. The
blessed well in Ballingarry, County Limerick, was associated with diseases of
lhe stomach and the bowel while other Limerick wells including SI. Bemard's
in Rathkeale and SI. Patrick's in Ardpatrick were associated with a more
diverse range of cures including those for rheumatism, lameness and rickets.
The most common cures associated with Irish holy wells are those for sore
eyes. If one is to judge by the number and popularity of eye wells, chronic
inflammation of Ihe eyes and eyelids must have been common complaints.
Presumably many people suffered from myopia as few people would have worn
glasses until relatively recently. Another cause of eye inflammation might
have been the smoke-filled cabins in which most people lived. One reason why
eye wells were so popular may be as a result of the Bible story that tells of
Christ curing a blind man at Ihe pool of Silae. The New Testament account
may have boosted the belief in eye cures, but evidence from Europe strongly
suggests that eye cures were being sought at wells even in pre-Christian times.
Tobarnanoran (Tabar na nAmhnin) in the parish of Rochestown has two eye
curing legends associated with it. both of which give rise to its name.
According to one story a blind man in England had a vision of the well. He
came to Ireland and was led to the well where he heard sweet hymns to Our
Lady and was cured. Another legend says that an itinerant French monk or
scholar was cured of blindness at the well and began to sing songs of praise al
the well, thus giving it its name.
The exact ritual carried out by the pilgrims to the holy wells varied from
parish to parish and from county to county. It is fair to say however that they
were all variations on a theme. After some preliminary prayers - usually some
decades of the Rosary - the pilgrim would approach the well and kneel there
to say some more prayers. The pilgrims might circle the well, drink some of
. ,-
the water, dip his or her hand ~nd bless themselves while circling. Beside the
well there might be a stone or a tree that was associated with the patron saint
and these might also be circled while praying. Three circuits of the well were
2 P.D. Ilardy. The ho(v wells of Ireland(Dublin. 1836).
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common and pilgrims sometimes did lhese circuits on their knees. The IIIras.
or pattern to the well. would be made on certain days, for example. on a
Monday or a Thursday or selection of certain days of the week for certain
aaions.
Three trips would often be made 10 the well for a cure. The power of the
'magicar number three appears again and again in all kinds of rituals all over
lhe world. and is solidly reinforced by lhe role that number has played in the
Christian tradition. Tobermacduagh (Tobar·Mo.-ehua) in the parish of
Darragh in south Limerick - a well named after the saint Darrach Mochua
who was patron of the parish as early as 1185 - would have been a typical
example ofthis ritual involving the number three. A pattern was held there on
31August each year. The ceremonies performed included three rounds of the
well wilh a decade of the Rosary being recited on each round. Drinking cups
for the pilgrims were kept in a little wooden shrine in a tree next to the well.
Votive offerings ofmgs and religious objects were sometimes left at the well.
The custom of leaving a votive offering was an essential part of any
pilgrimage to a holy well. This tradition goes back at least as far as the Middle
Ages when rich people went on pilgrimages and made very generous offerings.
thereby making some shrines very profitable. This practice was not confined to
Christianity alone. In India pilgrims left votive offerings at holy places.
Anyone visiting a holy well in Ireland was expected to leave something behind
as a token. This could include anything from a coin to a safety pin. Whether
this practice of leaving trinkets or rags derived its inspiration from the desire
to please and petition. or from the belief that illness can be transferred by
means of contagious magic is not clear. Sometimes the offerings of medals.
crosses. pins. rosary beads. coins, flowers. rags. and even crutches. were left
on the ground or on a tree near the well. Pins and nails were driven into a tree
above the well at St. Bemard's Well in Rathkeale. in what may have been
symbolic of Christ's crucifixion. Some wells that were known for a cure for
warts saw a practice where the pilgrim lifted a little water on the point ofa pin
and dropped it onto the wart. When this was done the pin was placed in the
water to rust away and it was believed that as the pin rusted the wart would
disappear.
Another form of offering particularly common in the penal years of the
eighteenth century was the collection for the Roman Catholic priest. This
became common practice when people assembled at a holy well on the feast
day of the patron saint. Collections such as these were often made at weddings
and funerals and it is only in recent times that the custom of paying funeral
olTcrings has come to an end in certain parts of Ireland.
While many sufferers benefited from their contact with healing wells there
is another side to them also evident in the tradition. Places believed to convey
supernatural power posed a grave danger to those who desecrated them or did
not respect the rituals inherent in the healing process. Early examples of the
alleged vilification by travelling people are evident in the traditions associated
with Sunday's Well (Tobar Ri an Domhnaigh) in Ask-eaton and Patrick's Well
in Grean. The well in Askeaton was reputed to have been desecrated by a
travelling woman \\'ho stopped to wash clothes in it. while the well in the
parish ofGrean moved because a travelling woman bathed her child in it. Two
alternate traditions of why the well mo..ed apply to the holy well at
Toberstroke in the parish of Caheravally. One account states that the well
moved when a local person washed clothes there. The other says that some
passing Cromwellian soldiers washed their clothes in the well thereby
descecrating it and causing it to change location. Toberanoran (Tabor na
nAmhrim or Tohar an Fhuarain) in the parish of Rochestown is also said to
have moved because someonc washed shecp in the well. The 'movement' of
wells is common in every county, but a more natural explanation can be
countenanced as a more reliable explanation. Wells. including holy wells.
sometimes dry up for geological or agricultural reclamation reasons. Where
the reason for a well's disappearance was not obvious, some supernatural
reason would be sought to explain what had happened.
Ingratitude in relation to a cure was also a reason for censure according to
tradition. Following a visit to St. Colman's Well in the parish of Colmanswell.
a Limerick man foond that he was no longer lame. He left his crutches at the
wen as a ..otive offering. Later, hO\o,'Cver he repented ofhis generosity and took
his crutches back to sell them. His lameness returned. Another tradition relates
the story ofa man ....'hose money vanished from his pockets. as he went past St
Coleman's well, because he worked on the day of the pattern.
Another phenomenon particularly associated with holy wells in Ireland is
the appearance of fish as ponents of healing. In Celtic mythology deities were
believed to assume the form of various creatures and sometimes fish. who were
believed to live in certain watery places from the earliest times. There arc
many stories of legendary fish in the Lives of,he Irish saints while another
well.known fish legend is that of.t;ionn Mac Cumhaill and the 'salmon of
knowleage'. If a person believed in thOe sanctity and healing power of the water
of the well, it would follow that any fish found in a well must be supernatural.
The appearance of fish, especially ecl or trout, is associated with the traditions
of many holy wells in County Limerick. If the fish was spotted while visiting
the well it was a premonition of a cure. Healing fish were· associated with
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Sunday Well in Askealon, SI. James' Well in Nautcnan and Lady's Well or
Sunday Well in Cloncagh, Tobermacduagh in Oarragh, St. Molua's Well in
Emlygrennan and Lady's Well in Ballylanders.
In Ireland there is hardly a parish that does not have a holy well
somewhere within its boundaries. Some of these wells are forgotten now and
are no longer treated as 'holy' while a number of these sites have seen a
revival in pilgrimage in the last ten years or so. Although the customs
associated with many ofthese wells have all but disappeared during the course
of this century, increasing curiosity is leading many to visiting holy wells.
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From 'castle' bishop to 'moral leader'?
Edward 0' Dwyer and Irish nationalism
1914-7
Jerome aan de Wiel
Edward Thomas O'Dwyer was born in Tipperary in 1842. Although he
was never a member of any nationalist political organisation, his
background suggests an early involvemenl in Irish politics. He
supported lsaac Butt, the founder of the Home Rule Party, in the 1870s
and was convinced that Home Rule would bring prosperity to Ireland.
O'Owyer sided with Butt in the first Home Rule campaign during the
election of 1871. On that particular occasion, he was the only priest
present on the platform. I
O'Dwyer, who was consecrated bishop of Limerick in 1886, did
much for the neglected working class of Limerick and was rapidly
noticed for his shattering declarations on Irish public life. lie disagreed
vehemently with the Plan of Campaign, during the Land War, that had
been adopted by some members of the Home Rule Party. This plan
sought to gain a decrease in rent that farmers paid to landlords; if the
latter refused, fanners paid no rent at all. Contrary to a majority of
prelates of the Catholic hierarchy, O'Owyer believed that the plan was
dangerous as it might provoke unrest. He also thought that it was
morally wrong since in County Limerick many tenants were coerced
into accepting the plan.1 As a result of his stand against the Irish
Parliamentary Party, O'Owyer became isolated within the hierarchy and
acquired the reputation of a maverick. BUI his position was soon
vindicated as Pope Leo XIII declared in 1887, that the Plan of
Campaign was not acceptable from a catholic point of view. Leo's
decision comforted the bishop and did much to strengthen his ultra
montane tendencies. O'Owyer became an absolute ruler in his diocese
and forbade his priests to absolve anybody who was involved in the
Plan ....$oon, many nationalists qme to believe that he was a 'castle'
~ ,
I E. O'Callaghan. Bishop Edward O'Dwyer and the course of/rishpolilics
/870-/9/7, (MA thesis. N.U.1.. Galway. 1976).
2 L. Geary, Bishop O'Dwyer and the land question. symposium on I3ishop
O'Dwycr. lecture delivered in Mary Immaculate College. Limerick. May 1998.
55
bishop, working for the British Government, or worse a -landlord'
bishop.
Before the First World War. O'Dwyer was mainly concerned with
education. Up 10 that point, he had always been suspicious of the Home
Rule Party's alliance with the liberals in the House of Commons. He
suspected that the Liberal Party was trying to suppress religion in
schools and that this might eventually lead to the secularisation of
Ireland if home rule was pul into operation. When John Redmond was
appointed leader of the party in 1900. O'Dwyer was reassured since
Redmond had been campaigning for home rule and the creation of a
Catholic university. His opinion of the pany fluctuated according to
political events for he questioned Redmond's wisdom in trusting the
Liberal Party and their promises concerning Irish autonomy.
However. a few months before the outbreak of war in Europe.
O'Dwyer staned to doubt seriously the Government's sincerity towards
nationalist Ireland, despite Home Rule being approved by the House of
Commons in 1912. Ulster's mte. where a majority of people. mainly
proleslant, opposed autonomy, had yet to be decided. On 21 May 1914.
he wrole to Monsignor Michael O'Riordan. rector of the Irish College in
Rome. stating that partition was imminent and that John Redmond's
party was making mistakes.J On the eve of me war, O'Dwyer had
reached the conclusion that the Irish Party was nol taking into account
nationalist public opinion and had, so it seemed, anticipated troubles in
the north of the country. When the war broke out in August 1914, home
rulers and unionists agreed to shelve home rule until after the war.
Irehmd was in the grip of war fever; the nationalists under John
Redmond, formed the sixteenth Irish Division, symbol of Ireland's new
nationhood, whereas Sir Edward Carson and his unionist supporters
formed the thirty-sixith Ulster Division, symbolising Ulster's
attachment to the United Kingdom. Only a handful of Irish Volunteers
remained under the command of Eoin MacNeil, who were more extreme
in their nationalism. believing that the war was not Ireland's figh!.
Between 1914 and 1915, the war was relatively popular in Ireland.
The major newspapers supported it and displayed as much jingoism as
their English or continental counterparts. They did much to encourage
Irishmen to join the British anny. In August 1914, the nationalist Cork
l O'l)wycr to O·Riordan. 21 May 1914. Irish College Rome, O'Riordan papers
(15) 123.
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Examiner reported that 'Rule Britannia' could be heard in Cork and that
the police had been obliged 10 baton-charge an overexcited crowd trying
to see the soldiers off. and unwillingly preventing their departure.· The
recruitment figures seem to allest this enthusiasm: between August and
December 1914, forty-three thousand men enlisted, and between
January and August 1915, another thirty-seven mousand fol1owoo.5 The
Irish Catholic Church was overwhelmingly in support of the war
although two important prelates, Cardinal Logue from Annagh, and
Archbishop Walsh from Dublin. had strong reservations.' O'Dwyer's
reaction to the war had been quite long in coming. Being ultra montane
and not sure about nationalist Ireland's future, he decided to voice Pope
Benedict XV's peace appeals and consequently did not specifically
blame the Central Powers - Gennany, Austria·Hungary and Italy - for
the war. In November 1914. he declared: 'people talk lightly of the war
going on for years; some public men speak of carrying it on until their
enemies are beaten to their knees. We must beware of a proud and
insolent spirit, which is not the spirit of the Christian religion'.7
O·Dwyer. inspired by the pope's recent encyclical Ad Beatissimi, had
warned Redmond indirectly.
In February 1915, O'Dwyer wrote an eloquent Lenten pastoral in
which he stated that the war was pure folly and that it had to stop
immediately. In Rome, O'Riordan was struck by O'Dwyers eloquence
and his position on the conflict, an identical one to that of the pope. The
rector of the Irish College decided to translate the pastoral into Italian
and presented it to Benedict XV and to other Vatican officials. Cardinal
Gasparri, the secretary of state, declared that the pope was extremely
satisfied. O'Riordan would systematically translate O'Dwyer's writings
and this would have important consequences as it mcilitated a
rapprochement between the Holy See and nationalist Ireland.9
~The Cork Examiner. 6 August 1914.
~ J. Lee. frs/and. /9/2-85: politic! muJ~ie~v (Cambridge. 1989). p. 23.
6 J. aan de Wicl ..L 'Eglise Calholique en f(/onde. 19/-1·19/8: guerre et
polirique' (Ph.D. thesis. UnivcrsityofCacn. 1998), pp. 44·146.
7 The Tablel. 12 December 1914.
q J. nan de Wiel. . Monsignor O·Riordan. Uishop O'Owycr and the shaping of
new relations between nationalistlrcland and thc Vatican during World War 1'.
in Eludes Irlandaises. 24 (1999). pp. 137-47.
• 57
On 28 July 1915, the pope made an ineffectual appeal for peace.
Only a few days before, Redmond had written to Dublin City Council
that the war was the main preoccupation at the moment and that
nothing could prevent home rule from becoming law. lO His leller was
meant to reassure nationalist Ireland but Redmond was somewhat
worried. His anxieties may have renected a change in the public mood.
A consequence of that change was a rapid fall in the number ofrccruits.
There were several reasons for this. Firstly, Irish nationalist recruits
were not ....~II-treated as Lord Kitchener. minister for war, was deeply
suspicious of Irish nationalism. Secondly, the war office disliked
promoting Irish nationalism in ils recruitment campaigns. 11 Thirdly, the
courage and bravery of Irish regiments at the /Tont was rarely
ackno"Jedged by the poorly organised recruitment authorities in
Ireland. l1 Fourthly, there was the new coalition cabinet: in Britain.
which included Carson and the intransigent unionist James Campbcll.
To nationalist Ireland, this meant that the English liberal prime
minister. Herbert Asquith, would probably nOl extend home rule to
Ulster. Finally, some nationalists opposed to Redmond became more
radical as the war dragged on, with home rule rapidly falling from sight
as the conflict persisted.
It was at that particular moment that O'Dwyer decided to intervene
publicly by asking Redmond to hear the pope's appeal and to "or~ for
peace. It "''as the beginning of a personal confrontation. O'Owyer was
too clever a politician not to know that Redmond was facing some
difficulties. He also knew that the people were fed up with the war. lie
must have known beforehand that his letter supporting the pope's
initiatives would cause a sensation in Ireland. especially in republican
and nationaHst opposition circles and that these nationalists would use
his leller against Redmond. It can be argued that it was O'Owyer's plan
to guide this rising radical nationalism before it degenerated into
violencc. Whatever his hidden motives, the result was a hard blow for
Redmond. In the [eller, O'Dwyer asked Redmond to think about the
hundreds of thousands of men that were being sacrificed in a senseless
war and nOl to follow die-hard politicians and statesmen. But far more
interesting was a paragraph which O'Dwyer devoted to the future
10 71,e Tablel. 31 Jul) 1915.
11 r. Dcnman. Ire/al/d's unknown soldiers (Blaekrock. 1992). pp. 22. 34-5.
I~ G. Dangertield. The damnable questiQn (London. 1977). p. 131.
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economic crisis that would hit Ireland after the war and ruin many
fanners. England, loser or winner, would not sufTer as much:
Then. Ihe moment the war ceases. there will be a sudden collapse
of prices ... Strong men will be hard set to keep Iheir heads o\er
water: but the ordinary fanners \\il1 find it CllOUgh to do 10 pay
their annuities much less to meet an unheard-of taxation load.
England. too. \\il1 feel the suain. bul she has greal resources ."
Whate\er way !he war goes, Ishel \\il1 TCOO\Cr her proslXrity. [f
Ithe war) goes on for anothcr )'Car, it will sink us in irretrievable
. u
rum.
O'Dwyer had used the economic argument remarkably well. This could
not fail to impress a predominantly agricultural country.
Redmond was in an awkward position. On the one hand, if he
accepted O'Dwyer's plea, he risked breaking up his alliance with the
English libentls which might lead Ilerbert Asquith to adopt a more
favourable attitude to the unionists. To unionists, very much in favour of
pursuing the war, it would justify their fears that home rule would mean
Rome rule. Partition would become unavoidable. On the other hand. if
Redmond refused, his grip on nationalist Ireland might slacken. He
knew well that farmers would be impressed by O'Dwyer's economic
arguments, aJl the more since the country was enjoying an economic
boom. Furthermore. the existing gap between his party and more radical
nationalists would widen. Eventually, Redmond decided to respond
negatively. He still believed that he was able to impress the majority of
the nationalist population. His reply, however, was short and not at all
appropriate to O'Dwyer's letter. He simply Slated: 'to the best of my
judgement, the course of action you suggest to me would not be
calculated to promote the cause of peace'. He equally said that Germany
was the aggressor in the war and that she should repair all the wrongs
that she had inflicted upon Belgium and France. I " Incredibly, Redmond
did not even try to show that O'Dwyer was wrong in his economic
arguments! It was a monumental blunder. Various nationalist opposition
movements attacked Redmond and were full of praise for O'Dwyer.
MacNeill wrote in The Irish Volunteer that:
Mr. Redmond has not ventured 10 controvert the Ilishop of
Ul'l:l~rick's forecasl oflwenly mil1~ pounds a year to be levied on
IJ O'Dwyer to Rt:dmond, 4 August 1915. Limerick Diocesan Ofl1ce. O'I)Y:yer
papers. tile 11.
1" The Tablel. 21 August 1915.
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Ireland - if Ireland submits. lie has awidcd the disagreeable
subject. and blinked the Bishop's questions. IS
This matter may have hastened Redmond's decline in Irish political life.
O'Dwyer was 'satisfied' with the outcome of his correspondence with
Redmond. On 13 August 1915, he wrote to O'Riordan:
I havc had a simple refusal from fRedmondl to bring any pressurc
to bear on the govemment. but I rather think the popular lear of
taxation and poverty will soon bring pressure on himscir. ]-le and
the Irish Pany are afraid to do an)1hing. Thc Home Rule carrot
keeps the Irish donkey moving·. 16
If the bishop of Limerick's intervention had had impressed nationalist
opinion, the population remained willing to change political allegiance.
As the political crisis dragged on with no solution in sight, a general
apathy or indifference towards the war, home rule and partition took
hold over the masses. Redmond tirelessly continued with his recruitment
policy. On 18 October 1915, he declared to the representatives of Dublin
city, that Ireland had produced magnificent recruitment figures. L7 This
was untrue since voluntary enlistment figures had drastically dropped at
the end of 1915. 18
In November 1915, a second confrontation between O'Dv.yer and
Redmond took place, resulting in further damage to Redmond's
reputation. In October 1915, the recently created department of
recruitment in Ireland launched a new campaign. The losses of the tenth
Irish division at Gallipoli had been critical and public opinion in the
country started to believe that Irish nationalist soldiers were being
deliberately being used as cannon fodder by British generals. L9
According to New Ireland, an opposition newspaper. the police had
established a list of potential recruits throughout the country.lO Some
Irishmen panicked and when trying to emmigrate to the United States
by embarking from Liverpool, they were prevented from doing so by a
hostile English mob. The Press Association interviewed Redmond about
the incident. He tried to reassure British public opinion by saying that
IS The Irish I'olurneer. 21 August 1915.
16 O'Dwyer to O·Riordan. 13 August 19151rish College Rome. O·Riordan
papers. (107).
17 The Tablel, 23 October 1915.
IS Lee. Ireland 1912-85, pp. 23-4.
19 Denman. Ireland's unknown soldiers. p. 131.
20 New Ireland. 13 November 1915.
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only some pcople in the west of Ireland had been involved and that 'it
was very cowardly of them to try and emigrate,.21 This last sentence was
the beginning of the end of Redmond's political career, O'Dwyer was
terribly outraged by Redmond's remark and wrote a vitriolic ICII~r
against him and the Irish Party. It was censored in Dublin but Lt
appeared on 11 November 1915 in the Limerick Chronicle and the Cork
Examiner. I-le denounced the behaviour of the English mob and argued
that Irish people had every right to emigrate because the war in Europe
was not theirs. He stated:
Their blood is not stirred by the memories of Kosovo. and they
have no burning desire to die for Serbia. They would much prefer
to be allowed to till their own potato gardens in peace in
Connemara. Small nationalities ... and all the other cosmopolitan
considerations that rouse the enthusiasm of the Irish Party are far
100 high nying for uneducated peasants.
Concerning home rule. he was of the opinion that it would never be
implemented and that the war would ruin Ireland. Finally, he made a
personal attack on Redmond: 'Yet the poor fellows who do not sce the
advantage of dying ... are to be insulted as 'shirkers' and 'cowards',
and the men whom they have raised to power and influence have not
one word to say on their behalf .22 To these whom Redmond had called
cowards, O'[)wyer had become a defender against conscription.
Incredible as it may seem, Redmond decided not to counter
O'Dwyer despite the fact that the bishop's letter had created a sensation.
Perhaps the home rule leader believed that to be dragged into a pu~lic
controversy with a member of the Catholic hierarchy would go agamst
him and give more publicity to O'Dwyer. The difference between the
two men was that O'Dwyer took into account the evolution of Irish
public opinion to the war whereas Redmond still believed that he would
be able to change it. Of course, one should not forget that Redmond was
obliged to take into account the unionist and the British cabinet's
opinion of the conflict and therefore, from a political point of view, he
had far less room for manoeuvre than O·Dv.yer.
Arthur Griffith's Nationalily, MacNeill's Irish Volunleer and The
Hibernian. published and praised-Q'Dv.yer's letter. His popularity and
reputation went far beyond the lim'fts of his diocese. The Royal Irish
11 Ibid.
II TheCorl< Examiner. 11 November 1915.
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Constabulary reponed that O'Dwyer's letter had been found and used
against the war and Redmond in at least seventeen counties.23 On 25
November 1915. Augustine Birrell. the Irish chief secretary. reponed
that 'the distribution (ofO'Dwyer's letter] should not be allowed but I
do not think in view of the circulation the letter has had already we can
usefully try 10 stop its funher circulation,.N Dublin Caslle was
powerless. It cannot be contested that 0' Dwyer had played an important
role in sapping the grip of the party on nationalist Ireland. On 12
January 1916, he wrote to O'Riordan Ihat:
it is \"cry hard to gauge opinion in Ireland now. Rcdmond and the
Freeman's speak and write like British Gingos ... nle Gaelic
League has done good work and has deserved well of the country.
The 'Party' are contemptiblc',2~
O'Dwyer's reference to the Gaelic League and his judgement on the
Irish Party signalled a radicalisation in his political views. The events of
the Easter 1916 would confirm this.
The Easter Rising against British rule was a military failure. The
Irish people had largely been against it. However, when Patrick Pearse,
James Connolly and other leaders were summarily exccuted, public
opinion tumed against the authorities. With the exception of
Archbishop Walsh of Dublin and Bishop Fogarty of Killaloe, the
majority of the Catholic hierarchy had condemned the rebels. O'Dwyer
had not voiced publicly any opinion about the event until 6 May 1916
when General Maxwell, the commander-in-chiefof the army in Ireland,
asked him to take disciplinary sanctions against two priests of his
diocese whom he accused of having republican sympathies. Before
answering, the bishop enquired into the matter and found out that the
two priests in question had indeed ties with the Volunteers. However, he
decided that both men were perfectly entitled to their opinions. This was
an indication that O'Dwyer was in a very nationalist trame of mind
when he wrote his reply to Maxwell. The vehemence of his arguments
against Maxwell and British rule was not surprising when one takes into
2J David Miller. Church. state and IWlion in Ireland 1898-/91/ (Dublin. 1973).
p.317.
:4 'Printed copies oflhe Bishop ofLimeriek's leller distributed in County
Donegal'. 2 December 1915. Public Rt."COrd Office. London. CO 904/207.
~~ O' Riordan to O·D""ycr. 12 January 1916. Irish College Rome, 0' Riordan
papcrsll6) 17.
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account his frustration with the Irish Party and the execution of the rebel
leaders. O'Dwyer had timed to perfcction his public answer to Maxwell
for at that precise moment Asquith was in Ireland in order to assess the
political situation. His letter also coincided with a debate on
conscription in Ihe House of Commons. On 17 May 1916, his letter was
published by the Cork Examiner and the Evening Mail. Firstly, he
defended his two priests and then attacked Maxwell. He wrote thal
Maxwell was a 'military dictator; and denounced the executions which
had 'outraged the conscience ofthe country'.
O'Dwyer's letter had an astounding impact on nationalist Ireland.
The very republican minded Monsignor Curran, Archbishop Walsh's
secretary, noted that in Dublin. the Evening Mail had published the
letter and was sold out despite the warnings of the authorities.26 The
population rallied to O'Dwyer as he became their new champion. He
was S(.'en as their best guarantee against conscription, especially in rural
Ireland.
O'Dwyer was a shrewd political observer and considered that the
executions had not been entirely in vain. According to him, the
executions had stirred the nationalist people. On 18 May 1916, he wrote
to 0' Riordan that 'the country was being hypnotised by the politicians,
but it is being revived these days'.28 He was right. In the summer of
1916, during which the issues of conscription and partition were being
debated, new nationalist parties began to offer an alternative to the
Home Rule Party. They were the Irish Nation League of George
Murnaghan, the Repeal League of Michael Judge, and Sinn Fein of
Hcrbert Pim, The danger for the nationalist opposition was political
tragmentation at a crucial time. The parties lacked political leadership,
as many were in prison. Quite naturally, it was at this juncture that
some nationalists began to consider O'Dwyer. The Irish Opinion and
the Irish Nation published speeches of 0' Dwyer, some from before the
war. A republican supporter wrote a poem reflecting the situation:
Who shall ..... rite the Easter story
Who is worthy to relate
All its romance. hopes. and glory
.. ~.
---=-------- •
~b Monsignor Curran's memoirs, '01'. O'Dwyer's famous letter 10 General
Maxwell·. National Library of Ireland. SCan T. O'Kelly papers. MS 27728(1).
Cl! O'Dwycr 10 O·Riordan. 18 May 1916. Irish College Rome, O'Riordan
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Ilow our leaders met their rate...
God has !ell us yet one hero
His pen is like a sword orlirc.
Ireland loves him. Ircland thanks him.
God watch O'er you. Bishop O'Dwyer.z9
IfO'Dwyer had become the opposition's hero. it is not surprising that
Stcphen O'Mara of the Irish Nation League asked him to become a
member, But the bishop refused. However, O'Dwyer was well aware of
the present difficulties that the nationalist opposition was facing. On 31
August 19 [6, he wrote to O'Riordan:
If [WilliamJ O'Brien UIld [T.M.I llealy had not diSL....cdited
themselves we should have an alternativc. but as it is, I do not sce
who are to displace the ·Party". unless as is not improbablc, the
Sinn Fein mcn gather strCII/:,'lh cnough to rout thcm,JO
O'Dwyer feared above all the division of the opposition and had taken a
serious interest in Sinn Fein, Since its creation by Griffith in 1905, he
had been able to follow its progress and analyse its policy. Sinn Fein did
not have an organisation comparable to the Irish Party, but belonged to
this new nationalist grouping which included the Gaelic League and the
Gaelic Athletic Association, O'Dwyer decided to aid Sinn Fein in
becoming the new nationalist political force in Ireland. An opportunity
was given to him to do so when the city of Limerick decided to confer
on him the freedom of the city on 14 September 1916. During his long
acceptance speech, he explained that he understood the rebels. although
he did not agree with their use of violence, and he denounced the
hypocrisy of the British Government concerning home rule and the war
in the defence of small nations. He finally announced his support for
Sinn Fein:
I will state my alternative to the Party, who trust the Liberals. and
are now reduced to the statesmanship of Micawber - waiting for
something to turn up. ,.. Sinn Fein is, in my judgement. the true
principle, and alliance with English politicians is the alliance of the
lamb with the wolell
What exactly Sinn Fein stood for was problematical. Some of its
members, such as Griffith, were in favour of a dual monarchy for
29 Limerick Diocesan Oflicc. 0' [)wyer papers.
.JO O'Rionian to O·Dwyer. 31 August 1916 Irish College Rome. O'Riordan
Papers. (17) 140,
Ireland based on the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. while others such as
Cathal Brugha favoured the idea of a republic. Moreover, O'Dwyer
knew that Griffith had not always been supportive of the Catholic
Church.3Z In fact. O'Dwyer had thrown a line to Sinn Fein; ifgrasped. it
could m('an a very effective collaboration between radical nationalism
and Catholicism. Subsequent events proved this to be true since Sinn
Fein played the 'Catholic card' in 1917 and 1918, trying to prove to the
nationalist population that the party was not eomposed of bloodthirsty
revolutionaries but of very respectable Catholics,J) It is difficult to
measure with certainty the impact of O'Dwyer's speech on the
nationalist population. However, if one takes into account his popularity
in the country, his public endorsement ofSinn Fein must have been very
significant. The Irish Opinion believed it was an historic speech.
Another man convinced of 0' Dwyer's importance was I-Ierbert ASQuith
himself. The British prime minister told his cabinet that among the
causes that had led to the radicalisation of Irish nationalism was the
bishop of Limerick's leller to General Maxwell.J4 As to O'Dwyer, he
was decidedly in a combative mood in the months of September and
October 1916, so much so that he forgot, or wished to forget, his own
political past. He declared to an amused Archbishop Walsh: 'When did
we ever get anything by constitutional means? We won the land laws by
shooting landlords. We won emancipation by the threat ofcivil war' .JS
The executions and the conscription and partition crises of the
summer of 1916 had done much to undennine the Irish Party's authority
on nationalist [reland, John Redmond had been seriously undennined by
David Lloyd George who had been entrusted with the mission to find a
reproachment between nationalists and unionists. so as not to hinder
voluntary enlistment in Ireland which by now was almost non-existent.
Lloyd George had prom ised Carson that partition of the country would
be definitive but had assured Redmond that it would be temporary.
When the matter became public, Redmond was terribly embarrassed. On
12 November 1916. John DiIlon, the party's deputy leader, made a very
angry speech in London entitled 'Ireland and the war in Europe' in
.. ~.
Jl Limerick Diocesan Office. O'Dwyer paJkrs. file 'Irish politics' 1912-22'.
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which he denounccd all the disastrous decisions taken by the cabinet
regarding Ircland.36 His speech, though ccrtainly objective, was meant
to put Redmond back in the driving seat and by using some of the
arguments of the nationalist opposition. Dilloll tried to neutralise this
same opposition. The Irish Party was still solidly implanted in Ireland
and the West Cork by-election of November 1916 proved that it was still
capable of winning, although no other nationalist opposed the
nationalist candidate.J7
If the Irish Party's influence was diminishing. the nationalist
opposition failed to garner this support. It was obvious that the Easter
Rising had provoked a nationalist renaissance but it remained to be seen
if the population was now ready to fight and die for a republic as
proclaimed by Pearse and Connolly. Certainly. nationalism had become
more radical. The pro-Redmond National Volunteers' decision to
repudiate the authority of their leader and re·unite eventually with the
Irish Volunteers in July 1917, proves the point. The military reports of
the British army provide an important glimpse at the political landscape
of the country. From these, it is clear that Sinn Fein was relatively
popular from September 1916 until the second half of 1917. 38 However.
this was mainly due to the sympathy the people felt for the executed
rebels and because Sinn Fein was resolutely against conscription and
any kind of participation in the war. British military intelligence noticed
that Sinn Fein 'lacked leaders, organisation, and aid from abroad and
[that it could not] affect much'. Equally, the intelligence officers had
noticed that the Catholic Church was in danger of losing its moral
authority with the people if it persisted in advocating voluntary
enlistment and that a gap between bishops and older priests, still in
favour of the Irish Party, and younger priests in favour of Sinn Fein had
taken place. This new trend was also noticed by the French diplomatic
corps who believed that if Catholicism was to oppose nationalism, the
lattcr would triumph. 39
JS I lagan papers 1916. letter no lOO, Curran to /-lagan. 15 October 1916.
)(, The Freeman's Journal, 13 Novcmber 1916.
31 13. Murphy, Pa/rick Pearse and the losl republican idea/lDublin. 1991), p.
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O'Dwyer continued his personal crusade against Redmond in 1917.
In February O'Dwyer wrote a passionate Lenten pastoral denouncing
militarism and pro-war die-hards like Redmond who had recently
declared that peace was not conceivable as long as German soldiers
were still in France. He denounced the chauvinistic attitude of the press,
and its emphasis on Gcrman atrocities. He believed that some attrocities
had taken place but he compared them with the behaviour of British
soldiers during the Easter Rising. He reiterated his most powerful
argument, that the war would cause an economic catastrophe in
lreland.4G O'Dwyer's pastoral had impressed many people, especially
those eligible for military service. Indeed, even though David L10yd
George, now prime minister, had decidcd not to impose conscription on
Ireland, the threat was still in the air: the disastrous offensive on the
Somme, in July 1916, had resulted in four-hundred and twenty thousand
casualties.41
On Saint Patrick's Day 1917, Count Plunkett took the initiative of
organising a convention of all the various nationalist opposition forces.
The debates were stonny but eventually all agreed that Ireland was an
independent nation and would send a delegation to the future peace
conference to seek international recognition. It was quite natural that
Plunkett asked O'Dwyer for help and that the latter authorised the
priests of his diocese to attend the meeting in Dublin.42 On 9 May 1917.
the South Longford by-election took place, contested by Sinn Fein and
the Irish Party. The possible influence of Archbishop Walsh of Dublin
who wrote a letter on the eve of the election, criticising the Home Rule
Party's disastrous policy, was decisive. O'Dwyer's letter, however, is
rarely mentioned and yet it was distributed throughout the whole
country. He firstly attacked the way rebel prisoners wcre treated in
English prisions and wondered how the United States gover~ment an.d
the important Irish·American population might react to thiS as theIr
country had just declared war on Gennany. Then, he made vitriolic and
ironic commcnts on Redmond and the Home Rule MPs:
. ~
40 Lent~n pastoral. FebruaT)' 1917, Limerlck Diocesan Oflice. O'Dwyer papers.
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I'hey arl: thl: 'patriots' that allo~ed that wretched measure ~hich
has.bt.-cn pasSt."d by Parliament to be hung up during the \\ar. and
~a\llng suspended the liberties of their count!') turned to rccruiting
In Ireland for the British GO\emmcnt ... The) are British
Pari iamentarians.· I
~ring in mind O'Dwyer's popularity, the letter must have had some
mfluence on the outcome of the election. On 16 June 1917, Eamon de
V~lera. still relatively unknown to the Irish public, was freed from
pn~ and shortly afterwards was campaigning in the East-Clare by_
election. O'Dwyer was satisfied with de Valera's speeches and \\'fOIe to
O·Rior.dan in Rome that the rising nationalisl politician was 'a good
Catholic and a clever fellow'.44 De Valera in turn understood that his
c~ances ~f elect~1 success would be increased considerably if he had
o Dwyer ~ public support, which he got just before the election. During
the campaIgn. he played the Catholic card and did much to convince lhe
people that he was not a dangerous revolutional).
.~ 19 AugU.Sl 1917, O'Dwyer died at the age of se\ent}-six. His
polTtlcal evolutIon from 'Castle' bishop to moral leader of a
disorganised nationalist opposition had been remarkable. He ensured
that Sinn Fein had a strong political foundation on which this party
could build in the years to rome. He hastened the demise of John
R~mond's Irish Party by systematically criticising the party's pr"war
pol~cy a.nd lack of independence of the English Liberal Party. All
natIonalist newspapers., including the Freeman's Journal, paid tribute to
O'Dwyer. But it was de Valera who made the most prophetic statement:
all Ireland o.... ed a debt of gratitude to Dr. O·D.....,,'Cr and she ~ill
not forget that debt. and his name willli\e in hisl.;ry and will be a
model for Irish bis~ .... OO wish to .... in the hearts ofthcir flocks.
As l~g as there are bishops such as Dr. O'o....)'Cr there .... iII never
be antl-etericalism in this land' .•s
The ",lessage w~ clear. If the Church wished to survive as a political
force In Ireland, It would have to collaborate with the new increasingly
powerful Sinn Fein.
., c .~rran pupers. Important prooouncement of the Bishop of Limerick'. 30
April 1917.
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Relinquishing educational dominance
The Catholic Church and Irish secondary schools
1829-1989
Annella Slack
The title of 'the island ofsaints and scholars' refers to the period following the
introduction of Christianity into Ireland when many of the great monastic
schools were founded. However, during the era of British rule, education for
the Catholic population in Ireland experienced repression and neglect.
Following Catholic Emancipation, the Catholic Church assumed an
increasingly dominant role in the Irish educational system. This paper will
examine the role and the influence of the ~hurch in Irish education,
particularly in secondary education, and will argue that the relative lack of
progress in education until the 19605 may have been due to the dominant
position of the Church within the educational structure.
Towards the end of the eighteenth century there was an easing in the
implementation of the penal laws. English politicians began to realise that all
attempts to abolish Catholicism in Ireland had failed. In order to end the bitter
strife in Ireland. they felt that by granting greater freedom and rights to the
Catholic Church. the latter would act as a means of pacifYing the masses of
Irish people. As Wolfe Tone argued: 'Persecution will keep alive the foolish
bigotry and SUpel"Stition ofany sect. Persecution bound the Irish Catholic to his
priest, and priest to the pope'. I Under the Relief Act of 1782, the Irish
parliament restored the right of Catholics to teach in schools and as a result,
schools specifically for the education of Catholics were established. The
Presentation Sisters were founded in 1791, the Irish Christian Brothers in
1802 and the Sisters of Mercy in 1828. The schools that these religious orders
established neither required nor necessarily wanted any state intervention, and
provided the first educational structure to cater for the needs of Irish Catholics.
With the establishment of these schools a strong alliance between the Church
and the Irish educational system was created.
As a res~lt of the new approach ~ted by the go~emment, ~a~ooth
College w:{~ founded in 1795 for the p~pose of educatmg Cathohc Priests.
The British government believed that through the training and educating of
priests within Ireland, the possibility ofconf1ict would be reduced, as Church
I John O'Beime Ranelagh. A short hislOry of/re/mul. (Cambridge) p. 118.
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leaders would not be exposed to other SOCieties or cultures. particularly
revolutionary France, and therefore any radical thoughts of reform would be
extinguished. In 1831 the national system of education was established
through ~hich. for the firs( time the go..'emment gave Catholics opportunities
to receive instruction in their o~n religion in schools. In a relatively short time
the number of Catholic schools. churches and institulions had grown
dramatically and had become a major force in Irish affairs. A parliamentary
report in 1838 argued for the support of secondary education 00 the basis of
the mixed denomination principle that had been established for the National
School system. The Catholic Church objected to such a principle of integrated
education, as they maintained that secondary schools were formalive
institutions for future clergy, in addition to providing a general Roman
Catholic education for other students. The year 1850 marked a milestone in
the power and influence of the Church. Cardinal Paul Cullen assembled a
synod at Thurles for the purpose of having a unified position in the whole area
ofeducation. The Church decided to continue to conduct secondary schools on
a private basis unless the state was prepared to fund denominational schools
and avoid interference with the Church's authority. As a result, the
Intennediate Education Act was passed in 1878. which established
examination boards and funding for schools, based on a payment-by-results
scheme.
The main effect of this act was to allow the state to give indirect funding
to secondary schools on the basis of examination results. The main function of
the Intennediate Educatioo Act was to act solely as an examining authority
which posed no Ihreat or challenge to the managerial aspect of secondary
schools owned by the Church. Fees were paid to the ecclesiastically appointed
manager, and who could then distributed those fees. Lay teachers who taught
in Catholic schools fared worse under this system. They generally received
much less than their ecclesiastical counterparts. Lay teachers had no contract,
no security of tenure, no stipulated salary scale and were operating on a results
system which did not benefit them financialJy for examination success, but
might punish them drastically for failures by reducing assurance of continuity
of employment.2 The Catholic school system had developed without state
assistance during an era of repression and active proselytising, and the
Catholic clergy were adamant in maintaing their influence, especially
appointing people of an ecclesiastical nature to their boards of management.
The lay teachers were often referred to as 'birds of passage' as they were not
1 S. OBuachalla. Educalion policy in twentieth cenlury Irelalld (Dublin. 1998). p. 46.
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supported by the Church. resulling in some having a very short working life
within the teaching profession.
One of the more serious consequences of the Intermediate Education Act
was the delay in introducing any specifications of minimum qualifica!ions. for
teachers in secondary schools. The whole area of teacher prof~lona~l~
needed reformation. The ecclesiastical ban on Catholics attendmg Tn~lty
College meant that very few teachers at second level had appropnate
qualifications. A report in 1905 revealed that only eleven per cent of male
teachers possessed a degree,while eight per cent of female teachers~ a
similar qualification.} A cleric in Blackrock College, when asked :or ~IS vIew
on the suggestion that all teachers be required to take an exam~natlon and
obtain a certificate. said that 'it would be a great and unnecessary mterference
with the liberty we now enjoy'.~ The clergy objected to a qualified teaching
profession because there was no recognised Catholic university in. the country.
However. in 1908. the Irish University Bill introduced by the chief secretary,
Augustine Birrell, established the Queens' U~iversity in Belfast and th-:ee
colleges of the National University of Ireland III Cork, Ga.'way.and Dublin.
Although the universities enrolled Catholics., the c1~gy. still objected to the
whole area of teacher professionalism. Other objections related to the
possibility that lay teachers would be better qualified than priests and would be
more entitled to teaching positions within secondary schools. Thus. the
Church viewed the area ofstate teacher qualifications as an interference, and a
weakening of the control they held over the Irish educational system. .
The establishment of the Department of Agriculture and Technical
Instruction (DATI) in 1899 evoked a new era of reform within the educational
system. It was the first department to be set up by the Br~tish .government to
meet Irish needs. The DATI established a system whereby It tramed people for
teaching posts and provided free summer courses. for tea~hers oft~h~ical.and
private institutions. Therefore, OATI was estab~lshed WIthout bemg l~ direct
conflict with the Catholic secondary schools as Its focus was on techmcal and
practical training as opposed to academic education. .
The passing of the Intennediate Education Amendment. Act III 1900.
allowed for the temporary inspection of schools. The Catholic Headmasters
Association (CHA) agreed to the in~ion of their schools. by. t~porary
inspectors. l'itley has suggested that this ~ision ~ the fi~st Illdlcatl~ that
the Catholic authorities were beginning to comply WIth state Illvolvment III the
}O'Buachal1a Education policy. pp. 48-9.
• B. Tilley. Church. state and control ofschooling in Ireland. 1900-44 (Dublin), p. 14.
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day-to-day running of schools. The Dale and Stephens Reporl of 1905
highlighted that Irish schools were inadequate and inferior compared to their
English counterparts and recommended the creation of a permanent
inspectorate and the establishment of a system of registration for secondary
teachers.
It was only in the late 1890s when secoodary schools were coming under
review Ihat lay teachers began to unite under the trade union movement. The
Association for Secondary Teachers in Ireland (ASTI) was founded in 1909.
The main aims of ASTI were firstly to secure a system of registration of
secondary teachers. secondly to secure an adequate salary·scale and thirdly to
obtain security of tenure and pension rights for members. The question of
teacher registration brought the ASTI into direct conflict with the Catholic
Church. There was a lengthy correspondence between Murphy, Secretary of
the CHA and Birrel!. on the issue of teacher registration. A compromise was
finally reached where it was agreed that a grant towards teachers salaries
would be paid from 1915 and a new body to deal with teacher registration
would be established in the amended Intermediate Education Act of 1914.
Educational review was becoming a major issue during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries in Ireland. Parliament decided that Irish
education should be aligned with its English counterpan. Two committees
were established to report on the positions of national and intermediate
education in Ireland. One of these. the Moloney Committee, drew attention to
the defects that it found in Irish secondary schools. These included the urgent
need for improvement in salaries, security of tenure and the provision of
pensions for intennediate teachers. the need for an organised and centralised
authority for primary, secondary and technical education and the abolition of
the ·payments--by·results' scheme. In response, Professor Timothy Corcoran
gave the apinion oflhe Church:
As loog as the Slate confines its services towards such schools, to tn.:
'promotion' of l,.'ducation. as it was rightly termed in the original
Intermediale Education Act. no difliculty will occur; but if the stale
assumes to 'control' or 'direct' the actual education given in Catholic
schools. issues of principle arise, The mosl essential issue in the Catholic
nature of Catholic schools is full Catholic cortlrol of the choice oftcachers,
retention oftcaehcrs and removal oftcachers.6
In 1919 Jamcs McPherson replaced Birrell as chief secretary.
MacPherson's tenure as chief secretary marked the final attempt by the British
6 Louis O'FlahcrlY, Management mul cOn/rol o/Irish educalion: a post-primary
experience. p. 17.
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government to regulate the Irish educational system, His education bill
supported the concept of one central educational authority and recommended
that provision should be made for the establishment of local education
councils. He was also vel)' careful to point out that he did nOl favour a
'Godless education' and that the COfltrol of secondary schools would remain
with the denominations.7 However the bi11 was shelved during the War of
Independence. As Titley suggests:
the abandonment of the Bill meant that the Church could enter an era of
iodepcndeTlce wilh school systems. both primary and scooodar). largely
under its control and y, ith certain confidc.:nce that changes would only take
place \~ith its oonsent.'
A dependency syndrome. inculcated during the colonial era, was reflected
in the new nail Eireann of 1922, The new Cumman no nGaedheal
government did not question the role that the Church had claimed in education
and openly avoided any interference in its structure. The principal reason for
this was that the political leaders were mainly products ofthe Catholic schools
and were devoutly Catholic in their personal lives. Eoin Mac eill made it
clear Ihat he. as minister for educatiOfl, would not introduce any structural
changes into the educational system. In tenns of curriculum development, it
could be argued that the political leaders of the day placed more emphasis on
the 'romantic Ireland' of language, music. history and geography rather than
asserting any constructive measures in the pedagogy or curriculum being
taught. Education was viewed as a tool in the creation of a new and
independent Irish culture.
Despite the strong influence of the Church. the educational system was
moving into an era where reform was necessary. The ASTI was gaining
recognition and playing a vital role in its fight for better conditions for lay
teachers. In May 1920, the ASTI conducted its first strike in Calholic schools
for the purpose of receiving a reasonable salary·scale. As a result, the
Intermediate Education Act of 1924 abolished the 'payment-by-results'
scheme and introduced capitation fees, This act also incorporated an increase
in salaries for teachers. However, the department of education was careful to
emphasise that, despite government involvement with the issue of teacher
salaries, 'the state has assumed no responsibility for the appointment of head-
. ".
•
" Titley, Church, stale and control ofschooling in Ireland. p. 60.
~ Ibid., pp. 69-70.
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masters or teachers. and the secondary system remains as hitherto one of
purely private management'.'
In an effort to impro\'e the quality of education and extend educational
opportunities for studcnls, the Vocational Education Act of 1930 was passed.
which in effect desolved the DATI system. These vocational schools were
built. owned and mainlained by local authorities were intended to provide
students with practical skills as opposed to purcly academic ones. Therefore.
these schools were not allowed to teach or prepare students for public
examinations that granted access to higher education. The schools were
managed by local authorities and represented the first major change in the
structure and management of Irish education. Although these schools were
not seen to be in direct conflict with the Church. they reflected a new era of
change and certainly impinged greatly on the management structure of a
highly denominational educational system.
The Church was not solely responsible perhaps for restricting the
development of the Irish educational system by trying to maintain the status-
quo. Successive Irish governments, through their lack of involvement and
responsibility in educational matters were equally responsible. For example,
when Fianna Fail returned to power in 1951, with Sean Moylan as minister for
education. the question of teacher's salaries was re-introduced. However.
Moylan decided that school buildings were a higher priority than teacher's
salaries for budget expenditure. The shortage of teachers was also highlighted
at this time, with particular mention being paid to the state's policy of banning
married women in the teaching profession. The government refused to rescind
the ban and instead began to employ untrained assistant teachers. An
examination therefore of the whole educational structure reveals that the
Cathol ic Church cannot be held solely responsible for the deficiencies of the
Irish educational system. The state must share some of the responisbillity.
Apart from the establishment of vocational schools, the general attitude of the
state towards the educational system was /aisse=-faire and this attitude
continued until the mid 1950s.
The structure of the educational system was primarily suited to the needs
of the elite in society. While this problem was not unique to Ireland, the
majority of Irish families were not in a position to pay for a secondary
education. In an attempt to encourage more students to enter secondary
schools, the government established a scholarship scheme whereby students
with high academic tendencies might receive a grant towards their secondary
'lbid.. p.112.
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schooling. However. because the number of these scholarships .... ere limited,
the scheme was of limited value.
Curriculum issues were not adequately addressed by the state. In fact, the
curriculum was applied differently to each gender and the issue o~ eq~al
opportunities was not addressed until the 1970s. Girls were focused primarily
on religious issues. languages and arts-based subjects while the focus for boys
prioritised sciences and technical subjects which generally prepared them for
the labour market. Gender issues were further pronloted through the school
ethos, for example. Grainne O'Flynn refers to her education in the 1940s as a
moulding process. Girls were to: . .
regard themsehes and their bodies as ,essels OrSIO and the best \\3) 10 nd
thcmsehcs or this c,i1 \\as to pro}. be modest. adopt. 10\\ \ocalloocs and
" "become non-argumentatl\c.
The education ofgirls ....'as to prepare them for marriage and parenthood. Pope
Pius XI stated that 'the functions of a woman is to found a hon:-e a~d rear
children: the function of a man is to work for the support of. hIS. Wife and
< "Iy'" Because the educational structure was mainly dcnOnllllallOnal, andlan11 . . I'
the Catholic priesthood was exclusivdy male, the curriculum bemg taug 1t III
Catholic schools tcnded to promote gender inequalities.
However. despite these tendencies supporting the status quo, there was a
growing realisation that a more efficient public educational stru<:ture n~ed to
be implemented in order to align the educational systcrn WIth SOCial and
economic expansion. Higher education expanded as more students completed
a second level qualification. The ban on Catholics anending Trinity College
was lifted. primarily because Catholics ignored it rather than a~y fundamental
change in the Church's position. This suggest~ a chan~e of m1lldset amongst
young Irish Catholics toward their Church and Its.leachmgs. Ot.her factors a.lso
refiected changes in the whole structure ofeducation. A CounCil for EducatIOn
was established in 1950, in order to examine both primary and secondary
curricula. Its membership of twenty-nine included twenty·six profcssi~al
educators with eleven c1erics. 12 Parents had little po....cr on the board and given
no opportunity in promoting curriculum or having their voices heard. .
In 1959. Taoiseach sean Lemass. announced that an immediate po!F~ of
the government was to increase the fa<:ilities for post.primary edUcation.
. .."
ICl Grainnc O·Fl)lln. 'Girls don't do honours' in Mary Cul1cn (cd.). Irish women in
fducation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Dublin). p. 84.
I1 O·Fhnn. 'Girls don't do Honours'. p. 91.
I~ 6B~halla. fducatio" policy. p. , 12.
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Extended scholarship schemes were introduced in 1961, and in 1964 the state
gave capilal grants for secondary school expansion. The key policy of the
government was to provide equal opportunities for all students irrespective of
gender. social. or economic background. In 1966, the first three
comprehensive schools were opened. These schools encouraged a multi-
denominational approach to schooling and a comprehensive curriculum for all
studcnts irrespective of gender. In order to promole equal opportunities for all
students. the two year course in vocational schools was extended to three years
with the intermediate certificate course being offered by both comprehensive
and ...ocational schools. thus aligning these schools with other secondary
schools which "ere managed by ecclesiastical interests. By 1966. the new
minister for education. Dooogh O'Maller. introduced free post·primary
education for all students along with a bus transport scheme to facilitate
centralisation ofschools. In 1972. the minimum school leaving age was raised
IQ fifteen years.
Thc go...ernment introduced the first community schools in the 1970s.
These schools "ere designed to replace secondary and ...ocational schools so
that the whole educational system woold become more centralised. The
Catholic hierarchy was concerned that these new schools should have at least a
minimal Catholic character. Cardinal Conway noted ·the Catholic school
authorities cannot be expected to consent to arrangements which would legally
de-Catholicise their schools'.1l It was finally proposed that the school
management's board should be made up of two representati ...es!Tom secondary
school authorities (namely clerics). two from ...ocational schools and two
elected representatives of the parents. The establishment ofcomprehensive and
community schools in the late 1960s and early 19705 extended the capacity of
post-primary education and thus enhanced educational opportunities in many
areas; ofthc thrcc-hundrc:.'(I thousand enrolled in full-time post-primary courses
in 1980. over twenty·five thousand were enrolled in comprehensive and
community schools. I "
Curriculum issues were not neglected either and a new child-ccntred
pedagogy was introduced to national and post-primary schools in 1971. This
impinged on the Church's authority as they could no longer dictate what was
to be taught within schools. These factors combined with a fall in vocations to
the religious life. loosen cd the grip of the Church over the educational systcm.
IJ J. 11. Wh~'c, Church and stale in modern Ireland 1923 -79 (Dublin. 1980). p. 391.
14 OBuachalla. Education policy. p. 74.
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Another aspect 10 considcr is that from the mid 1960s. teachers had acquired a
greater voice in policy formation and their conditions of employment were
much improved. In a similar fashion. the managerial bodies were no longer
solely of an ecclesiastical nature but constituted a local and national
management structure.
From the 19605 onwards. the number of Catholic clergy decreased. This
led to a reduction of religious power and a diffusion of religious aUlhority. As
Irish people gained a better education they asserted their views. opi~ions and
anitudes regarding the educational system. In the 1970s the scttmg up of
boards of management at both primary and post-primary levels allowed
parents. teachers and the local community to become involved in educalional
issues. The National Parents Council was established in 1985 and Ihis further
enhanced parental ;n\ol...ement.
The leading headline on the !Tont page of the /ri.fh Independent un
Thursday. 14 December 1989. read "Religious should quit secondary schools'.
It was suggested that a central post-primary systcm should be introdu~ and
thal in most towns. all post-primary schools should be amalgamated m order
to promote equality of opportunity for all pupils. According to an Economic
and Social Research Institute report. the dual Systcfll of secondary and
\ocational schools was found to be 'divisi\ie' and wasteful. with in-built
inequalities. The report claimed that there should be no difficulties in using
unified second level schools 10 educatc all children in an Irish country town.
In conclusion this essay has highlighted the evolving role of the Irish
Roman Catholic Church in education. from providing the only education
available 10 Irish Catholics. to an institution striving to mainlain their
influence against growing secular beliefs. A Roman Catholic priest. Noel
Barber. acknowledged the powerful influence exercised by the religious orders
in the past but stated 'it might be in the manner of their going from it [that!
will be their grealest contribution in the years ahead'.
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'Carthaginian peace'
The Treaty of Versailles
1919
Gerard Downes
I '!/(:lIre tilt /II/".d ri!j!!emem des comples est \'enue,·· declared French
I'n.'Sidcnl ClcmCflccau at the beginning of the Paris peace negotiations on 18
January 1919. Even the choice ofdale for opening proceedings was significant
a~ it marked the anni ...ersary of the German Empire proclaimed with such
pump in the lIall of Mirrors al Versailles forty-eight years previously. The
..igning of the treaty in the same Parisian suburb. five years to the day that
(iavrilo Princip's falal shots reverberated around the world. was for many OIl
the victorious French side exactly as their president decreed - a squaring of
accounts with the vanquished German stale. Clemenceau was determined to
neutralise German) militarily. thereby ensuring that France did 1101 succumb
to a third invasion by its leviathan neighbour. The cooference was dominated
nO( by Ihe smaller nations intent on fulfilling their aims for independence but
rather by Ihe so-called Council of Ten and eventually by the 'Big Four' of
France, Britain, Italy and the United States of America. It was. in ShOl1,
'organised as a congress of victors, not as a general assembly of the European
states'.! Its aim to prevent war engulfing the globe again - was to prove
incontrovertibly futile. Ultimately the Treaty of Versailles failed because its
provisions for abrogating a resurgent Germany were vindictive. myopic.
ethnocentric and unworkable. Germany would eventually plunge Europe into
another war in order to destroy the provisions of Versailles and regain the
glory ofempire.
The provisions of the Treaty continue. more than eighty years after its
signing. to provoke polenlical debate. The more contentious of its four-
hundred and forty articles contained the following stipulations: Germany and
her allies had to accept all the guilt for the war and reparations were 10 be paid
for damages caused by Germany and her allies during the war. The provinces
of Alsace and Lorraine were to be restored to France - they had been in
I "The time tor squaring accounts has come.' Quoted in. James Joll. Eul'ope since /870
an imernmiollal his/ory (1.A:mJon. 197J). p. 277.
1 Norman Da... ies. El/rope: (l his/ory (Oxtord. 1996). p. 927.
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German control since the Franco-Prussian war of 1870·1 and the states of
Czechoslovakia and an independent Poland were to be created. Unity between
Germany and Austria was prohibited. The Gennan army was to be reduced to
one-hundred thousand men and its navy to fifteen thousand. A League of
ations to settle international disputes was established. The Saar region was to
be transferred to French control under a League of Nations commission for
fifteen years. in addition to permanent demiltarisation of the Rhineland. All
German colonies were to be allotted to victorious states as League of Nations'
trust territories. 1
In 1961. the Hamburg-born historian Fritz Fischer launched a
historiographical revolution in his mammoth study of the First World War.
Griff lIach der Wellmachl. Fischer asserted that. contrary to previous
interpretations of the origins of the war, Germany bore the main responsibility
for the outbreak of the conflict. In tandem with the onus of guilt was a further
indictment, namely that the aims of German foreign policy from Wilhelm II
through to Adolf Hitler were virtually identical and that the annexiooist
policies and blatant racism displayed by the Second Reich during the 'Great
War' were a precursor to the notion of a Herrl!lIvolk or 'master race'.-
Rctrospect.i"e1y, the Treaty of Versailles can be perceived as punitive but
Germany had instigated the ....-ar and her imperialist designs had to curbed.
France with a population of forty million and a critically low birth-rate. was
understandably wary of a state on its border populated by more than sixty
million citizens.3 Restoring the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to France
was. even at the time of the annistice signing. virtually a/ait accompli. merely
rendered official at Versailles. It was also an act of natural justice given that
the inhabitants of the territory were. with some exceptioos. more amicable to
rule from Paris than from Berlin.'
Compared to the treaty of Brest·Ljtovs"-, which GL"fmany signed with
Soviet Russia in 1918, the terms of Versailles cannot be construed as being
unduly harsh. Both treaties were signed after armistices, rather than after
surrender by either party. Both involved the transference of huge tracts of land
- Russia was to lose the Baltic provinces. Russian Poland and the Ukraine -
and both involved the punishment of a fledgling state for the sins of its
. ~
, Da\ id Childs~ Germany in the TlI'entieth cl!nfllr.~ (I.ondon. 1991). pp. 27-8.
~ Cited in G. Martel (cd) Modern Germany n'C()/Isidered (u-mdon. 1992). p. 55.
< Wi Iliam Curr. A history afGermany 1815-/99{} (l.ondon. 1992).
I> Fdix Gilbert and David C. l..argc. n,e end of /he l~lIropeall era. 189010 lite preselll
(New Y\lrk. 1970).
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political antecedents. If this was Germany's idea of a negotiated settlement
with a defeated power, then the punitive provisions imposed on it at Versailles
l.:an be interpreted as justifiable retribution on an imperialist state. That
Germany had to be rendered impotent as a military power was not merely a
vindictive aim of the victorious powers in Paris. As Brest·Litovsk
demonstrated. a triumphant Germany could be as incorrigibly imperious as the
western powers proved to be at Versailles. Seven years before a struggling
~rlist turned wartime Meldegiinger became chancellor. the head of the German
~rmed torces. General Hans von Seeckt dispatched an extraordinary memo to
the German Foreign Office on 6 March 1926. Van Seeckt had, as early as
1922 called for the partition of Poland between Germany and Russia. 7 He now
demanded the 'reacquisition of those areas essential to the German economy'.
Von Seeckt stated that:
thl.: immediate political aims \\ ill produce connict with FrdIlcc and
tklgium and \\ith Poland ... then \\ith Czechoslovakia ... Germany will
eH:ntllall~ L"Ome into L'Ontliel \\ith the American-English powers ... after a
ne\\ solution to the German·Franco problem has bt.-cn achieved through
either peace or \\ar,g
Versailles has often been denigrated as inherently flawed because as Harold
Nicholson. a British diploma! to the conference, stated, it was 'taking revenge
on a Germany that no longer CXiSIf.-d,.9 Fischer drew on von Seeckt's
statement for evidence of the imperialistic intent of the German High
Command even in the Weimar years. Wolfgang Kapp's attempted plll.sch in
Berlin in 1920. the rapid growth of the freikorps and the collaboration with
Russia after the Treaty of Rapallo in violation of its own Wehrgesetz -
Defence Law - of 1921, all demonstrate that Germany was a nation intent on
regaining former glory. Versailles trom this perspective was a not
unreasonable attempt to contain blatant German expansionism.
The League of Nations, so often derided as a toothless talking shop, had
significatanl moments of diplomatic sucess after its birth at Versailles. In
1925 it managed 10 avert near-certain conflict in the Balkans between
Bulgaria and Greece. It also solved territorial disputes between Sweden and
1 Anthony Adamlhwaite. The losl peace. internalional relalions in Europe.
1918-39 (London. 1980). p. 54.
~ Cited in II.F. Kcarney (cd.). Problems arid perspeclives in historyfrom Bismarck 10
Hiller (London. 1970). p. Ill.
9 BBC Television. 19/.1-8. episode 7 "The legacy'. 1996.
Finland as well as avoiding hostililies between Poland and Lithuania. lo The
League failed ultimately because of US isolationism but this w~s not a fatal
flaw of the Versailles Treaty. None of the delegates to the Parts conference
could have envisaged that the US Senate would vote against joining .the
League or that Woodrow Wilson would be replaced by Warren G. I-I~rdln~.
The latter had railed against US involvement in European affairs dunng hIS
successful presidential campaign of 1920. . .
Despite its noble aim of pre....enting a recalcitrant Germany from rtSlng
again. the Treaty endeavoured 10 do so by pulverising rather than mere.l)'
punishing the new state. The victorious powers' insistence on the war.~u'h
clauses. neglect of the rise of Soviet Russia and lack of powerful mecha~lsms
to ensure the treaty's implementation all contributed to its spectacular .fal.lure.
The economist John Maynard Keynes. himself a delegate to the negotiations.
denounced the provisions of the Treaty in his treatise, The economic
consequences oflhe peace, published in the summer of 1919..His words were
echoed by Winston Churchill who referred to the reparations clauses as
"malignant and silly to an extenl that made them obviously futile·. 1l .The
diktat that many Germans felt was being imposed on them was an unqualified
humiliation and at total variance with what they had assumed would be the
basis of a negotiated settlement, President Wilson's Fourteen Points.
Germany had. after all. signed an armistice not a degrading surrcnde~. ~ost
galling for Germany was being forced to sign an admittance of ' war gutlt :
rhe Allied and Associated Governments atlinn and Germany accepts the
responsibility of Gennany and her allies for causing all the loss an~
damage to \\hich the Allied and Associated Governments and lhelr
nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imlX"Sed upon
them by the aggression of Germany and her allies. 12 .
In retreat the German army had destroyed mines. factories and farms In
northern France. lis own industrial complex had remained unscathed. 1J It
was deduced as logical to impose some form of sanction for damages caused
to the victorious countries. The extent of the reparations bill however.
threatened to bankrupt the nascent German republic. Even though Germal~y
defaulted, renegotiated and eventually had its debts eradicated at Lausanne In
1932, the..latent discontent at bein&..!orced to pay damages and accept total
- ;
10 Norman Davics. Hear! of Europe: A short history ofPoland (Oxford. 1984).
11 JolL Europe. p.282.
12 Article 23 L
IJ Sharp. '"ersailles.
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political antecedents, If this was Germany's idea of a negotiated settlement
with a defeated power, then the punitive provisions imposed on it at Versailles
('an be interpreted as justifiable retribution on an imperialist state. That
Germany had to be rendered impotent as a military power was not merely a
vindictive aim of the victorious powers in Paris. As Brest-Lttovsk
demonstrated. a triumphant Germany could be as incorrigibly imperious as the
western powers proved to be at Versailles. Seven years before a struggling
artist turned wartime Meldeganger became chancellor, the head of the German
arrlK-tl forces. General Hans von Seeckt dispatched an extraordinal)' memo to
the German Foreign Office on 6 March [926. Von Seeckt had, as early as
IQU called for the partition of Poland between Germany and Russia.? He now
demanded the 'reacquisition of those areas essential to the German economy'.
Von Seeckt stated that:
the immediate political aims \\ill produce conflict with France and
fklgium and \Iith Poland ... then \\ith Czechoslovakia ... Germany will
":Iclltuall) L'Omc into L"Olllliet \\ith the American-English p(mers ... aller a
ne\" solution to th..: (knnan-Franco problem has blx:n achieved through
..:ither peace or \lar. 1I
Versailles has often been denigrated as inherently l1awed because as Harold
Nicholson, a British diplomat to the conference, stated, it was 'taking revenge
on a Germany that no longer existcd,.9 Fischcr drew on von Secckt's
statement for evidence of the imperialistic intent of the German High
Command even in the Weimar years. Wolfgang Kapp's attempted putsch in
Berlin in 1920. the rapid growth of the Freikorps and the collaboration with
Russia after the Treaty of Rapallo in violation of its own Wehrgesetz -
Defence Law - of 1921, all demonstrate that Germany was a nation intent on
regaining former glory. Versailles from this perspective was a not
unreasonable attempt to contain blatant German expansionism.
The League of Nations, so often derided as a toothless talking shop, had
significatant moments of diplomatic sucess after its birth at Versailles. In
1925 it managed to avert near-certain conl1ict in the Balkans between
Bulgaria and Greece. It also solved territorial disputes between Sweden and
1 Anthony Adamthwaite. The /os/ peace, internoliona! relations in Europe,
/918-39 (London. 1980). p. 54.
8 Cited in II.F. Keamey (cd.). Problems and perspeclives in historyfrom Bisman-k IQ
Hiller (London. 1970). p. Ill.
9 BBC Television. 191-1-8. episode 7 .The legacy'. 1996.
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Finland as well as avoiding hostilities betwecn I)oland and Lithuania. lO The
League failed ultimately because of US isolationism but this,w~s not a fatal
flaw of the Versailles Treaty. None of the delegates to the (am conference
could have envisaged that the US Senate would vote against joining .the
League or that Woodrow Wilsoll would be replaced by Warre~ G. H~rd1l1~.
The latter had railed against US involvement in European affairs dunng hiS
successful presidential campaign of 1920, ..
Despite its noble aim of preventing a recalcitrant Germany from f1Slllg
again. the Treaty endeavoured to do so by pulverising rather than mere.ly
punishing the new state. The victorious powers' insistence on the war-~U1lt
clauses, neglect of the rise of SovieI Russia and lack of powerful mecha~lsms
to ensure the treaty's implementation all contributed to its spectacular ,fal.lure.
The economist John Maynard Keynes, himselfa delegate to the negotiations.
denounced the provisions of the Treaty in his treatise, The economic
consequences ofthe peace, published in the summer of 1919..His words were
echoed by Winston Churchill who referred to the re~aratlOns ~l~u,s,es as
'malignant and silly to an extent that made them obVIOusly futile. .The
dikwf that many Germans felt was being imposed on them waS an unqualified
humiliation and at total variance with what they had assumed would be the
basis of a negotiated settlement, President Wilson's Fourteen Points.
Germany had, after alt. signed an armistice not a degrading surrender. Most
gaJJing for Germany was being forced to sign an admittance of'war guilt':
The Allied and Associated Governments anirm and Germany accepts the
fl:sponsibilit), of Gcnnany and her allies for causing all the loos an~
damage to which the Allied and Associated Gov~rnmcnts and theIr
nationals have been suhjct.1:cd as a L"Ollscquencc of the war imposed upon
them b} the aggression of Germany and her allies. I! .
In retreat the German army had destroyed mines, factories and farms 1Il
northern France, Its own industrial complex had remained unscathed.
1J
It
was deduced as logical to impose some form of sanction for damages caused
to the victorious countries. The extent of the reparations bill however.
threatened 10 bankrupt the nascent German republic. Even though Germa~y
defaulted, renegotiated and eventually had its debts eradicated at Lausanne 111
1932 the latent discontent at being forced to pay damages and accept total
, . '". ,
81
guilt for the war was exploited as a powerful propaganda tool. predominantly
by right-wing extremists.
Particularly galling for Germany was that its delegation to the conference
was /lot even invited to discuss its fate. The newly born German republic
found itself depicted in Paris as the baneful bite noir of democracy that had
to be strangled at birth. The man more responsible than any other German for
plunging his country into the abyss. Kaiser Wilhelm 11, was banished into
exile in the Netherlands where he lived as a country gentleman until his
death in 1941.1~ His erstwhile subjects were forced IQ accept a 'Carthaginian
peace' due to the imperialist designs of its bygone leader. One of the
Conference's main failings was that it was, long before its end, monopolised
by the major political powers. Its affairs were conducted in an atmosphere of
secrecy and deception captured by the French diplomat, Paul Cambon in his
diary. Despairingly, he wrote that:
No matter ho\\ hard you lry, you cannot imaginc thc shambles. the chaos.
the ignomnee here. Nohody knows an)1hing because evcrything is
happening behind thc scenes. 15
The treaty was inherently flawed because some of its provisions had an effect
that ran contrary to the intention. For example, the reduction in Germany's
standing army to one-hundrcd thousand men was inadvertently a boon to her
military capability. Devoid of unwilling conscripts. the armed forces were
transformed into a streamlined. highly professional unit of combat troops.
While the French persisted with training its troops in more efficient forms of
trench warfare, Germany was busying itself in becoming cognisant of new
military technology and tactics. By signing the Treaty of Rapallo with Soviet
Russia in 1922 Germany secured a testing ground for weapons banned under
the treaty. The French occupation of tile Rhur in 1923 exemplified not only the
diniculty in imposing the treaty's provisions but also how counter-productive
they could be. After Germany defaulted in its reparations payments the French
President Poincarc ordered French troops to occupy the Rhur basin. Not only
did such an action lead to deterioration in Angl()-Franco relations; it also
caused inflation in France due to the high cost of maintaining troops on
foreign soil. [n a manner unprecedented since the lime of Bismarck, France
succe~ded in uniting German national resentment. 16
14 AJ.P. Taylar. The origins of/he SeCOfUJ World War (London. 1961).
15 Alan Sharp. The "ersailles seltlement ( London. [992). p. 19.
I~ 1011. Europe. p. 284.
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The Treaty of Versailles was inherently flawed due to its vindictive and
ultimately self-defeating nature. However, in the bitter, flu pandemic-plagued
winter of 1918-9, the mood pervading a paralysed Europe was that conflict of
the nature just past had to be avoided for atl time and that the means for doing
so lay in punishing the perceived chief aggressor, Germany. Despite its failure
to prevent a second global conflagration, the treaty's ultimate legacy was in
the lessons that it taught the victorious protagonists when Germany was
vanquished again. a mere twenty-six years after that fateful conference.
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The Treaty of Rapallo
An assessment of Weimar foreign policy
1922
Heather lanes
The Treat) of Rapallo, between Germany and Soviet Russia, was the first
independent international political treaty signed by Weimar Germany since the
Treaty of Versailles of 1919. It was colllroversial at the time and look many of
the European powers by surprise. It occurred after a period when the German
roreign office had adopted the lactic of Erju/lungspolililr. _ a policy of
fulfilment ~owa.rds the Western powers. The aim of this policy was to try to
meet the VlctOrlOUS powers' demands on Germany, resulting from the Treaty
of Versailles, whilst proving at the same time Ihal these demands were
impossible to fulfil. Ilowever. the Rapallo Treaty marked a notable break with
this policy. The timing of ils signing, deeply angered the victorious powers,
who had wished to draft a treaty at the Genoa conference, which would
reintegrate Soviet Russia.
The Rapallo Treaty therefore raises three questions. Firstly, what were the
pressures on Germany that caused it to move away rrom a policy of fulfilment
of the Versailles Treaty? Secondly what did the treaty signifY for the Western
po"ers. Finally, could it create an eastern ahemative to £ifullungspoliriJt!
In the months leading up to Rapallo, Germany was facing an economic
crisis with inflation and unemployment levels soaring, with no prospect of
reversal. By 8 ovember 1921. the United States dollar was worth over twl>
hundred marks and by 19 April 1922, it was at three-hundred marks. l The
victorious powers' war debts after the First World War far e.xceeded those of
the defeated nations.. and consequently added pressure was placed on Germany
to pay reparations on time, in order that they could pay their own creditors,
chiefly the United States. German foreign policy had devoted itself to
obtaining a reduction in the amount of reparations sought, since May 1921,
when the London Reparations Conference convened. The latter finally set the
sum demanded of Germany at one-hundred and thirty·two million gold
I Erich Eych. A hisLOry ofrhe Weimar Republic (Oxford. 1962.3). p. 176; W.M.
Mcdlico~t. Documents on Bririshjoreign policy 1919·38. series 1. 1919.25 (London.
1947). XIX. 00.78. p. 456.
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marks.2 Public opinion in Germany was hugely resentful, believing that a
generation yet unborn would be in debt to the victorious powers. At a
conference in Cannes in January 1922, the German delegation tried to
convince the Reparations Commission ofGermany's financial difficulties. The
French government, led by Alexandre Millerand, refused to grant a
moratorium. insisting on guarantees that Germany would renew payments
once the financial crisis was resolved. The Commission at Cannes decided.
therefore. that Germany should pay thirty-one million gold marks, every ten
days. staning on 18 January 1922. and that subsequently a provisional
moratorium would occur rrom 21 March until 31 May. The instalments of
five-hundred million marks, due on 15 January, of two-hundred and sixty
marks due on 15 February. and the next five-hundred million due on 15 April
were not insisted upon. Therefore. at Cannes. the German delegation led by
the minister for reconstruction, Wallher Rathenau. had successfully
demonstrated that the policy of fulfilment could lead to a revision of the
reparations payments.3
Rathenau became foreign minister in January 1922 and considered the
reparations to be of paramount imponance. Therefore, his priority for the
subsequent conference at Genoa on 10 April 1922. was to obtain further
reparations relief before the 31 May deadline when the moratorium expired.
The French however staled that they would not attend if there was any
mention of revision to the Versailles Treaty.4 This annoyed the British, as they
wished the conference to report on the European economic situation as a
whole. It also meant that the main hopes of the German delegation rested with
the possibility of private conversations with David L10yd George. These had
been quite successful at Cannes. because the British prem ier had been
impressed by Rathenau. l Therefore. when the Genoa conference appeared to
be producing no result 00 the reparations issue. the German delegation may
have felt the need to create some other diversion. or result. to offer to the
Gennan public. The idea of looking East when the West proved intransigent
over reparations. had been tried before: when Germany was presented with the
.. "',
l Marsha1'1 Lee and Wolfgang Michalka. (ftrmanforeign policy 1917·33: cominuily or
break? (New York. 1987). p. 40.
J Ilarlmut Pogge von Strandmann. Walther Rarhenau: industrialist, bank.er. inrellectua/
and politician. 1907·22 (Oxford. 1985). p. 290.
4 Viscount D'Abemon. An ambassador ofpeace (London. 1944). p.292.
S Eyck. Weimar Republic. p. 198.
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London ultimatum on 5 May 1921, the text of a provisional agreement
between Germany and Soviet Russia was published the following day.6
Issues of trade also forced Germany to come to an agreement with the
Soviets. There was increasing German business interest in the eastern
countries. On 27 March 1922. Germany signed a provisional trade treaty with
Lalvia. which was not ratified. however, before the Genoa conference.7 The
treaty gave Gennany favourable access to Lativan markets. By 1922 German
firms and banking institutions were already in place in Estonia and Latvia. It
was clear, therefore, that German interests saw the east as a source of potential
growth. German trade to Russia before 1914 had provided forty·seven per cent
of Russian imports. and although this had represented almost nine per cent of
German exports at that time, by 1922, with German access to other Western
markets reduced, consideration of the Soviet market took on new importance.'
Industrialists increasingly pushed for a direct deal with Soviet Russia.' Light
and specialised industries. which needed Western raw materials, 'A'Cfe keen to
.see the de..elopment of the Soviet market. During the winter of 1921·2, aaive
negotiatioos between German industrialists and Soviet authorities 'A'Cfe
initiated, both for trade development, and for the granting of concessions: 'the
first German·Soviet mixed companies~ Derutra for transport, Derulufi for air
traffic, Derumelal for trade in scrap metal ore, came into being at this time' .10
Therefore, pressure from the heavy industrialists for a direct deal led to much
ofthe pre-Genoa, Soviet-German contact.
The Soviet market was becoming a major issue in European politics,
despite its shrinkage due to the tunnoil ofrevolutioo. Moreover, L10yd George
believed the Soviet economy held the key to European reconstruction, and
favoured the idea of an international consortium to exploit this idea. Lenin's
new economic policy which had commenced in 1921, further encooraged
Western powers that Soviet trade might be possible, and led to a trade
agreement with Britain and the Soviets on 16 March 1921. 11 The purpose of
Genoa, for L10yd George, was to organise a united European approach for the
political and economic integration of Soviet Russia, which would lead to the
~ R.I-I. Ilaigh. D.S. Morris and A.R. Pet~. German-Soviet re/alions in the Weimar era
(London. 1985). p.76.
7 John Hiden. The Baltic stales aruJ Weimar OS/pollfik (Cambridge. 1987). p. 115.
• Edward 11. CalT. German-Soviel relations between the 1'01'0 world wars 1919-39
(Baltimore.1951). p.52.
9 Michalka. Germanforeign policy. p. 52.
10 Carr. German·Soviel relations. p. 54.
11 Ibid.• p. 51.
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economic reconstruction of Europe. It was his idea to expand the international
consortium to include a joint approach to political recognition, as weJl as
economic exploitation.
German military pressure for closer lies with lhe Soviets had also been
increasing for some time. The promotion of Hans Van Seeckt to commander-
in-chief of the Reichswehr. after the Kapp Putsch in 1920, meant that the
military were now led by those who believed in accommodation with the
Soviets., rather than those who had believed Ihat an overthrow of the
Bolsheviks was a prerequisite to German-Soviet agreement. 12 The German
military had met and negotiated with the Russian military leadership
previously at the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. I) When Soviet Russia went to war
with Poland in 1920. Germany was supportive of the Soviet's drive. refusing
the transportation of munitions through German territory to Poland.l~ Von
Seeckt was establishing links with the Soviets at this time, through Victor
Kopp, the Soviet diplomatic agent in Germany. IS By 7 April 1921,
negotiations 'A'Cfe taking place for the establishment of German armaments
firms on Soviet soil, among them: Albatro~'erke, Blohm and Voss and
Kropp.lf> These firms could develop anny equipment and munitions in Soviet
Russia that was banned to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, such as
planes and submarines. By the summer of 1921, links developed further, with
an exploratory mission to Moscow, headed by Colonel Oskar Von
iedermayer.17 The German military's intense dislike of Poland had brought a
reassessment of the Soviet potential. They believed Poland's existence was
intolerable and that it would have to collapse. both through its own internal
weakness and through Soviet pressure with German assistance. Van Seeckt
could see the advantages of Soviet.Qerman military links, disregarding
ideological differences between the Reichswehr and the Red Army as
irrelevant: 'They might be voodooists, or sun worshippers, or adherents of the
Salvation Army, for all he cared,.11 In September 1921, secret talks in Berlin
resulted in von Seeckt adopting a policy of Abmachungen - German-Soviet
rapprochement. He organised the GEFU, oslensibly a private trading concern,
11 Haigh. German-Sovie/ relalions, p. 63.
tJ Marshall.,Germanforeign policy. p.40....
14 Ilaigh ....German-5oviet rela/ions. p. 73. \
IJ John Whl.ocler.BcnneH. Hie //emesis ofpo'o1'er: tile German army aruJ politics 1918-
~5 (London. 1964). p. 127.
\1> Carr. German-Soviel re/alions. p. 56.
17 Whl.'Cler.Bcnnctl. Nemesis oflJOwer. p. 127.
IS Ibid.. p. 139.
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but in reality a cover for the armaments factories established in Soviet Russia,
as well as tank and flying schools for German and Soviet military personnel. 19
The GEFU was funded by the German government, and disguised as a
commercial operation, with the co-operation of Wirth.2o The Soviets gained
German expertise in establishing military plants, and in military training,
something Lenin felt was necessary after the failure to defeat Poland in 1921. 21
The German military hoped that by such aid, the Red Army would regain the
capability to make war on Poland.22
By February 1922, Karl Radek. a leading member of the Communist
International and close to Lenin, had a personal meeting with von Seeckt.23
Thereby, the military connection was well established by the Genoa conference
and Chancellor Wirth was aware of it. Rapallo itselfdid not contain any secret
military clauses. simply because they were in the process of being negotiated
elsewhere. A secret military treaty was eventually signed on 29 July 1922. In
May, von Seeckt wrote: 'Others suspect that the Treaty contains more than is,
in fact, the case. Actually there are no political-military agreements
whatsoever,.24 Indeed the controversy in the diplomatic world over whether
Rapallo contained military clauses, distracted from the actual real links that
existed elsewhere. Wirth's knowledge of the military contacts may well have
meant that he desired a broader economic treaty to consolidate the connection.
Certainly an increase in economic co-operation would make it less likely that
questions would be asked of Germany by those who did not favour the Soviet
al1iance, such as the German president Freidrich Ebert, regarding the real
purpose of the GEFU.H Moreover, a general treaty with Soviet Russia at
Genoa, involving all the western powers, would reduce Germany's influence
as the Soviet's sole source of outside military expertise, and the resulting
western involvement in the east would entail the possibility of the military
links being exposed.
The final pressure behind the signing of the Rapallo Treaty was that of
diplomatic circumstance. The German foreign office was deeply split over
whether to adopt an Eastern or Western orientation. Ago van Maltzan
IQ Ibid.. p. 128.
3l Carr. German-Soviet re/arions. p. 59.
II Wheeler-Bennctt. Nemesis ofpower. p. 126.
n Carr. German-Soviet relations. p. 60.
2J Whcclcr-Bennctl. Nemesis ofpower. p. 126.
24 Eyck. Weimar Republic. p. 210.
2S D'AbemOIl. Ambassador ofpeace. p. 304-5.
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advocated the former, Rathenau the latter.26 The League of Nations' decision
on the division of Upper Silesia resulted in Maltzan's promotion to head the
eastern department, and he was the major influence on the rest of the German
delegation in Genoa in the eventual signing of the Rapallo Treaty?7
Genoa was the first conference since the First World War that involved
Germany as an equal power, a development attributable to the policy of
Erfullungspolitik. Germany, however, saw the prohibition on discussing the
problems relating to Versailles at Genoa as an injustice, and this was probably
a factor in their holding talks with the Soviet delegation before they went to
the conference, resulting in a draft treaty.28 This was to act as Germany's
insurance should Genoa not progress in their favour, and was clearly why they
delayed signing before the conference. The Soviets were also kcen on the idea
or an insurance treaty as they were under pressure not to return empty handed
fTom the conference. Lenin made this clear in a speech to the Russian
Communist Party congress on 19 May 1922: 'We shall ally ourselves not only
with Beelzebub but with his grandmother too if it is a question of defending
the rights for which the Russian working class bled and starved,.29
The British believed their establishment of a financial sub-commission
into the European economy at Genoa would prove enough of a compensation
10 Germany for the absence of any reparations discussions.3o They therefore
believed that any German discontent had been removed and focused their
attention on negotiating with the Soviets. For the victorious powers,
diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia was concomitant with the latter
granting the western powers economic concessions and, more importantly,
honouring the war debts of the tsarist government. Such a deal would then
rescue the European economy: 'No one would advance money until peace was
established in Europe.'JI After the opening session the conference established
a sub-commission on eastern affairs, on which al1 thc main countries were
rcpresented, including Germany. However, at the request of the Sovict
delegation, Germany was then excluded. Clearly the Soviets intended to divide
Germany from the western powers, and should the western powers' terms to
~ ... "".
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reparations to the western powers was out of the question, An economically
based treaty with Germany offered the way out. Thus, the Soviet delegation
contacted the Germans early on the 16 April, 10 finalise their treaty.JI
After failing to contact the British. the German delegation, signed.)9 They
wished to end their isolation and perhaps thought that concluding a separate
treaty with the Soviets would offer them more leverage against the western
powers. They could also see perhaps. that the westem powers' own talks with
the Soviets had reached a stalemate and that it was unlikely that the
c~nf~rence would result in any intemational treaty. The speed of the signing.
with m hours. shows that almost all the work had been prepared in Berlin.40
The western powers reaction was one of anger towards Germany rather
., .
than the Soviets. They considered the Germans to have broken the Cannes'
conditions. on the basis of which countries had been invited to Genoa: in
particular the articles which demanded that all countries who desired foreign
credit must undertake to recognise previous debts.~2 Under the Rapallo Treaty.
Germany agreed to write off any previous Soviet obligations..~J The treaty
underm ined the western powers anempt to force the Soviet Russia to pay her
old loans and the compensation for damages and financial loss due to the
Bolshevik revolution. German-Soviet debts were also far smaller than. for
example. Soviet·French ones. They also considered Germany to have broken
the Treaty of Versailles. which stated that Germany was not allowed to dispose
of property in favour of any other nation without consulting the Reparations
Commission, and also that Germany should recognise [he western powers'
position on Soviet Russia, whatever that would prove to be.~~ The strongly-
worded lener of disapproval that the western powers sent to the German
delegation on 18 April. illustrated the annoyance they felt at the German
action.~5 The conference was in danger of collapse; Germany signing a
separate treaty had rendered a general treaty almost impossible.
France viewed the treaty as a direct threat to her ally, Poland. Since the
First World War and the Bolshevik revolution. France had lost the security of
the Soviet Russia not prove generous cnough. they could rum to the isolated
Germans. and sign the draft treaty.
Perhaps as Germany had no war debts to the Soviets. the western powers
saw nothing unusual about their absence at such meetings. To bring the
Soviets to honour war debts. and pay compensation to foreigners who suffered
due to the Bolshevik revolution. it was vital that the other powers presented a
united front. The Soviets would then be taced with diplomatic isolation if she
did not comply. The German delegation felt itself isolated due to these secret
meetings. and due to the inaccessibility of L10yd Gcorge, upon whom they had
counted for private discussions on reparations. L10yd Gcorge. angered by an
unflattering Reichstag spea:h made about him by Rathenau remained
distanl.12 The German delegation had been working to divide the British from
the French for some time. and this coolness alarmed them. This was an even
grealer blow. because Germany had hoped to regain her status as a world
power at Ihis conference. and mollify the right wing danger at home.
The French. British. Belgian. and Ilalian talks with the Soviets failed to
agree a compromise o....er the tsarist debts; the latter being reluctant to pay. The
Soviet delegation presented the western powers with a bill for their civil war
. . n
mterventlon. In return. the western powers called Brest-Litovsk a breach of
contract.~ and presented the Soviets with a draft treaty, which offered
postponement of these debts. until Soviet Russia was in a better economic
condition. The western powers insisted that investment in Soviet Russia could
nOI occur until old creditors were paid. The German delegation came to
belicvc that the possibility of dcmanding war reparations from Germany,
provided for in the Treaty of Versailles. was also being offcred to the Soviets.)'
As Eyck himselfpointed out, the western powers would not have done this. as
the maximum the German economy could pay in reparations had already been
decided and divided between the western powers. To allow any new Soviet
claim would necessarily lessen their own share..J6 By 16 April 1922 the Soviet
position was looking extremely difficult. due to the western powers' insistence
on the debt issue. Lenin had instructed his delegation to go to Genoa 'not as
communists but businessmen' and to retum with a result. J7 Economic links
were. therefore. paramounl. A return to Moscow with the equivalent of Soviet
J; Ibid.. p. 40.
lJ MedJiool:t. IJocuments on Bririshjoreign policy, p. 413.
J.llbid.
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possibly rescue the German economy on its own. Germany's economic nt.'Cd
was tor rapprochement with the west. With its economy dependent on
~eparat~on revision, an independent foreign policy was unwise and ultimately
nnposslblc. The military links. whilst they may have helped bring about
Rapallo. were themselves independent. and would have continued whatever
the outcome of Genoa. Moreover. the policy of Erfullungspolitik had been
gradually winning gain for Germany. such as the moratorium on reparations
a~d ~he invitation to the Genoa conference. There were pressures operating
wlthll1 Germany from the economic. military. and diplomatic spheres, for a
liaison with the Soviet Russia. but Germany never really examined L10yd
George's option of an international approach. The statement of German
diplomatic independence which Rapallo signified did not win over the German
right. as proved by Rathenau's assassination, and Rapallo resulted in France
and Britai~ mov.ing closer together in the area of foreign policy, isolating
Germany. rhe 1 reaty of Rapallo. finally. did not contain any major links
between Germany and Soviet Russia; it consisted only of a return to normal
diplomatic relations, cancellation of debts. and favoured trade for Germany.51
Therefore. it was not heavy-weight enough to warrant offending the wcstern
powers from whom Germany required reparations relief; as to German-Soviet
relations nothing mueh had come of it. It was certainly more in Soviet
Russia's interests than in Germany's to sign a separate treaty. and Rapallo
resulted in Germany being distanced from the western powers and ultimate
isolation.
an alliance with a major power in the east. and had attempted to compensate
for this. by allying with the buffer states lying between Germany and Soviet
Russia. The Rapallo Treaty between two countries that deeply resented
Poland's existence alarmed France and pushed her to find more security on
her Western front. Plans to occupy part of Germany, or split the Rhineland
from Germany, were therefore given new currency. The occupation of the
Ruhr was a result of this French search for new western securities against
Germany.46 Raymond Poincare, the French premier, had pointedly stayed
away from Genoa as he was opposed to the idea of Gennany entering the
conference as equals. L10yd George was hoping that Poincarc's absence from a
successful conference would isolate him, but instead when the Germans signed
Rapallo, Poincan!'s anti-German position was consolidated. France could then
claim that Germany should not have been accorded equal status at Genoa in
the first place. 47
The western powers were also highly alarmed by the Soviet Russia
becoming part of a potentially rival power block. The alliance of two major
European countries in the east, created an alternative power base, which might
challenge the western powers post-war hegemony. The Genoa conference had
aimed: ·to lay the foundations of a new world;4J to reintegrate Germany and,
more especially, Soviet Russia, in a manner which would best serve the
interests of this western position. The independent alliance of Germany and
the Soviet Russia marked a move outside ofwestern control.
L10yd George was so angered by the German action, that he prepared a
draft note for them to offer to the Soviets. announcing their withdrawal from
Rapallo.49 Had Rapallo not been announced in the German press, the German
delegation could perhaps have exploited this western desperation and pushed
for concessions in return for withdrawal from the treaty. The delegation did
not. however, consider this, and were proud ofacting independently.so
As an alternative to Erfullungspolitik, the Treaty of Rapallo was extremely
limited. Germany's economy was suffering from increasing inflation and was
linked indissolubly to the western powers by the issue of reparations. The
Soviet economy had shrunk to one fourteenth of its pre-war size and could not
46 Marshal!. Germanforeign policy. p.61.
.7 Eyck. Weimar Republic. pp. 208-9.
q The Times. 3 April 1922.
49 Mcdlicott. Documents on Britishforeign policy. 00.78. meeting between Chancellor
Wirth and Lloyd George, p. 462.
5(1 Marshall, Germanforeignpolicy. p. 60.
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The United Fruit Company
United States intervention in Central America
1899-1970
Alexander Gray
The cause of our plight is the oligarchy.... Another cause is industT).
toreign and domestic. which keeps salaries al the hunger level to compete
on the international market. thus explaining their blind opposition 10 any
tvpe of rctorm which tries to improve the living standards of the people.
Archbishop Oscar Amulto Romcro. 1980 1 •
Latin American history has often been seen as one of unfulfilled promIse.
Despite apparent wealth in natural resources. the region has not achieve.eJ
sustained growth in output. Using Central America as a regional example, thiS
paper will argue that external factors both promoted and constrained
development in the region. These factors included United States foreign policy
and economic penetration by multinational corporations (MNCs). In order to
demonstrate the effect that US foreign policy, combined with economic
penetration by MNCs, had on the region. the case of a single MNC will be
examined. 11 is argued here that the US-based United Fruit Company (UFCo),
supported by the United States government, significantly influenced the
economic, political, and social development of Central America. Special
emphasis will be given to the rote played by (UFCo) in thc Central Amcrican
republic ofGualcmala.
US foreign policy towards Latin America was well summarised by
Woodrow Wilson's declaration that:
Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manulaClurer insists 0f1
having the world as a market. the flag of his nation must follow him. and
the doors of the nations which are elosed against him must be batlen..-d
down, Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by
ministers of state. even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged
in the process. Colonies must be obtained or plamed. in order that no
useful corner of the world may be overlookl:d.
From the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, to the more recent US administration,
Latin Americans have i:Mxn subjected to demonstrations of US hegemony in
the region. These demonstrations manifested themselves in a variety of ways.
but with similar results - the preservation of US access to the region.
I J. Cockcrofl. Latin America: history. politics. and US policy (Chicago. 1996). p. 145.
us based MNCs represented the largest group ofMNCs operating in Latin
America. From the early 1800s the US had viewed Latin America as an
extension of its own territory. and a strategic source of raw materials. To this
cnd. US foreign policy had been developed in such a way as to advance US
dominance in the region.
In 1823. President James Monroc laid thc foundations for thc next onc
hundred and seventy-five years of US/Lalin American relations. The Monroe
Doctrine created a framework which allowed US-based interests to reign over
the region. A 'positive' strand in the Monroe Doctrine held that:
I.atin America's dc\clopme11l IHlUld mirror the United States' and that
united. this hemisphere would bt.'U)flle the world's most advanced. A
necative 'strategic dc.:nial,· in contT'J.St. merely place[dl the hemisphere 00'
lil~its to an) foreign po\\cr that Washington DC. vicw[cdJ as a thrcal,2
Essentially, the Monroe Doctrine acted as a declaration to the global
community in general. and European rivals in particular. announcing that
Latin America was now within the US 'sphere of influence'.
As early as the 1820s, US diplomatic representatives were dispatched to
Central America in an effort to secure US interests in the region. Among the
first of these representatives was. John L10yd Stephens. a prominent \"Titer on
the Maya people of Central America. Stephens had been contracted by the US
President's office 10 undertake a covert mission 'to locate a Central American
government with which Washington could enter inlo commercial and
diplomatic relations,.3 At this time the US was engaged in, what might be
described as. a 'battle of the imperialists' with Gn:at Britain. Both powers
wanted to dominate the region in order to secure access to strategic raw
materials.
In securing a leadership role, the US sought to create formal structures
that would organise the relationships between the countries of the America's.
The Rio Pact of 1947 provided for a regional variant of the Truman Doctrine-
the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance. It stated that, 'an armed
attack by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack
against all American states'. This treaty 'side-stepped the United Nations and
provided a legally binding regional 'self-defence' approach for future US
covert and overt interventions against reformist democracies in the name of
~.
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combating communist aggrcssion·.~ The ink was barely dry on the treaty
before the US embar"ed on a military campaign throughout Central America.
In 1954. Guatemala was targl..1ed under the pretence of ridding the region of
so-called communist innuences. 1I0we\'er, it was the need to secure access to
Central America's resources that spurred the US on.
fhe guise of the 'Cold War' gne the US a pretext in the post Second
World War era to be wary ofcommunist innuences in the western hemisphere.
In fact, a go'..ernment-inspired media led the fear of communism throughout
the United States. empo"ered the US go\oemment with public support to
combat any communist threats. Consequently, if the US wanted to mobilise
support for a direct military intervention, or other military acts against another
American state. all it had to do was shout 'the commies are coming' and the
faithful media would quickly rally public support.s During the Cold War there
was little or no threat of a communist take-over ofCentral America. However.
this did not stop the US from fdbricating the belief that communists were
infiltrating Central American governments, threatening US national security.
which therefore had to be stopped. It is ironic to note that the US halted
'communist' forces throughout the region by toppling democratic governments
and replacing them with authoritarian military dictatorships. Strong
authoritarian governments were, not surprisingly. successful in attracting
foreign capital to the region, often to the detriment of the poor majority.
None the less, US policy heightened fears among the people of the region.
as it served to enforce social stability of a sort that favoured the local and
foreign elite. One method used by US officials was the infiltration of Central
American military groups. The infiltration of the Guatemalan military best
exemplified this method when the democratically elected government of
President Arbenz was toppled by the US-backed Guatemalan military in 1954.
The 1954 collapse of Arbcnz's danocratic-capitalist re\'olutiOll made
scH:ml things dear. I-i~t, the militaJ) could not be relied upon to defend
the COlJn~ against ~iOll ... The trnditional ... oligardly and its
foreign allies (the US monopolies) found il easy to topple the Arbenz
gD\emment and absorb much of its bureauCl1lC) - after "iping out the
radical opposition to the 1954 coup and any possible Arbcnz or ArC\"alo
·s}mpathisers·.'
Guatemala. and other Central American countries, could no longer depend on
their own militaries, as US military aid and instruction was plentiful, with
~ Cockcroft. La/in America, p. 41.
S Noam Chomsky. On pO'wer and ideology: {he Managua leclures (Boston. 1987).
oCockeroft. Lalin America. p. 130.
many prominent military personnel recetvmg their trammg at US military
academies. Guatemalan sovereignty had been undermined.
Backing up the objectives of US policy were se"eral institutions including
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). the Pentagon. and the National
Security Council ( sq. A unique role was pla)'ed by each. Howe\oer. all
participated in securing US dominance in the region. The CIA arranged the
1954 military coup in Guatemala. while during the 1980s the NSC drew staff
from the Pentagon and the CIA to run its propaganda campaigns for US
Cl,.·ntral American policy.
It is clear that US foreign policy had been structured in such a way as to
f"vour the dominance of US economic. political, and social interests in Central
America. This dominance resulted in the US-based MNCs playing a
prominent role in shaping development in Central America. A particular
vulnerability was created as the region came to dep...~d heavily on the banana
trade. Large foreign firms played a conspicuous role in Latin American
politics and economics. Their enormous size and economic strength allowed
them to virtually control entire sectors of the economies in which they
operated. They had particular influence over the economies of the weakest
Latin American states, including those of Central America particularly, when
authoritarian governments promoted neo-liberal economic measures. Policies
of the World Bank. (WB). International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other
international financial agencies and development experts aided MNCs in
playing an intrusive role in the region, sometimes leading to foreign MNCs
monopolising regional economies.
The Guatemalan economy was panicularly effected when foreign M Cs
penetrated its agricultural sector. In doing so, they all but completely displaced
land ownership by locals. Some MNCs, including the UFCo. played a
markedly invasive role in the Guatemalan economy. Cockcroft argues that 'the
combined aggressiveness of UFCo and the coffee market hacendados and
merchants ... left only 7.3 three per cent of all Guatemalans owning land by
1926'.7 This disastrous situation worsened during subsequent years as the
military dictatorship of Jorge Ubico (1931-44) encouraged such agrarian
disparity. At the end ofUbico's regime, counting each foreign corporation as a
person. ninety-eight percent of all cul~ated land was owned by one-hundred
an forty-two people. i In 1954. following the US installation of the Castillo
Armas government, the economic interests of local populat;ons were further
1 Ibid.. p. 128.
~ Ihid.. p. 129.
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subordinated to those of the foreign MNCs. By the 1980s 'four-fifths of the
largest forty Guatemalan companies were US-controlled,.9 US policy had
played its prescribed role. The Guatemalan economy was now in the hands of
the US-based MNCs and the local business elite.
In Guatemala, particularly since the success of the CIA-organised 1954
military coup, the US has been encouraging its MNCs to take advantage of the
'safe' business climate it helped to create. In 1981, the US embassy in
Guatemala city released a report promoting investment, on the basis that the
Guatemalan government allowed 'full repatriation of earnings and payment
for all imports without exception'. III National governments in the region
accommodated US investment, furthering the already established predatory
process of the US-based MNC and its take-over of the Guatemalan economy.
Central America's authoritarian military governments subscribed to nco-
liberal ideologies throughout the 1960s and 1970s as they sought to create
'attractive' business environments for MNCs. Nco-liberalism 'aimed at
reinvigorating capitalist enterprise, by tax cuts, deregulation, and the transfer
of state undertakings to private ownership',I! which it gained popularity in
Central America, as the debt crisis compounded disillusionment with import-
substituting industrialisation. Since 1982, Central American 'financial plight
has given leverage to the US, working together with the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.. This coalition urging nco-liberal
reforms on developing countries, as a prerequisite for further loans'. For
example, during the 1960s the World Bank and other financial agencies and
development experts actively encouraged deforestation in Central America for
the purpose of cattle ranching. Many US-based MNCs also assisted Central
American governments in these deforestation projects. 12
Some MNCs played an incredibly obtrusive role in their host country, to
the point that they dominated public utilities that were integral to the
functioning of the country. A definitive account of this sort of MNC power was
exemplified in Guatemala during the Second World War. At that time the
Electric Bond and Share Company controlled all electric power in Guatemala.
In order to protect US economic interests in the region under the guise of
protecting the distant Panama Canal during the war, thousands of US troops
9 Ibid.. p. 125.
10 Ihid.. p. 125.
11 John Ward, Latin America: developmem ond conjlic (London. 1997). p. 13.
12 Ibid., p. 13
wen:: stationed in Guatemala. maintaining US supremacy in the region. 13
While the MNCs dominated strategic sectors ofGuatemala's economy, the US
military was on standby, serving as a deterrent to any local forces that may
have been opposed to such domination.
Thus far this paper has discussed, in general terms, the ways in which US
foreign policy, and economic penetration by MNCs, have impacted on the
politics of Central America. The focus now will be turned to the case of the
United Fruit Company and the role that it played throughout the last century
in development in Central America. In particular, it will be argued that UFCo
abused its economic power, resulting in many harmful consequences for the
region. Harmful results were plentiful, and were brought about by UFCo's
Washington connections, labour movement repression, encouragement to shop
at company stores, and contributions to corrupt judicial systems.
Powerful lTiends in both the public and private sectors allowed UFCo a
sense of security that was not enjoyed by many MNCs. Cockcroft has
demonstrated that in 1954 UFCo was able to use its connections with the
Eisenhower administration to provoke an invasion of Guatemala.
UFCo's law stan- and shareholders included many top US government
nilicials. The law ollicc of Secretary of State Dulles had drafted UFCo's
1930 and [936 agre<;;mcnts with the Guatemalan government. The
secretary's brother. CIA Director Alien Dulles. had been a member of
UFCo's hoard of dirlX.'\ors. The assistant secretary of state for [nter-
American An-airs. John Moors Cabot. and Cabot·s relatives. were urco
shareholders. Cabot"s brother was UFCo president in 1948. UN
Ambassador llenry Cabot Lodge was also a ureo stockholder.l~
Considering such high-powered Washington connections, it is not surprising
that the company was given free reign over the region. In fuct, it is arguable
that UFCo's Washington allies encouraged the banana giant to engage in
aggressive tactics in order to ensure optimal profits for all concerned.
Many ofUFCo's Washington lTiends were also its shareholders. In 1952,
when President Arbenz of Guatemala was in the process of introducing land
and other social reforms. he nationalised some of UFCo's unused lands. This
represented UFCo with the threat of loosing part of its low-cost labour force as
its employees returned to peasant farming. Following the 1954 coup,
ownership of the unused lands retumed~to UFCo. More significant, however,
was the deci"mation of the labour mo~enl. as it was reduced 1T0m one-
hundred thousand to twenty-seven thousand, with more than two-hundred
jJ COCktTOft. Latin America. p. 129.
14 Ibid., p. 124.
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trade union leaders killed directly following the coup. IS When it became clear
that the US would not abandon its fight to destroy Guatemalan democracy, a
frustrated Arbenz resigned. In his hastened resignation speech he spat out the
following words: 'The United Fruit Company, in collaboration with the
governing circles of the United States ... is responsible for what is happening
to US,.16 Under its new military government, Guatemala became more
dependent on foreign investment. Therefore. it had to offer the reassurance of
a 'safe' business climate, secured by political repression.
UFCo employees were subjected to further hardship as company shops
were used to both attract workers and to prevent docile. low-cost labourers
from retreating into a selt:sustaining economy. Consumer values were instilled
in the people, creating previously unknown desires. Chomsky notes that the
'device was "repeatedly abused" by the company, its official historian
concedes, as goods were sold "at outrageous prices to the workers - all too
frequently on credit." driving them on "a straight road to peonage...•17 The
practice ofspending ones salary and buying on credit at the company store was
a common one throughout Central America. In this one-sided relationship it
was the company that benefited.
More recently, UFCo demonstrated its hold over the region by its
successful corruption of the Honduran legal system. The reputation and
possibly the integrity of the Honduran judicial system was compromised by the
underhanded, and often illegal actions ofUFCo's progeny. Chiquita. Mangold
notes:
It is sad to say that in today's Ilonduras. it is all but impossible to obtain
justice unless one is prepared to buy it, and Chiquita apparently has been
willing to do SO.13
Chiquita's policy appeared to be reliant on its ability to bribe its way through
the Honduran legal system and was therefore viewed more a part of the
problem than part of the solution to Central America's successful
development.
However, after a century of wealth accumulation and regional dominance,
the enonnous influence of the Chiquita company was so strong that even the
IS Noam Chomsky and Edward S. I-!ennan. The Washington connection and Third
Worldfacism: the political economy ofhuman rights. i (Boston. [979), p. 274.
16 P.I-!. Smith. Talons ofthe eagle: dynamics ofUS-Latin American relations (New
York. 1996). p. 137.
11 Noam ChomsJ..:y.year 501 the conquest continues (London, 1993). p. 229.
I! Alexander Mlll1gold, 'The Honduran Republic ofChiquita' ,hltp://www.coha.org
(1996) p. 19 «()(.tober 1998).
100
United States came to support a reduction in its power. The US government
therefore, enacted anti-trust legislation in an attempt to weaken the banana
giant.
For decades. Europtl's supply of bananas has been controlled b)' US
multinational corporations led by United Fruit ... putting them in a
monopol) position. In fact, Dole's and Del Monte's banana operations
\\er..:: created as a result of anti-trust action by the US Oepartment of
Justice in order to break up the existing Chiquita monopoly. 19
The emergence of new companies in competition with Chiquita
demonstrated that US anti-trust legislation enjoyed some success in its efforts
to lessen Chiquita's monopoly power, although Chiquita's offensive business
tactics continued to dissuade other MNCs from locating in the region20 In spite
of US anti-trust laws. Chiquita still enjoy<..-d a great deal of influence 111
Washington and Central America.
Chiquita has spent a lot of money in Washington buying influence. and
\\hcn the time came to use it. it was at Chiquita's disposal. As for
Honduras. the Chiquita caudillo [Chiquita's CEO. Carl Lindner]
apparently sees the country as little more than his personal banana liefdom
where. for a price. everything is for sale.21
The purchase of influence in Washington by business people like
Chiquita's Chief Executive Officer Lindner. acted to retard the development
process in Central America. Where a foreign MNC makes a mockery of local
judicial and political processes, local populations suffer the consequences, as
they are often subject to the laws of the MNC that employs them.
In conclusion, the case of the United Fruit Company exemplifies and
provides a case study of the ways in which US foreign policy and the economic
penetration by MNCs, combined to effect the economic, political and social
development of Central America. Regional instabilities, brought about
primarily by US foreign policy, appear to have resulted in UFCo enjoying a
high degree of autonomy in the region. Moreover, US foreign policy played a
significant role in successfully overthrowing democracy in much of Central
America. Ultimately, US foreign policy coupled with UFCo's business
practices, undennined the economical. social and political systems in Central
American countries. Consequently, it can be argued that US foreign policy and
economic penetration by United ~Fruit Company were factors which
contributl!d to constraining regional d~lopment in Central America.
19 Ibid.. p. 6.
20 Cockl..Toft. Latin America. p. 125.






On 11 February 1979, Muharnmad Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran left the
country his family had ruled since 1925 never to return again. In his wake he
left a slale in turmoil. in the midst ofa revolution that would reshape not only
its politics and society but would also change the geo-politicaJ map of the
Middle-East. Few commentators had predicted the revolution and even less
could have predicted the final outcome even as the shah flew into exile.
This paper will examine the events surrounding the shah's departure and
ask whether the revolution was inevitable. The revolt resulted in the successful
establishment ora modern, religiously-led government, in which Iran replaced
its western-orientated. dynastic monarchy with a clerically-led Islamic regime.
What best symbolised the revolution was the contrast of modernity and
tradition, as typified in the two opponents in the struggle: the imperial
western-orientated shah of Iran. the self proclaimed Shahanshah, the 'king of
kings', and the bearded and turbaned Ayatollah Khomeini, 'the spirit of God'
who after years of exile, returned triumphantly to Iran to a tumultuous
welcome.
The revolution is all the more spectacular, given the fuet that it took
western commentators and governments by total surprise. In hindsight, the
emergence of the Islamic revolution should have been expected, taking into
account the recent history of Iran together with the presence of an autocratic
and erratic ruler. Even these scholars with a good understanding of the history
and culture of Iran, however, could not have predicted the eventual outcome of
the revolution through which the clergy would surfuce as the legitimate
government of the country. Even in the throes of the revolt it was not obvious
that the establishment of a theocracy would be the olltcome, it was only a
series of extraordinary events that brought this about. The history of Iran
throughout the centuries can be mapped by the constant waves of foreign
invasion upon its soil and culture. Foreign interventions in the internal politics
of the country and the influence of the ShUte fuith have been the two constant
influences throughout the history of Iran. Both played an important part in the
development of the post-revolutionary Iranian society.
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The revolt in Iran was a populist opposition to the shah's foreign policy
and his domestic politics. The disparate forces of opposition were as united
against the de facto alliance with the United States as they were against his
repressive rule. Whether one traces the roots of the Iranian revolution to the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) engineered overthrow of Mohammad
Mossadeq's nationalist government in 1953, to the bloody suppression of the
Khomeini led anti-shah uprising in 1963, or 10 the earlier developments in
Iranian society, culture and politics. the fact remains that at no time before the
period from 1972 to 1977 had the socio-political exclusion from the Shah's
regime reached such explosive levels of populist expression. The sale by
President Richard Nixon of an array of conventional weapons, alienated not
only the shah from his people at a time of an economic downturn but also
brought American influence in the internal affairs of the Iranian government
into the limelight. The boom of rising oil prices in 1973 was followed by the
sudden economic depression, which transfonned the rising expectations of
Iranian society into disillusionment with the shah's economic policies. Finally,
the creation ofthe Rastakhiz Parry in 1975 symbolised the height of the shah's
repressive policies and compounded the psychological and financial
dislocations from the economic upheaval over the previous years, leading to
the explosive levels of populist expression. The result was a revolution born
out of the ashes ofdiscontent in a country enveloped in chaos. I
Chaos accompanies any revolution, yet in a very short time after the return
of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic quickly began to consolidate
itself. A referendum in March 1979. less than two months after Ayatollah
Khom~ini's return from exile, transformed Iran's government from that of a
monarchy to a republic based on the Islamic faith. A new constitution was
ratified by the end of the year and by mid 1981 the Islamic Republic of Iran
was institutionalised, with militant clerics in full control of the reins of
government.
The constitution and the governmenl of Iran were based on Khomeini's
ideas on Islamic government as developed in his speeches and writing while in
exile, especially during his period in Najaf in the early 1970s.2 The main
"revolutionary idea' of Khomeini's doctrine on Islamic government was his
belief, not ~nly in direct clerical ruleot.:,but the principle of velayat-e [aqih, or
• •
I R.K Ramar.ani, The United Swtcs and Iran: the patterns afinfluence (New York.
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'guardianship of the people'. Khomeini suggests that in the absence of the
'hidden Imam.' that the Guardian should, in essence, be the shadow of God on
earth and rule in his absence. This principle was enshrined in the constitution
that was accepted by the people in the subsequcnt constitutional referenda. The
constitution named Khomeini faqih for life and invested him with final
aUlhority as the religio-politicalleader of the state.
With the acceptance of Khomcini's constitution, the consolidation of
power in the hands of the clerics was almost complete. The opposition that
successfully overthrew the Pahlavi regime was a mixture of religious, secular
and various political groupings. In the aftermath of the revolution there was
little consensus as to the type of government they wanted in place of the old
regime. Only the religious leadership, under the guidance of Khomeini, had a
clear plan and framework for government in mind. The initial government
appointed by Khomeini was mostly a secular government. However the
militant clerics ran the Revolutionary Guards, which had bt..'Come the military
arm of the government in the aftermath of the revolution. In 1980, Bani-Sadr
was elected Iran's first post-revolutionary president, but his belief that clerics
should have an indirect rather than a direct role in government put him at
odds with the clerical classes and numbered his days in office. He was
removed in June 1981 and what followed was the eradication of, not only
secularist, but also moderate clerics from government. The spate of bombings
by the Islamic leftist group Mujahidin-e Khalq, throughout the summer of
1981, which killed not only the new president of the Republic, Muhammad Ali
Rajaee and a large number of the members of parliament, but also the much
revered Ayatollah Beheshti, gave the government the excuse it needed to crack
down on all opposition groups and completed the transfer of power into the
hands of the militant elements of the Islamic clergy.
Policy decisions in Iran were conditioned by the unique historical
experience of the revolution, whereby the new leaders moved from subjugation
to domination.
Nations like individuals. are largely the product of their past. Mcmories
and experience colour their assessment of present day reality, shape their
vision ofthc future and fOfm their national cthos.J
Iran is not only a product of is history but also of its geographic location.
Bordered, to the south by the contentious Persian Gulf from whence the Arab
invasion in the founeenth century led to the islamification of the country, to
) Shireen Ilumcr. Iran and the world- cOnJinuily in a revolutionary decade (Indiana
[990).
the west by Iraq, an historical and ever present enemy, to the north by the
now-defunct Soviet Union. which has had a long and varied history in Iran,
and, to the east. by the predominantly Sunni dominated government of
Afghanistan. a dominion of the Soviet Union until the late 1980s, and by
Pakistan.
This perceived threat on the part of Iran in response to its immediate
neighbours is funher exemplified when one looks at its historic relations with
the western powers. The Russo-lran conflict between 1804 and 1828, resulted
in the loss of Iran's Caucasus territories. which severed its economic and
political links with central Asia. British policy in the Persian Gulfalso worked
contrary to Iranian interests. Britain's desire to undermine Russian influence
in the area was carried out at the expense of Iran and for the purpose of
creating a buffer to protect their valued Indian empire. An examination of the
previous fifty years reveals the debilitating impact of the western powers on
the internal politics of Iran.
The occupation of Iran by both Britain and the Soviet Union during the
Second World War, the forced abdication of the shah in favour of his son, the
Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan from 1941 to 1946 and the establishment ofa
Russian-dominated communist government there and in Iranian Kurdistan, all
attest to the abuse of Iranian sovereignty at the hands of the Allied powers in
the period during and directly after the Second World War. Western
interference in the internal affairs of Iran can be further seen in the 1953 coup
d'etat in Iran. which re-installed the shah as the ruler of the country and
overthrew the nationalist government of Mohammad Mossadegh. The coup
was supported and organised by both the US and Britain, not for any moral or
humanitarian reason but because Mossadegh's government intended to
nationalise the oil industry which would have been detrimental to US and
British concessionaires. These examples of interference support the argument
that the western powers were only interested in having a colonial view of third
world countries such as Iran. This led to the Islamic Republic having a
polarised vision of world politics between those who dominate and those who
are dominated, along with a deep suspicion of the intentions of western powers
when they talk ofdetente.
Most o! Iran's foreign policy i~he days follow:ng the revolution. was
influenced, not only by geography but frtso the country s contemporary hIstory
at the hands of first world countries. As previously outlined, its strategic
location has meant that over the centuries, Iran was vulnerable to attack and
occupation at the hands of foreign forces. Consequently, Iran's preoccupation
with its position in the aftennath of the revolution led the country to follow
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initially an isolation ist type of policy. However, explaining the determinants of
Iranian foreign policy simply in terms of geography and history, is to give the
subject too narrow a focus. When determining a country's foreign policy
tendencies, onc must look at how the country defines itself and its ideology.
Ibis will have a determining effect on its foreign policy formulation and the
character of its foreign relations. Most countries with secular tendencies would
be more influenced by. and therefore define their policies through nationalism.
Where religion is the dominant ideology, it will influence the state's identity.
This is the case with countries such as Iran. Pakistan and Israel. In Iran. the
Pahlavi regime (.....hich lasted from 1925 to 1979) gained its legitimacy
through the triumph ofnatiooalism o"er religioo.
The conflict between nationalism and Islam is a recent phenomenon in
Iran. Many saw the full of the Persian empire and the decline of Iranian
culture as a direct result of the Arab invasion. which coincided with the
introductioo of Islam to Iran. Therefore. for many, the ooly way to rcverse
such ills was the implementation ofsecularisation and the resurrection ofpre-
Islamic nationalism. Tension between the clergy and the government have
always existed in Iran since the foundation ofShi'io Islam as the state religion.
Ho......e"er. it was in the last decade of the Pahlavi regime that these tensions
came to breaking point. Khomeini opposed nationalism as a political theory
because it placed emphasis on Iran's pre-Islamic past and thus diluted Iran's
Islamic character.
Nationalism as an ideology has not disappeared from the Iranian psyche.
In reality, both religion and nationalism have continued to interact and have
shaped the identity and character of Iran and influenced its foreign policy and
international behaviour to varying degrees. Whilst looking at religion as an
ideology, we must look specifically at Islam and more specifically in relation
to Iran, at Khomeini's interpretation of Islam as the political ideology of the
regime in the Islamic Republic. Some have argued that the emergence of Islam
as a political ideology in the twentieth century has been an attempt by third
world countries to reverse the passive acceptance of foreign influence. Modern
ideologies have been adapted to suit third world countries: socialism became
Nasserism in Egypt, and Ba'athism in Iraq. China developed its own
interpretation of Marxism~Leninism after the 1949 'People's Revolution'.
However the emergence of the Non·Alignment movement in 1968, of which
Iran was a part, was the third world's response to the two major ideological
camps that dominated world politics since the Second World War.
Nevertheless. whilst the Non.Alignment movement was an attempt to shake
off the imperialist influence of first world countries, most countries in it were
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influenced to some degree by the two dominant ideologies and this affected thc
character and implementation of their foreign policies. Since the revolution in
Iran. the role of Islamic ideology in formulating foreign policy increased
significantly. However. at times. the pursuit of the ideological. as will be
argued. threatened national interests and even at times threatened the survival
of the regime. In response to the irresistible will to survive. it was inevitable
that the regime compromise on ideology.
Iranian foreign policy, being a product of all that has preceeded. can be
divided into three phases. In the immediate aftermath of the revolutioo.
countries were viewed in the context of their past deeds and relationship with
the previous regime. Iranian foreign policy during this time followed an
isolatiooist tendency along the lines of Khomeini's principle of 'neither east
nor west but Islam· ... In this context it was maintained that the countries of
Europe. were likened 10 the US and viewed as colonisers or profiteers. For this
reason Iran's foreign policy followed the principle of 'the enemy of my enemy.
is my friend' and therefore initially tumed to'A'3.rds the Soviet Union and
Japan. However. this relationship ran into problems because it was perceived
that Japan wanted to be an economic superpower and therefore was tending
towards the profiteering end of the relationship scale. For their part. the
western countries. fearing the expansion of the Islamic movemenl into its
allied states on the western Persian Gulf. categorised Iran as a threat and its
relationship therefore can be compared to fear of the Soviet: Union.
The policy of exporting the rcvolution has to be seen in the larger context
of revolutionary theory. Promotion of a regime's ideology and revolutionary
manifestos abroad have been a phenomenon of revolutions throughout history:
the examples of the American. French and Russian revolutions alllx':ar witness
to this. In exporting its revolution. the Islamic Republic of Iran wished to
make the world safe for Islam.' The second phase of the development of
lbreign policy took place during the war with Iraq. Here the foreign policy
relations were based on the stance taken by particular nations towards the
conflict. For example. during this period useful commercial contact existed
between the Islamic Republic and Germany and haly respectively. This is
mainly because their relationship with Iran during this period was not based
on any po~tical agenda and therefO(~ bi·lateral trade relations grew. France
- .
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and Britain, on the other hand, took Iraq's side predominantly during the war
and, therefore, faced a foreign policy backlash for their stance. So the foreign
policy relations for the period up to and shortly after the war were influenced
by those perceived as allies during the conflict. During this period, and in fact
during its first ten years, the Islamic Republic remained committed to the twin
goals of Khomeini's ideology, 'to perpetuate the revolution both at home and
abroad,.6 Iran's constitution expressly proclaimed that the foreign policy of the
Islamic Republic was the unity of the Islamic world and the liberation of all
oppressed throughout the world. This led Khomeini to offer the Iranian
experience as an example to other countries and as a guide to the formation of
a world-wide Muslim community, thus enhancing his agenda for the unity of
all Muslim states in a cultural and political struggle between east and west.
This policy led Iran to support morally, and at times financially, other
'struggles' against perceived colonialist and hegemonic powers. It brought
lran into direct conflict with countries ranging from its Gulf neighbours to
Britain and other western powers, with the accusation being made that Iran
was a sponsor of world-wide terrorism.
The war with Iraq provided the Iranian government at the time with a
cause or rallying point to unify the nation. The low-key democratic opposition
that existed before the outbreak of the war, felt obliged to support the
government of Khomeini in defence of national sovereignty. The war also
acted as a distraction from the serious econom ic and domestic problems that
Iran was experiencing. The end of the war brought an apparent shift in Iranian
politics both internally and externally. Internally, the political atmosphere was
more open as people began to criticise government policies. Newspapers were
more open in their discussion of current affairs. Externally, Iran wished to re-
integrate itself into the world community after a decade of isolation. It was
now less sensitive towards those who had taken Iraq's side during the war. It
was a wiser Iran. that was more aware of the political realities ofintemational
relations. With the end of the war also came the task of reconstruction. Due to
the decline in the price of oil during the 1980s Iran had succeeded in previous
years in becoming almost self-sufficient in food production. In addition, this
period saw a redirection of Iranian foreign policy as a result ofthe break- up of
the Soviet Union. Iran now sought a new international partner. Since
partnership with the United States was not an option, the European Union
(EU) emerged as a potential economic trader. The EU was seen as a counter-
balance to the growing hegemony of America in international affairs.
oConstitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran article 152 to 155.
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The third phase of foreign policy development materialised with the
dection of President Khatimi. The groundwork for this stage was laid in the
previous Rafsanjani presidency and throughout this stage there was a
movement away from the isolationist maxim of 'neither east nor west' and
towards a more engaging foreign policy. Iran tried to down play the previous
attempts to export the revolution and. as a regime dedicated to democracy,
assured its immediate neighbours that it would not interfere in the internal
affairs of other countries. This was encapsulated in President Khatimi's
Dialogue amongst civiJisatiom. which was S/.."Cn as a sign of normalisation of
relations with other countries.
It has just been little over twenty years since the advent of the Iranian
revolution. Few had foreseen it and its outcome is still uncertain. While it
appears certain that thc revolution sprouted from the ideals of freedom, the
right of assembly. the freedom of speech and of the press, it differed rrom
other revolutions but faik'<l to improve the short-term economic situation of
many Iranians. However, the question that may be posed is, whether the
freedom that was sought through the shouting of slogans and the spilling of
blood in 1979. has been achieved? Many would argue that the objectives of the
revolution have not yet been fulfilled, the events which occurred in the
allcrrnath of the revolution. the attack by the Mujahidin-e Khalq and others on
the security of the state and the invasion of Iran by its neighbour Iraq. meant
that to preserve the intcgrity of the state all agents of legitimate democratic
opposition had to desist and support the government of the time, a government
that was controlled by the hard-line elements of the Islamic clergy. The years
which followed allowed this group to institutionalise its power and develop
the means to enforce its ideas. It was only with the end of the war with Iraq
and following a period of reconstruction. that the seeds of the revolutionary
ideals of 1979 began to blossom. Recent disturbances within Iranian
government and society may be the final act in the play that had spanned over
the previous two decades. What is certain is that the Iranian revolution
changed the geo-politicallandscape of the Middle East. led to a resurgence of
Islam as a political ideology, moved into the void left by the fall of the Soviet








This paper will examine the extent to which both Royal Yugoslavia (1918-41)
and Tito's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-90) were hampered by an
unequal socio-economic topography and the preponderance of power by
specific agents. In this regard the paper attempts to show the extent to which
these two realities created the environment upon which ethno-nationalism
could flourish. The exa(,1 nature of the ethno-national character in the Balkans
was vividly displayed both in 1987 when Slobadan Milosevic nullified the
autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina and in 1990 when the Croatian Republic
issued regulations defining its six-hundred thousand Serbs as a 'minority'
rather than as a 'constituent nationality', In 1990, with the collapse of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), the federal republic was thrown
into disarray and turmoil. Political theorists and journalists have forwarded
many relevant reasons for the break-up of Yugoslavia, including the death of
Tito and Mikhail Gorbachev's more co-operative policy towards the west.
However, to ascertain a fuller understanding of the causes of sectarianism and
subsequent disintegration, it is necessary to undertake a broader and more
historical analysis.
Before an analysis of the principal causes which led to the decline of both
the Royal Yugoslavia and the Tito regimes, it is first necessary to acknowledge
the extent to which nationalism had taken root in the Balkans prior to the
advent of Royal Yugoslavia. This development, particularly from the
nineteenth century onwards. resulted in the augmentation of gapping chasms
between the peoples of the Balkans, which were expressed through the actions
and language of nationalism and nationalist parties. Nevertheless there is a
strong likelihood that the economic and cultural heterogeneity between the
peoples of Royal Yugoslavia could have been lessened if the period of
reconstruction (1919-24) had been followed by a period of unintcrrupted
economic growth. Charles Jelavich argues that:
The fall of world farm prkes after 1925. seriously hun the agrarian sector
of the Balkan economy. while the world economic crisis of the thinics not
only provok..:d a crisis in Ilalkan industry but aggravated the crisis in
13alkan agriculture. J
The dire economic situation created the environment in which those opposed
to pan-Slavism could promote their ideas successfully. Nationalist groups.
therefore. succeeded in winning support in the years following the First World
War. Examples of such nationalist parties that emerged included the U.\"lasi
who were fundamentally anti-Serb. anti-communist. and anti-intellectual. The
Radical Party was the continuation of the pre-war ruling party in Serbia, while
the I'easanl Parly under Stjepan Radic. won mass support from the Cromian
peasants and stood strongly for Croatian autonomy.
After the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia discontentment was
initially overcome by two popular revolutionary principles. namely the self-
determination of peoples and worker ownership of the land. ln essence the
implementation of these two principles should have had the affect of quelling
the strong discontent which expressed itself by way of national consciousness
in the pre-war era. However. the implementation of these principles was less
straight forward than envisaged. If indeed these two principk'S had been
successfully implemented they may have rectified the unequal SOl,io-economic
topography and preponderance of power, which had facilitated the
fermentation of ethno-nationalis1l1 in the Balkans. initiated by Ottoman and
Habsburg domination. On the issue of land. not alone was the agricultural
sector going through a period of depression. but the new farm holdings were
too small and unproductive. combined with the fact that the new owners
lacked both capital and experience of modern agricultural techniques. In
addition. many large estates had becn economic units with processing
industries. and their break-up caused a drop in labour demand in the very
areas where labour supply was excessive because there was not enough
expropriated land to go around.1 The reforms liberated and thereby destroyed
all vestiges of political strength of the feudal class. Nationally. the land
reforms were instrumental in fragmenting the stranglehold that large estate
owners had upon political and economic power. Instcad political parties
elected by general and equal franchise would hold power. The post 1918
agrarian reforms mark the final break-up of feudal power and its replacement
by a more ..equitable system. FundanJ.;"tal problems arose however. from the
.. ,
I Charll,.-S and Barhara 1clavich. (eds.). fhe Balkans ;nlrans;/;on (Calilornia. 1963).
p.331.
: Slcnm K. l'a\'lIm itch. }"UKoslavia (I.ondon. 1971). p. 56.
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fact that this new system also failed, and perhaps intensified socio-economic
deprivation and inequality.
The peasantry suffered most from the post First World War economic
depression. There was little they could do about the situation because they
were actually, ifnot fonnally, disenfranchised. The peasants had very little say
in government and any peasant opposition was controlled either by economic
pressure or by the police.3 Nevertheless. the almost destitute plight of the
peasants, politically, socially, culturally and economically, caused them to
become increasingly hostile to the government bureaucracy based in Belgrade,
who in the eyes of the peasants, had replaced the former feudal class as
collectors of taxes.
On the complex issue of self-detennination, both Cnlatia and Serbia had
differing political traditions which effected their attitudes towards the question
of the creation of a new united Yugoslav state. The failure to agree on self-
determination arose specifically from their experiences with imperialism and
is probably best explained by Edward Said, who argued that the problems of
nationalism:
is that the cultural horizons of nationalism lIl'e latally limited by the
common histOf)' ofooloniser and colonised assumed by the nationalist
movement itself. Imperialism after all is a co-operative venture. Both
the master and the slave participate in it. and both grew up in it. albeit
unequally.·
The Serbs through their historic struggle with the Ottoman Empire had come
to see a strong centralised state as natural. At each stage in their struggle with
the Ottomans, more territory with kindred population had been liberated and
integrated into the existing unified and centralised state structures that had
given strength to Serbia. According to this version. the Yugoslav state was just
the final stage in this process.
The Croatians on the other hand had experienced a tradition of dualism
under Habsburg rule and consistently rejected a centralised state. Eventually
however a centralist policy was initiated which greatly strengthened the
influence ofthe Serbs, as the largest bloc. This caused many Croats to become
suspicious of Belgrade's strategic goals. Political parties such as the Peasant
Party were enraged by the idea of being administered by a ruler and a
government in a distant and unknown capital.
J Velimir Bajkic. 'Peasant credit' in Jozo Tomase\ieh (cd.). Pea~anls, po/ili<".l· and
economic change in t"ugoslavia (Stanford.1955). p. 249.
4 Edward Said. ·Nationalism. colonialism and litl;;rature; Veuts and dccolonisation' in
A Field Day Pamphlet. (15) 1988.
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Vic\\cd in retrospect. the constitution of 1921 symbolised thc triumph
of the unitary. centralist. Serbian tradition over the Austro-lIungarian
tradition ofethnic and constitutional complexity. ~
Increasingly from this point forward the political parties represented sectional
interests. In March 1923. a general election was held on the issue of the
constitution. Broadly speaking the Serbs voted to k<,'ep it centralist. while the
Croats voted for change. With the growing increase of sectarianism and
chauvinistic politics, King Alexander initiated a policy of direct personal rule
from 1929 onwards. Henceforth. parties based on regional. ethnic or religious
sectionalism were forbidden. Nevertheless sectarian politics had taken root.
culminating in the assassination of Alexander by the Ustasha in 1934.
Sectarianism prevailed in a region where the west had collided with the
east for centuries in terms of religious. cultural and social practices. as well as
militarily. The Sl.'Ctarianism increased after the establishment of Alexander's
dictatorship. because he not only further centralised the Slate, but also limited
the principle of self-determination with the establishment of nine banovine or
regions. These regions consciously disregarded historical provinces and
instead utiliSt..>d gerrymandering to contrive a Serb majority in six of the nine
banOl'ina.b The monarchist period. or the 'first' Yugoslavia. was finally
brought to an end in April 1941 by the occupation of most of the country by
German forces and the establishment of the Ustasa regime as a German
puppet state.
The conflict between Serb and Croat was to a large extent created by their
union under the jurisdiction of the kingdom of the Serbs. Croats and Slovenes.
and later under Royal Yugoslavia.7 A process of political genealogy, however.
can by utilised to question whether mantra or repetition of one historical fact
can explain history. Instead. it can be argued that the contlicts and animosities
experienced on this occasion between Serb and Croat are in fact neither unique
nor specific to the 'first' Yugoslavia. but were present in the Balkans from a
much earlier period. The government in Belgrade simply took the place of the
feudal lord as the collector of taxes and Belgrade took the place of Vienna and
Istanbul respectively, as the preponderant capital.
A study Tito's regime reveals a new situation with a new set of
institutjpns. ideologies and principte~. Nevertheless, unequal socio-economic
topography and a preponderance of ~ower are also among the root causes of
< Pavlo\\iteh. }"ugoslavia. p. 64.
b Tomasevich. Peasants. politics. and economic change. p. 238.
7 lraj IJashi. 'The disintegration ofYugoslaviu; regional disparit;es and the
national ities qUl;;stion' in Capilal and Class. (48) 1992. p. 44.
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the conflict. Reaction to these factors again manifested itself, resulting in the
renaissance of ethno-nationalism, a widening of the dichotomy between 'us'
and 'them' and finally, the yearning for separate nation states.
Socialist Yugoslavia experienced affinnative reaction to ethno-
nationalism. In the aftennath of the Second World War socialist Yugoslavia
under Tito faced the uphill struggle of re-building a war-tom economy
combined with the much heavier task of national reconciliation. As attempted
in Royal Yugoslavia, Tito had 10 tackle socio-economi~ in~ualit~es and the
concentration of power. Of course these two tasks were mvanably mterrelated
and perhaps if Royal Yugoslavia had paid more attention to regional
disparities, the degree to which the grotesque nature of the Second World War
polarised the peoples of Yugoslavia c?~ld have been, ~t.the very le~t, r~uced.
It is thought that, of the 1.7 ml1hon dead. I million were kLlled In
fratricidal struggle between the various groups of Yugoslavs rather than by
the foreign enemies.s .
Certainly one of the most grotesque examples of such fratricidal aggresston
was executed in the Krajina in the summer of 1941. In April of that year, the
Axis Powers had invaded and partitioned Yugoslavia. In Croatia and Bosnia,
the Croatian fascists, led by Ante Pavelic, declared the Independent State of
Croatia (NDH). Serbs in earlier times, had settled on the Vojna Krajina -
literally meaning 'military front' - between the Habsburg and Ottoman
empires. The Austrians recruited Orthodox Christians who had fled from
Ottoman controlled Serbia, and settled them on the land and then employed
them as a pennanent defensive barrier against Ottoman expansion. The Ustase
led by Pavelic set about ethnically purifying Croatian territory, which res~lted
in the massacre of Krijana Serbs. In the desire to impose natIOnal
reconciliation in the post war environment, the government discouraged signs
of ethnocentric nationalism, to prevent ethnic violence.9 This aspiration was
codified in the constitution of 1946, as Tito attempted to implement, what
post-nationalist theorists refer to as civic nationalism. Th~s envisaged the
nation state as comprising of all its citiz.ens, regardless ofthetr blood, creed or
colour.
From the start. the equality of all nationalities and their right to use their
own language. and develop their cultural heritage and identity on the basis
of their own conditions. were guaf<dfIteed under Article 13 of the
constitution. The six constituent republics were given an equal position in
S Frcd Singlcton. A short history ofthe Yugoslav peoples (Cambridgc. 1985). p. 206.
9 Sec Laura Silber and Allan Little. The death of >'ugoslavia (I.ondon. 1995). chapter
7.
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the h."deration irrespective of their size. population. wealth or lcvel of
devclopmcnt. 1o
Regional development needed to be tackled in a fundamental manner if
the new regime was to be a success. An examination of national income per
capita from the years 1947 and 1948 reveals that Croatia's national income
was seven percent above average. whilst Kosovo had an income of forty-eight
percenl below average. 11 To achieve an equality of nationalities it would be
necessary that the richer regions support the poorer regions, or that the
relationship between state and citizen be based upon a positive symbiosis.
However, the principal of equality would require both a sense of solidarity and
altruism on behalf of Yugoslav citizens. The ambitious project to create a
nation of nations based upon equality and fraternity would require that all
Yugoslav citizens manifest a sense of brotherhood and unity. However
individual citizens tended 10 be more concerned with their 0"'" immediate
difficulties, rather than with the concerns of the whole of Yugoslavia. Regional
animosities and fervent ethno-nationalism was, by the end of the Second
World War. an overriding problem in the Balkans. One of the weaknesses of
Yugoslavia's first constitution was that it concentrated power at the centre.
thus perpetuating the preponderance of power. Although it had a federal
character according to the formal constitution, the real power was
concentrated in the centre and executed through a bureaucracy based on the
Russian system of public administration. 'Vertical lines of command had
priority over horizontal co-ordination and integration.,'2 Such a system was
bound to create suspicion and paranoia. especially among the less developed
regions, leading to growing feelings ofalienation and under-representation.
Between the years 1947 and 1952. Tilo organised and administered the
economy based upon the Soviet model of central planning. Investment and
resource transfer was to occur from morc developed regions (MDRs) 10 less
developed regions (LDRs). However, competition between different regions for
resources. backed by political pressure. resulted in a final distribution which
was neither satisfactory 10 any of the LDRs. nor willingly accepted by the
MDRs. 1J
~ ~~
10 I-Iashi. Disintegration of >'1I1{oslavia. p. 5'0.
11 Ibid.. p. 52.
12 Vuekovie. Gojko.. Failure of socialisl self-management to create a viable nation-state
and disintegration of the Yugoslav administmtive state and state institutions' in East
European Quarterly. (32) 3. 1998. p. 358.
IJ lbid.. p. 354.
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The failure of this policy was further compounded by Yugoslavia's expulsion
from the Cominforrn in 1948. This inevitably caused a reduction in transfers
from the Soviet Union, resulting in scarce investment funds being allocated to
the more developed regions and to projects with a higher productivity of
investment
Following the failure of this system, Tilo introduced market-based worker
self-management programmes from 1952 until 1974. Through this policy lhe
federal government's ability to direct resources for regional development
purposes was further weakened. The ability (0 give loans to LDRs passed from
the federal government to a newly established General Investment Fund.
Following the subsequent abolition of this body, the banks took on the role of
loan-maker. It can strongly be argued 'that the socialist self-management
system ... introduced into the Yugoslav political system in 1950, made a
significant and largely unrecognised oontribution to the ethnic violence and
disintegration of Yugoslavia,.14 Rather than anempting to erect links and
connections between the republics, the process transformed Yugoslavia from a
community of nations to a community of nation-states through constitutional
changes and decentralisation. These changes served to widen the economic
cleft between the republics, which in time manifested itself through cultural
mechanisms. What was actually required at the time were policies promoting a
society based upon economic equality. Economic equality however, was not
achieved and the 1960s witnessed a resurgence of Croatian, Bosnian and
Slovenian nationalism. because they found themselves receiving fewer foreign
currency reserves than they generated. Such discrimination. which was
arguably necessary to revamp the poorer regions, led to widespread complaints
of unfair treatment. The foundation was now cultivated for the articulation of a
growing list of grievances concerning the republics' position in the Yugoslav
federal stale. The delegates from Bosnia-Hercegovina called an unprecedented
meeting of the Chamber of Nationalities in 1961 to air their grievances.
Croats complained of being treated as linguistically second-class in the
preparatioo of a Scrbo-Croalian dictionary, of de:mogrnphie plots by Serbs
to encourage Croats to work abroad; and of Serbian plans to encourage: a
. . h f~I·"separate autonomous status for the tourist-ne area 0 lJd malla.
Socio-economic dissatisfaction allowed for, or perhaps created the
environment on which cultural disquiet excelled. During this period Tito's
warnings about the dangers of nalional exclusiveness became the constant
14 Ibid.
U J. Robcrt Donia. and V.A. Fine. J.R. John. Bosnia and Her:egovina: a tradition
betrayed(Loodon. 1994). p. 182.
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theme of his speeches. However his insistence on the need for 'brotherhood
and unity was enthusiastically applauded. but was largely ignored in practice.
Eventually the federal government was forced 10 act so as to halt the explosive
rumblings of revolt. The Chamber of Nationalities was given a greater status
and the republics attained greater powers. 16
In 1914 the federal government saw the failure of their earlier policies and
began to restore the authority and guiding role of the party. The League of
Communists of Yugoslavia again asserted the primacy of collective interests
over those of individual economic units. This post 1914 self-management
policy gave republics and provinces the greatest degree of independence in
Yugoslavia's short history.
The Constitution of 1974 in~'ested each Yugoslav republic and province
.....ith theoretical ·statehood·. and it clTecti\elY created a scmi-wnfcderati\'c
political struclurc in \\ hidl PQ\\erful sectional leoo..:r.;hip emerged. 11
Such a process only served to codify the sectional interest and growing
centrifugal character of Yugoslavia. It is true that national relations did
improve under Tito's Yugoslavia, which was principally caused by rising
economic prosperity and the prestige enjoyed by Yugoslavia in the
international community. These achievements were however overshadowed
and eventually overturned in the 1980s by the slow pace of change in the
LDRs in comparison with the rest of the country. On another level the gap
between MDRs and LDRs had also increased in the same period. Such
regiooal disparity was bound to accentuate animosities between the peoples of
the various regions, as many Croats. for example. would not willingly part
with their capital, ""hilst Kosovars felt that Belgrade did liule to comfort their
economic distress.
Economic crisis certainly provided a breeding ground for spiralling
nalionalism.
Aller 1%5. high bels of cmigratioo to onSet transitory unemployment
and bring hard currt:ncy remittances had sc\erc domestic effects. Petro-
dollars borro.... cd in 1975-81 were squandered on consumptioo rather than
producth·c in\cstmcnt. catching Yugoslavia in 1I debt trap as the dollar and
real interest rales soared. IS
The drastic economic decline su~ucntlyaffected the proper redistribution of
income"1o less developed regions.""~e decline in the economy also resulted in
11> Singleton. ruga/slav peoples. p. 247.
11 vuckovic. 'Failure of socialist sclf-mllllagcmcnC. p. 364.
11 Ole Waner. lJarry Buzan. Mortcn Kelstrup. and Pierre Lernaitrc. (cds.) ldenlily.
migration and the new security agenda in Europe (London. 1993). p. 95.
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economic disintegration between the republics. With levels of trade and
pnxluctivity fulling, the republics became more autarchic. Finally in 1990, the
Communist Party disintegrated due to political crisis and the full of
communism elsewhere in eastern Europe. The disintegration of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia was followed by the emergence of new political
parties that captured the support of ethno-nationalists. Following the
multiparty elections of 1990 Ante Markovic came to power and attempted to .
implement economic refonns in line with democratisation and free trade.
However such moves to develop the Yugoslav economy were much too late, as
the process of transition towards a multiparty democracy left Yugoslavia in a
weak position. The inherited Yugoslav political institutions and administrative
state appeared incapable of maintaining stability in the absence of a strong
central authority. With the economy in dire turmoil, ethnic animosity
developed quickly and manifested itself in the form of ethno-national political
parties.
Generally speaking socialist Yugoslavia tailed to nullify the regional
economic inequalities or to successfully disperse the concentration of power.
The economic problems of Yugoslavia could not be solved by way of capital
transfers, as the less developed regions of the country were neither cost
effective nor productive. The situation would be serious enough in a country
with a culturally homogeneous population, but it became explosive in a
multiethnic society like Yugoslavia. It is little wonder therefore that the
dividing line between rich and poor fuelled the fires of nationalism.
In conclusion, the earlier infiltration by the great imperial powers into the
local Balkan communities, in attempting to gather taxes and rationalise their
regimes, caused discontent, resulting in opposition which synthesised into
nationalism. By the end of the nineteenth century Balkan nationalism had
matured. While initially unrest was based upon material problems, the struggle
of uprising and revolution caused the original goals to mutate. In their
attempts to suppress ethno-nationalism, both Royal Yugoslavia and socialist
Yugoslavia considered it necessary to create a sense of solidarity between
peoples - Slav brotherhood. The feasibility of this task was considerably
jeopardised however by material deprivation and political alienation.
Deprivation and alienation cultivated the environment on which the dogma of
ethno-nationalism could and indeed did flourish.
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